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A precondition as well as a consequence of the increase in global business 
is the accomplishment of access deregulation. The latter should coexist with the 
complementary process of prudential re-regulation, in spite of the fear of regulatory 
arbitrage. Harmonising the different regulatory systems is essential in reducing 
inconsistencies among national regulations and in achieving unification of the European 
Internal Market. Reciprocity or Mutual Recognition of standards is also a basic criterion 
of the Community policy towards the liberalisation of the EU financial markets and the 
abolition of internal barriers. The main objective of the EU policy regarding securities Z' V 
reculation and, in particular, insider dealing is to establish a basic framework for the 0 tý - protection of investors and, thus, encourage oreater confidence in the financial sector. 0 C, 
The raison d'itre of the insider dealing reaulation is based on the Z' Z' concepts of market integrity, morality and fairness. Economic arguments still support the 
view that insider dealing is not so obviously detrimental that it needs to be prohibited. 
Economists have even argued that insider dealing can make stock markets work more Cý In efficiently. The US experience suggests that the broad scope and flexibility of insider Cýc dealing rules have been proved to be their weakness and make them susceptible to judicial 
abuse. In European countries, legal theory followed three successive objectives: the 4n 
protection of the Company (or fiduciary theory), the protection of the market and, 
finally, the protection of information. 
The EC Directive on Insider Dealing takes a positive step towards 
harmonising the insider dealing laws of EU States. The efficiency of the Directive 
depends greatly on the severity of sanctions that will be enacted in the Member States. 
The Directive, being a compromise text, has not always adopted the desirable solutions. 
The UK Criminal Justice Act 1993 reflects the Directive well but fails to alter any of the 
sanctions or enforcement procedures that were the main shortcoming of the previous 
British legislation. The implementation of the Directive by the Greek legislator in Art. 30 
of Law 1806/1988 and PD 53/1992 is in conformity with the EC policy. The Greek 
legislation constitutes an important effort to protect a still unsophisticated market from an 
anti-economical practice and to make all persons involved in stock market transactions 
more sensitive about the offence. 
Insider dealing is often a multi-jurisdictional offence and its prosecution 
is largely dependent on international conventions both at an EU and an International 
level. Finally, the task of regulating insider dealing is characterised as the "art 6f the 7 Cý possible" given that the most sophisticated rules cannot create an oasis of informational 
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A. Introduction 
Deregulation and Reregulation: Two tendencies 
1. Conceptual Framework' 
a. Access Deregulation. 
Since the beginning of 1993 the European Community has become a 
single integrated rnýrket without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital is ensured. 2 To this 
effect a legislative programme has been adopted by the Community with 
the aim of removing the remaining barriers to free movement. 
The freedom to provide financial ser-vices is an indispensable facet of 
the achievement 9f the-single market. 3 In the securities sector the ultimate 
aim is to promote a Community-wide trading system for securities, 
resulting in the creation of a European securities market. 
A precondition as well as a consequence of the increase in global 
business is the accomplishment of deregulation. 4 George Stigler provides a 
useful definition for regulation: it is "any policy which alters market 
outcomes by the exercise of some coercive government power"; 5 whereas 
deregulation can be loosely defined as the removal of competitive barriers 
and is undeniably a driving force for European Financial Integration. 6 
The starting-point of the movement towards deregulation can be 
traced in the early seventies in the US. It was the stock exchange of New 
York that saw the first "Big Bang" in 1975-76 with a deregulation of 
broking practices which led to a deep transformation of the conditions of 
competition. 7 It was only 10 years later that the first great reform of the 
same type took place in Europe, this time in the City of London. 
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An important distinction between the identifiable types of 
deregulation must be made from the outset: First, by "Access 
de reg it la tio n" is meant the reduction or elimination of regulatory barriers, 
(such as exchange and capital market controls) in such a way that 
regulatory structures are modified to facilitate foreign participation in 
domestic markets. 8 
"Access deregidation" must be distinguished from "prtidential 
deregulatioii" which relates to the removal of rules primarily designed to 
protect markets from abuse, illiquidity and uncertainty. The latter is often 
justified on the basis of laissez faire political policies and free market 
efficiency theories. As one writer points out, Europe's (access) deregulatory 
wave has been accompanied by virtually no prudential deregulation. 9 it is 
remarkable that, if anything, the tendency has been towards an increase in 
regulation, as the efforts for re-regulation indicate. 
In the Continental type of access deregulation there is an additional 
ingredient leading in most cases to a different, probably more complete, 
form of deregulation, than the US or UK deregulation reforms usually 
achieve. Whereas the deregulation of commissions (1a diregielation des 
cottitnissions) has been the principal characteristic of the American reform 
(which does not in itself constitute access deregulation while the latter is 
promoted only through secondary measures, aiming at the opening up of 
the market e. g. on "offshore" offers), the despecialisation of intermediaries 
(1a dispicialisation des interinediaires ), that is, the end of a monopoly or 
quasi-monopoly of a certain category of intermediaries, has played in a 
number of European countries a role at least equally important in the 
transformation of competitive conditions. Several markets have 
combined to various degrees the two aspects: deregulation of broking 
practices and despecialisation of intermediaries. -' 
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In an attempt to examine the reasons for this differentiation, it must 
be realised that access to European Stock Markets has been mainly 
influenced by two different traditions. A number of the "germanic" 
countries - Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg - have operated 
under the regime of the "itniversal bank", the bank that engages in all 
forms of banking activity, including investment banking or the holding of 
shares in public companies. In these countries the credit establishments 
have the right to operate directly in the Stock Market. The Dutch model is 
also close to that system. 
In the Member States with a Napoleonic tradition, such as France, 
Italy, Spain, Belgium, access to the market is reserved to specialised 
Intermediaries, the stock brokers or "agents de change", who benefit from 
the monopoly of the execution of orders. " 
The UK, post-Big Bang, is-moving towards a universal bank system 
with many of the large broking houses now subsidiaries of banks. The 
same trend is being followed by the French, Italian and Spanish securities 
markets. This trend towards a universal bank system is evolving due to 
increased internationalisation of securities trading and its prohibitive cost, 
the technological expertise required to trade long-distance and increasing 
diversification of products. 12 
In conclusion, different reforms are required in different markets but 
the end is everywhere the same: not only to increase the efficiency of 
national markets, in the interest of investors on the one hand and of that 
of issuers on the other, but equally - and more importantly - to enhance 
the attractiveness and competitiveness of the financial market 
concerned. 13 The latter aspect has become, in the recent past, the main 
concern of the member state regulators. As the deadline for the Global 
Integration of the EC is well behind, it is with a view to fostering the 
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European Market of Financial Services that the Community legislators 
have to adjust and update the rules of the game. 
b. Prudential Reregulation 
The overdue process of financial deregulation has been set in motion 
by the legislative instruments of the Community. The movement, 
however, towards deregulation must not be guided by the oversimplistic 
concept that a market can be un-regulated. 14 
Economic analysis suggests that regulation is necessary and desirable 
when market mechanisms reveal shortcomings. Design and control of the 
financial industry and markets can be both explained and justified along 
these lines. 15 
Even in the most liberalised financial centres, all the major types of 
16 financial institutions are regulated. Firstly, because the stability of the 
financial market is generally perceived as a "priblic good" and its 
maintenance can not be guaranteed by market forces. Secondly, in order to 
protect all kinds of investors against the risk of fraud, to which financial 
markets have always been exposed. 17 
The very functioning of financial markets requires therefore 
regulation, which should, however, be designed in the light of market 
deficiencies in general, with a view to preventing them, or, at least, to 
warding off their negative effects insofar as possible. 18 
The regulatory policy adopted by the commission has the twin 
objectives of ensuring that the Community financial market is opened, up 
and that so doing does not place in jeopardy either the stability of the 
banking system or the protection of consumers. The differences between 
the regulatory systems frequently increase obstacles to cross frontier 
competition. As the Director-General for Financial Services of the 
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Commission remarks with felicity: One man's prudential regulation is 
another man's trade barrier. 19 
In the aftermath of deregulation it soon became clear that it had to be 
accompanied by RE-regulation. The very nature of the financial system 
calls for a complex process of deregulation and reregulation. The latter 
term signifies the various kinds of legislative activity "undertaken to 
address the perceived shortcomings of regulatory systems", becoming 
apparent by reason of deregulation. 20 
As with the term deregulation, the necessary distinctions between 
access reregulation and prudential reregulation must be made: Whereas 
access reregulation resurrects old barriers to globalisation, prudential 0 
reregulation establishes "a regulatory scheme more appropriate for newly 
accessible markets". 21 . 
Access deregulation and prudential reregulation should coexist in. the 
face of financial innovation. A combination of those mutually 
complementary processes can improve a market's efficacy and at the same 
time strengthen the confidence of investors. This approach implies a 
thorough re-examination of the relevant regulatory and supervisory 
arrangements. Fundamental changes and adjustments will be 
indispensable if today's national systems based on differing principles, are 
to coexist in a stable integrated environment. 22 
Prudential reregulation aims at encouraging and promoting 
incremental investments in securities markets under expansion by 
providing a favourable (regulatory) enviroranent for their development. 
Markets that have become "more liquid, flexible, innovative and volatile" 
23 as a result of access deregulation, may also need the complementary 
control of prudential reregulation. 
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An important example of such a process can be drawn from the UK 
experience and, in particular, the enactment of Financial Services Act 1986, 
the aim of which was to provide the legal framework for all types of 
financial business. The Act introduced a new concept: Voluntary self- 
regulation within a statutory framework and by this system replaced the 
"uninhibited" form of self-regulation which had been traditional in the 
City of London. 24 In addition, the Act tried to strike a fair balance between 
the interest of investors, private and institutional, professional financial 
operators and the public. 
Every Member State of the Community has taken legislative steps to 
reform. Although different in shape, those reforms are invariably dictated 
by the necessity of prudential reregulation. 
c. The bogy of Regulatory Arbitrage 
Two contradictory theories regarding the motives that dictate the 
choice of regulatory environment can be identified: 
The historical precedent of New York and London markets that have 
emerged as the leading international money markets despite having the 
two most comprehensive securities regulatory systems in the world 2 -5 
supports the inference that the most severe regulatory environment 
(probably offering prestige) does not necessarily act as disincentive to 
financial institutions or investors. 
On the other hand there is the concept that financial institutions will 
aim to locate themselves in the least stringent regulatory forum. The 
lowering of regulatory barriers by national authorities, as a result of Access 
Deregulation, combined with the emergence of the home country 
principle, has paved the way to Regrilatory Arbitrage which is closely 
related to competitive deregulation. 
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The term RegWatory Arbitrage signifies that financial institutions 
will be attracted by a jurisdiction where they could operate in a market 
which is not subject to relatively more stringent rules governing 
disclosure, manipulative conduct, and other regulations protective of 
investors. 26 While the choice of a more liberal regime exists, no 
investment firm wants to end up "in some oasis of splendid regulatory 
purity". 
27 
It is the fear of regulatory arbitrage that can impose a severe restraint 
on the complementary process of prudential reregulation and can 
obviously lead to competitive deregulation. 28 
After the abolition of currency exchange and capital market controls 
the fear of the regulators focused on the possibility of economically 
damaging capital flight. 29 An official of the UK Securities Association 
(TSA) has stated that, "if the level of regulation is too high the major 
players move out of the EC to Zurich. The market is like a piece of soap . If 
you squeeze it too hard it squirts out elsewhere". 30 
In spite of this menace, no inference can be readily drawn that 
competitive deregulation is an answer to the perplexing problems posed 
by the "Europeanization" of financial services. 
The resolution of this dilemma should not be left to competition 
between regulatory systems, but lies in the achievement of a regulatory 
equilibrium within the EC, combining a dosage of minimal 
harmonisation. and mutual recognition which is likely to lead via the 
second of these principles, to competition between supervisory 
frameworks with a gradual convergence on the arrangements that best 
meet the needs of the market. 31 
Each national regulatory system has to be amended so as to compete 
on equal terms Nvith the others in view of the harmonisation process 
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carried out pursuant to Community provisions and, hence, in accordance 
with a supranational prudential framework. 
The objective of the preliminary formulation of a homogeneous core 
of supervisory rules is, thus, to prevent excessive deregulation and limit 
the risk of distorted competition. 
Despite the efforts made, after the integration deadline, the fear of 
regulatory arbitrage still looms large, influencing the decisions of both 
regulators and regulated. 
d. Harmonisation and alternatives 
The greatest obstacle to the unification of the European Internal 
Market is the variation in legal systems and regulations among Member 
States. Harmonising the different regulatory systems is an essential 
precondition for removing that obstacle. 
The concept of regulatory harmonisation is closely interrelated with 
those of deregulation and reregulation. Whereas access deregulation 
facilitates access to markets and prudential reregulation provides 
protection to the newly accessible and de-regulated marketSý2 the objective 
of harmonisation is to reduce the inconsistencies among national 
regulations and, thus, ward off the danger of arbitrage generating 
simultaneously higher levels of protection. 
The term harmonisation as used in European parlance, signifies the 
achievement of common regulatory requirements that envisage the 
development of substantially equivalent or uniform rules, governing all 
major issues, such as disclosure, insider trading, market manipulation, 
conflicts of interest and fraud. 
Professor Warren calls this achievement of common standards 
"coin inonality ", because he gives harmonisation a wider meaning, as 
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being the international accommodation of diverse regulatory regimes. The 
latter notion embraces both "commonality" (harmonisation) and mutual 
recognition (or reciprocity). 33 In this text the term will be used in the 
narrower sense to refer to the achievement of substantially equivalent 
regimes. 
Harmonisation can yield enormous benefits related to the promotion 
of universal investor confidence, whether it is effected through the 
independent enactment by national governments or in consequence of 
community legislation. 
Taking the example of disclosure, common standards would produce 
uniform and, hence, comparable information for making investment 
decisions that could involve a number of states. The acceptance and 
trading of securities according to co . mmon standar4s would increase 
opportunities for issuers and investors. In the long run, the 
accomplishment of an International Data Base could provide invaluable 
assistance to securities analysts. 34 
The harmonisation approach though, has been proved unrealistic in 
practice in view of the difficulties in agreeing on uniform rules and 
convergent standards. Harmonisation would clearly be favoured by the 
states with more exacting requirements in an effort to reduce any 
competitive disadvantage, if those standards were to be adopted, whereas 
this possibility would meet a negative reaction by the Member States that 
vvould prefer the adoption of a "lowest common denominator' approach 
for the fear of capital flight. 
The EC measures on company and securities law illustrate a 
"pragmatic shift" from harmonisation to reciprocity. A significant 
departure from previous Commission attempts to progress towards a 
Single European Market, which has relied on harmonisation of national 
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laws and regulations at every level (article 100 of the Treaty of Rome), has 
been marked by the 1985 White Paper. 
The innovative element of the White Paper was contained in the 
form of the dual strategy of minimum harmonisation (which is not 
necessarily the same as the lowest common denominator approach ) and 
mutual recognition. The intention of the Commission is to decrease the 
role of harmonisation, as it believes that the new approaches lead to 
quicker and less problematic progress. -15 
e. Concept of Mutual Recognition 
A key political issue in any discussion on European integration is 
Reciprocity, often used synonymously with the term Mutual Recognition 
or even called the single licence (licence ttniqiie). 
It was the more recently adopted approach towards the European 
Integration. This is not simply a financial services issue but rather cuts 
across the whole spectrum of economic activity in Europe. 36 
Reciprocity or Mutual Recognition can be achieved through the 
conclusion of a reciprocal agreement in which each state agrees to 
recognise and accept for its own regulatory purpose the regulatory 
requirements applied by the other. It is based on substantially equivalent 
minimum standards. 
Because of its relative ease of implementation, it can achieve 
integration more easily than harmonisation, and may prove a necessary 
first stage in the harmonisation process. 
It is important to understand that the terms are not mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, harmonisation in the form of common general 
principles or detailed rules may create the indispensable infrastructure for 
reciprocity. On the other hand, mutual recognition should aim at 
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encouraging, the development of substantially equivalent regimes xvorld- 
xvide as other states attempt to secure greater access for their financial 
institutions to more highly-developed markets. Professor Warren 
concludes that: "reciprocity based on substantial equivalence may serve as 
,, 37 foundation upon which to build a global securities code. 
The Commission while it is still envisaging harmonisation for the 
standardisation of basic rules, supports nevertheless the supplementary 
concept that technical standards which differ between Member States 
should be mutually recognised in order to allow goods and services 
originating from an other Member State, free access into a National 
Market. 38 
By extending the idea of mutual recognition to the provision of 
services, the Commission envisaged that Member States would adopt a 
procedure of home country control. This would involve the supervision 
of European-wide activities being the responsibility of an appointed 
authority in the Member State, in which a company has its head office. In 
moving towards the principle of mutual recognition, the White Paper 
proposed to speed up the decision making process and reduce the 
regulatory burden of companies wishing to operate on a Community-wide 
basis. 39 
Regulators however in the EC should beware of the danger that 
governments with more stringent regulation like the UK will give a more 
liberal interpretation to "substantial equivalence" in order to attract 
foreign investment, a policy which is bound to provoke the reaction of 
domestic firms demanding regulatory parity in order to compete on equal 
terms with their foreign counterparts. Those sharply contrasting interests 
could lead in a reduction to the least common denominator, instead of 
making an effort to gradually level up global regulatory standards. 40 
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It can not be overemphasised that the objective of the reciprocity 
provisions is not to close the internal market to third countries, but on the 
contrary to encourage a parallel opening up of the markets and to enable 
the Community to ensure that its financial institutions enjoy fair access to 
third countries' markets. 41 
The completion of the internal market and abolition of internal 
barriers makes it necessary to foresee from a Community standpoint the 
regulation of the access to the EC market by third countries' financial 
institutions. The criterion of reciprocity still remains the cornerstone of 
the Community policy in moving towards liberalisation and the 
establishment of the -, Norld's only multinational financial services market. 
f. Now superseded by a more complex approach? 
As has become clear, the very detailed comprehensive harmonisation 
approach (which enjoyed popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s) has 
gradually given place to the mutual recognition approach. 
Building on the principles of the treaty and legislation already 
adopted by the Community, the White Paper has proposed a three stage 
general method which supersedes earlier approaches: 
Firstly, the harmonisation of essential standards for prudential 
supervision of financial institutions and for the protection of investors, 
depositors and consumers. 
Secondly, mutual recognition by the supervisory authorities of 
financial institutions in each member state of the way in which they apply 
those standards. 
Thirdly, based on the first two elements, "home country control and 
supervision" (i. e. control and supervision by the Member State in which 
the financial institution is based) of financial institutions which wish to 
-12- 
operate in other Member States either by establishment or by offering their 
services directly across frontiers. 42 
11. Securities integration in the EU 
a. National objectives to date 
The expansion of retail securities markets is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in Europe. Even in the UK, the Member State with the most 
developed securities market, as late as 1980, less than three per cent of the 
population owned company shares. 43 
Despite the diversity within the financial services sector, the cultural 
differences between- national financial services markets and the 
considerable differences in financial regulation at the national level, some 
explanations of general application can be found in the political and 
economic history, the customs and the tradition of European nations: The 
tNvo -world Nvars have resulted in major economic dislocations across the 
EC. 44 European governments intervened by imposing exchange and 
capital market controls and by dictating the commercial policies that 
should be followed by financial institutions. 45 Differing prudential 
regulations and controls as well as dissimilar legal and administrative 
systems were obstacles (particularly in the investment from other 
countries) that also had to be overcome by external investors. 46 A few 
countries imposed restrictions on foreign investment and screened 
projects to determine whether they were in the national interest. The 
boundary between such protection of national interest and discrimination 
against foreign investors was often tenuous. In the field of corporate 
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finance there was an indisputable predominance of bank lendings over 
securities offerings. 47 
Only a relatively small number of companies, in Continental Europe 
were listed, until recently, and each Nvith a minority of shares available in 
the open market. 48 
The high transaction costs were an indication of an environment of 
insufficient or non-existent transparency and liquidity in European 
Securities markets. At the same time the absence of regulation affording 
investor protection resulted in popular aversion to the risk of securities 
investment. Lack of understanding and, moreover, lack of public 
confidence in the securities markets has influenced largely the operation 
of European Stock Markets. 
The privatisation of many state-owned enterprises, as Prof. Warren 
points out, has undeniably enhanced wider individual participation in 
securities markets turning the latter into a high priority objective of 
national policy in a number of EC states. The privatisation of state-oivned 
enterprises generally has required the development of supportive 
regulatory-based infrastructures. 49 Strategic considerations rendered 
mandatory at least the semblance of an investor protection scheme in 
order to maintain public confidence in an expanded retail securities 
market. 
The 1992 programme of the European Commission to create a single 
market in Europe has had a major impact on the EC's financial services in 
general and on the EC securities industry in particular. Until the 
promulgation of the 1992 initiatives, progress toward market integration 
in the financial services sector was slow. 
The programme to harmonise the securities industry involves the 
essence of community principles, namely mutual recognition, 
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harmonisation of minimum standards and co-ordination of regulation 
among national authorities. 50 Nevertheless, the codes are evolving 
without the benefit of strong historical antecedents in national 
regulation. 51 
Professor Gower has described securities regulation as "virtually non- 
existent" outside the UK. Despite the development of Company Law in 
various jurisdictions, stock-exchanges have been self-regulating without 
direct oversight by national governments. 
Full disclosure systems for the distribution and trading of securities 
were not made mandatory by most European states. Manipulative 
practices and, above all, insider dealin& generally proscribed by US 
securities laws were not, until recently, prohibited in many Member 
States. 
Insider trading in Europe has been described as "rampant -52 and one 
writer recently commented that France and (West) Germany "assumed 
that insider trading was what financial life was all about". 
53 
The overriding purposes of the EC programme are first, to establish a 
basic framework for the protection of investors, so as to improve the 
security of the Community's financial businesses and to encourage greater 
confidence in the financial sector, and, second, to remove barriers which 
currently exist among the various markets, thus allowing easier access to 
Community capital markets. This programme may be followed by further 
proposals leading to closer monetary co-operation and common exchange 
rate policies among Member States and, ultimately, the adoption of a 
common EC currency. 54 
The EC's Company and Securities Law directives generally have 
required each Member State to designate a competent authority to 
administer the resulting national legislation. 55 in view of the lack of 
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governmental "competent authorities" or regulatory bodies to administer 
those regulations or to supervise self-regulatory organisations in the 
securities industry. 
The Community's efforts to establish a Single European Market by 
1992 have contributed greatly to the change of the regulatory tradition in 
the securities field. 
Ultimately, the objective is to develop a European Securities Code 
flexible enough to adapt the regulatory framework to account for the new 
market realities and to maintain some regulation to protect consumer 
interests and guarantee the stability of the financial system. 
b. Progressive disappearance of National Monopolies - Development 
of the Single Market by 1992. 
A European financial common market without restrictions requires a 
single securities market where investors can issue and trade securities 
across national borders freely and without hindrance. The removal of all 
the numerous national restrictions still existing has become all the more 
urgent with the rapid internationalisation of securities markets and the 
need for the Community to achieve a dimension in tl-ds area equal to that 
of other major financial markets, such as those of the United States or 
Japan. 56 
In 1957 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic 
Community for the express purpose of creating a common market 
without obstacles to freedom of movement for goods, persons, services 
57 
and capital. The Treaty provides for the progressive abolishment of 
restrictions "on freedom to provide services within the Community" 
(art. 59) and of "all restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to 
persons resident in Member States and any discrimination based on 
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nationality or on the place of residence of the parties or on the place where 
such capital is invested" (art. 67). It also states that "the liberalisation of 
banking and insurance services connected with movements of capital 
shall be effected in step with the progressive liberalisation of movement of 
capital" (art. 61 ). 58 
The substitution of uniform standards for the widely disparate 
regulatory regimes of twelve states should provide easier, wider, and less 
costly access to suppliers of goods and services. The unified market will 
facilitate increased competition and stronger interrelationships among EC 
corporations. As a former EC commissioner succinctly puts it: "[it will] 
release the energies of the European Companies, facilitate their expansion 
into what are now distinct national markets [and] .... help harness the 
inventiveness and experience of American and Japanese companies to 
Europe's development. "59 
The Community began early with its efforts to harmonise at least to a 
minimum degree the different regulations of the Member States on the 
admission of securities to stock exchange listing and the information to be 
provided to investors, and thus the protection of investors. As early as 
1972 in a proposal for a first Directive in this area, the Commission stated 
that the omissions and differences in the information provided to the 
public regarding securities constitute a "second barrier" for capital 
movements between the Member States, which prevents the capital 
markets from benefiting in full from the advantages already achieved by 
the partial removal of currency restrictions. The second consideration, in 
addition to the provision of information for the public and the protection 
of investments, was the operation of a single securities market. 
Since 1979 the Council of Ministers has adopted a series of important 
Directives in this area. The first stage was the adoption on 5 March 1979 of 
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a Directive co-ordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to 
official stock-exchange listing (79/279 EEC). The Directive sets out the 
conditions that must be met by issuers of securities, including the 
minimum issue price, the company's period of existence, free 
negotiability, sufficient distribution and the provision of appropriate 
information for investors. The Member States, however, were free to 
impose stricter requirements. 
Closely connected is the Directive adopted by the Council on 17 
March 1980 co-ordinating the requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny 
and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the admission 
of securities to official stock-exchange listing (80/390/EEC). The Directive 
lays down the many items of information which must be published when 
shares, debt securities and certificates representing shares are admitted to 
stock- exchange listing. 
The third stage followed on 15 February 1982 with the Council 
Resolution on the Directive on information to be published on a regular 
basis by companies whose shares have been admitted to official stock- 
exchange listing (82/121). Under the Directive, companies listed on a stock- 
exchange must publish half-yearly reports on their activities, profits and 
losses. 60 
For almost 25 years after the EEC Treaty was signed, progress in 
financial integration was discontinuous, uneven, and on the whole 
modest. This can be attributed to a combination of economic difficulties 
and policy priorities, but also reflects the lack of coherent, comprehensive 
approach. Circumstances started to change in 1983-1984, by which time 
considerable progress had been made in correcting domestic and external 
imbalances in Community countries. In addition, pressure for 
deregulation and integration was created by financial innovation, the 
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rapid development of international financial markets, and the decision of 
some Community countries to dismantle their foreign exchange controls, 
notably their complete elimination by the United Kingdom in 1979. 
In June 1985 the Commission presented to the European Council its 
White Paper on "Completing the Internal Market", which set the 
ambitious objective of complete integration of financial markets by 1992 
and concretely identified the steps required to achieve it. A plan for the 
full liberalisation of capital movements was also presented to the 
European Council that year. Shortly afterwards, the approval of the 
European Single Act introduced in the EEC Treaty decision-making on a 
(qualified) majority basis for a broad range of Community matters, creating 
the conditions for speedier approval of legislation. Previously unanimity 
had been required .6 
'The formulation of a comprehensivý approach to the 
integration of financial markets, the agreement on a final date for its 
realisation, and the introduction of new procedures for Community 
decisions have created a momentum that was unthinkable only a few 
yearsago. The Single European Act strengthened the legal framework for 
development of the common market. 62 
A milestone decision was taken by the Council on 18 November 1985 
with two Directives on the free marketing of units issued by investment 
funds (undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities or 
UCITS). Both Directives implement for the first time in the securities 
sector the "new approach" called for in the White Paper on completing the 
internal market, namely the principle of mutual recognition of the legal 
provisions of the Member States based on a minimum level of co- 
ordination of national provisions and control by the country of 
registration or country of origin. A co-ordination Directive sets out the 
framework for the approximation of legal provisions so as to achieve 
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approximately equal conditions of competition and effective protection 
for investors in all EC countries. The provisions of the co-ordination 
Directive cover the field of application, the admission conditions, the 
structure of investment funds and their investment policy. Its provisions 
also cover the information to be supplied to unit-holders, the general 
obligations of funds, such as the ban on borrowing, the observance of the 
laws of the Member State in which the units are marketed, the rights and 
obligations of the supervisory authorities and the creation of a Contact 
Committee consisting of persons appointed by the Member States and of 
representatives of the Commission. Under a liberalisation Directive the 
Member States are required to remove all restrictions on the free 
marketing of units. 
The "new approacW'set out in the White Paper resulted in a further 
decision by the Council of Ministers. This was the Directive of 22 June 1987 
amending Directive 80/390/EEC co-ordinating the requirements for the 
drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be 
published for the admission of securities to official stock-exchange listing 
(87/345/EEC). The aim of the Directive is to ensure that listing particulars 
compiled in accordance with the earlier Directives and approved in one 
Member State are automatically recognised on the stock-exchanges of 
other Member States without the need for additional approval. 
The Council took two further steps towards greater transparency in 
the latter half of 1988. On 12 December it reached an agreement in 
principle on a Directive on the information to be published when a major 
holding in a listed company is acquired or disposed of (88/627/EEC). The 
aim of the Directive is to ensure that investors and the public are 
informed of major shareholdings, changes in holdings above or below 
certain thresholds and changes in voting rights for fisted companies in the 
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Community. The Directive requires certain action to be taken when a 
holding reaches 10%, 207o, 1/3,507o and 2/3. The Member States may apply 
a single threshold of 257o in place of the 207o or 1/3 thresholds, and 75% in 
place of the 2/3 threshold. 
On 17 April 1989 the Council adopted a Directive co-ordinating the 
requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of the 
prospectus to be published when transferable securities are offered to the 
public (89/298/EEC). The Directive is a further major supplement to the 
above mentioned 1982 and 1987 Directives on transparency and investor 
protection on the securities markets. In addition to numerous individual 
provisions, the Directive introduces for securities offered to the public for 
the first time a similar obligation to provide information to that contained 
in the 1980 gener4l prospectus Directive for listed securities. 
Also aimed at transparency on the securities markets and equality of 
opportunity in industrial restructuring was a Commission proposal of 
1988 for a Directive on public take-over bids. The Directive is important 
mainly because with the completion of the internal market and increasing 
deregulation of capital movements, merger and take-over activity has 
grown substantially and is expected to grow further. The aim of the 
Directive is to approximate the very different legal provisions on take- 
overs in the Member States in order to ensure fairness of business dealings 
and equality of opportunity. The main provisions are directed at banning 
partial take-over bids, obliging a partial bidder (from 30%) to extend his bid 
to all the stock and ensuring that a bidder states in advance his intentions 
regarding the assets and activities of the Company concerned. Further 
provisions cover defence measures by companies for which public bids 
have been made, the retention of securities by a supervisory authority in 
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each Member State and reciprocity arrangements with non-Community 
countries. 
Further initiatives by the Commission complete the programme for 
the creation of a Single European Securities Market. The proposal for a 
Council Directive relating to indirect taxes on transactions in securities of 
14 April 1987 is aimed at abolishing indirect taxes on such transactions, 
following the failure to reach agreement on an earlier 1976 proposal on 
harmonisation in this area. The fact that taxes on stock-exchange 
transactions on major financial markets, for example in the United States 
or Japan, have been removed or are to be reduced is a further argument in 
favour of abolition. Investor protection, the removal of distortions in a 
single European financial common market and the combat of fraud are 
the subjects of the proposal for a Directive of 28 April 1987 co-ordinating 
regulations on insider dealing. Insider dealing (or insider trading in 
American English) is dealing in company securities with a view to making 
a profit or avoiding a loss while in possession of information that, if 
generally known, would affect their price. 63 The use of such 'price 
sensitive' information, which has not been made public, is prohibited by 
many legal systems. The Directive is aimed at harmonising the different 
codes of behaviour in the Member States. Growing abuse and spectacular 
cases have increasingly concentrated international attention on insider 
dealing. 
Finally mention must be made of efforts to link EC stock-exchanges. 
Since 1984 the chairmen of the stock-exchanges of the Member States, in 
collaboration with the Commission, have been working on a stock- 
exchange link-up system known as the IDIS(Interbourse Data Information 
System). The Commission itself has completed an examination of how 
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links can be created or improved between the national clearing systems for 
securities transactions. 64 
c. EC Company and Banking Law proposals. 
The magnitude and the scope of the EC initiatives in the area of 
securities regulation can only be evaluated in the context of a large 
number of closely interrelated Company and Banking Law directives 
which do not pritna facie regulate stock-markets or securities but 
nevertheless play an undeniably important role in creating the 
appropriate legal environment for the effective operation of the market 
and the protection of investors. 
Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome provides the impetus for the company 
law Directives. Article 7 prohibits discrimination within the European 
Community based on the nationality of an enterprise organised in a 
Member State. Companies organised under the laws of a Member State 
have the right to establish branches in other Member States. In addition, 
article 54(3)(g) requires that regulation for the protection of shareholders, 
employees and creditors must be equivalent throughout the EC. To this 
end, the EC initially proposed and adopted Directives aiming at the 
achievement of harmonisation through detailed common 
requirements. 65 It has already been mentioned that the harmonisation 
approach has proved (both at a political and legislative level) not to be 
feasible. The Member States insisted on: "retaining [the] .... distinctive 
,, 66 features of their domestic regulatory schemes. 
The "new approach" adopted by the Community in the Single 
European Act was in favour of reciprocity (or, in other words, mutual- 
recognition) between Member States: The EC began to propose Directives 
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which prescribed only basic, essential principles, with a requirement of 
mutual recognition by Member States. 
In the context of banking law, the White paper calls for a single 
banking licence, home country control and mutual recognition. These 
principles are incorporated in the 1989 Second Banking Directive. 67 All 
credit institutions authorised in one European country will be able to 
establish or supply financial services without further authorisation. They 
will be able to undertake all the activities listed in the annex of the Second 
Directive provided that these activities are not forbidden by the home 
country supervisor. 
The list includes most activities of universal banks. The objective 
pursued by the European Commission appears to be threefold: free entry 
and provision of financial services throughout the. Community, the 
establishment of a fair and level playing field with single banking licence, 
home country control, mutual recognition and minimal harmonisation 
on equity, accounting, ownership and participation in the non-financial 
sector and, finally, consumer protection. In this respect references are often 
made to the European Court of justice case "Cassis de Dijon , 68 according 
to which control on the quality of a product is warranted but can be met 
fully by the hoine cotmtry stLpervisor. 69 
This study is an attempt to further examine the creation of the post- 
1992 Single European Securities Market in the European Community 
from the point of view of investment services by focusing on the 
problems of investor protection in the European Single Market with 
particular reference to the regulation of Insider Dealing. Special emphasis 
will be placed on assessing the results from the point of view of investor- 
consumer protection and on identifying the measures that still need to be 
taken. 
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It can hardly be contested that the achievement of a Single European 
Market in Financial and Investment Services is on balance beneficial. It 
provides investors with greater opportunities for high economic returns 
and diversification, and provides issuers of securities with broader 
markets in which to raise capital. The price of these benefits, however, is 
the Europeanization of fraud and increased regulatory complexity. 
The Community's work on the regulation of dealing in securities, for 
the most part limited to those listed on official stock exchanges, has been 
inspired by two major concerns: On the one hand to ensure the smooth 
operation of Member States' stock exchanges, and, on the other, to 
promote a greater interpenetration of national markets in securities. 
In order to do so, the Community took the view, that it would be 
necessary to guarantee a minimum Community level of investor 
protection, through harmonised disclosure requirements, what the 
Commission terms "information policy". The policy got off to a rather 
slow start, even by financial services standards, and by the beginning of 
1979 could only boast a (non-binding) Commission recommendation for a 
European code of conduct on dealings in securities. 
More recently and particularly since the entry into force of the Single 
European Act and the sudden progress of Community legislation on the 
free movement of capital, the Council has made fairly substantial progress 
in certain areas, the sufficiency of which in the long term remains, 
however, to be seen. 
The Directives concerning transferable securities adopted so far have 
covered the admission of securities to stock exchange listing (conditions of 
admission, listing particulars and prospectus requirements), the 
continuing supervision of securities so listed (publication of information 
on a regular basis), and the regular operation of the market (acquisition 
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and disposal of major shareholdings, prohibition of insider dealing), while 
a recent proposal seeks to liberalise the provision of investment services 
throughout the Community by means of a single authorisation to be 
issued by the investment firm's home country authorities. 
The most obviously "investor protection-minded" measure in this 
field is the Directive on Insider Dealing on which the Council adopted in 
November 1989 . 
70 As its preamble makes clear, the Directive is designed to 
protect that precious and sometimes rather fragile commodity, investor's 
confidence: 
11 whereas the smooth operation of the secondanj market depends to a large extent oil 
the confidence it inspires in investors... land] ... such confidence ... includes the 
assurance to investors that they are placed on an equal footing and that they will be 
protected against the improper use of inside information; 
whereas by benefiting certain investors as compared with others insider dealing is 
likel y to undermine that confidence and may therefore prejudice the smooth 
operation of the secondary market in transferable securities; whereas the necessary 
measure should therefore be taken to combat insider dealing" 
The Council thereby takes a clear and forthright stand on a question 
which has exercised many national legislators, to what extent insider 
dealing should be considered fair business practice and an acceptable perk 
for those in the know through good fortune or hard work, or deemed 
morally equivalent to theft. Another problem, inextricably linked to 
insider dealing, is the legality of (price-) stabilising practices. 
In any case, whether legal or not, on the national level the disparity 
in national provisions in the European Community (now renamed 
Eitropean Union) is such as to constitute an impediment to the creation of 
an internal market in unlisted securities. 
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Attention must be drawn to the degree of homogeneity that will be 
accomplished through the implementation by each Member State of the 
Insider Trading Directive, to the sanctions to be imposed for the 
infringement of the measures taken pursuant to this Directive which can 
be anything, criminal, civil or administrative provided that they are 
11 stifficient to indtice coinpliance", and finally to the repercussions (in the 
case of a request of information from a Member State) of a somewhat ill- 
defined concept of "sovereignty" into Community law as a limitation on 
the duties of a Member State. 
Case studies of the implementation measures adopted by EU Member 
States would provide deeper understanding of the effect of the Directive. 
Assessment of the legislative efforts of each national legislator seems to be 
a rather unfeasible task. Attention will be focused, therefore, to two 
representative jurisdictions: those of the UK and Greece. 
The UK is a common law jurisdiction with one of the most 
sophisticated international securities markets in the world and lengthy 
legislative experience in the field of insider dealing . With the exception of 
Ireland, that is also a common law country, all other EU Member States 
have civil law systems and comparatively novel regulatory sciteinata on 
insider dealing. Greece, among the latter, has a typically civilian system, 
with strong influences principally from the German and secondly from 
the French civil codes. The first criminal law statute prohibiting insider 
dealing was only introduced in 1988 (art. 30, Law 1806/1988), and was an 
attempt to comply with the Insider Dealing Directive proposals. In 
addition, the Athens Stock Market has come to flourish rather recently 
and is still developing. The examination of the impact the Insider Dealing 
Directive has had on the national laws of the UK and Greece, namely on 
two dissimilar legal systems, will contribute greatly towards the correct 
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evaluation of the Directive. The lessons which the UK's experience can 
give to the civil law countries of the EC will also be considered. 
The approach adopted will also attempt to shed some light to the 
means of enforcement the EU has in its armoury. The role of the 
European Court of justice particularly in the case of preliminary rulings 
recognising the direct effect of the Directive and possible infringement 
proceedings against Member States which violated EU legislation on 
investor protection should be examined. 
The feasibility of the formation of European Securities Commission 
with an aim of promoting regulatory standards within the EU and the 
compatibility of the various proposals for common European listings and 
electronic linkage of stock exchanges, in relation to investor protection are 
interesting issues in the same field. 
The ultimate aim of this study will be to develop a better insight of 
the problem of investor protection in the EU focusing on the Regulation 
of Insider Dealing within the EU and making suggestions for future 
moves. 
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B. The reasons for an Integrated Insider Trading Regulation in 
Europe. 
a. Raison ditre of the Insider Trading Law. 
The term insider dealing (insider trading) is defined by the 'Oxford 
Dictionary of Finance'as: 
"dealing in company securities with a vieza to making a profit or avoiding a 
IOSS While in possession of information that, if generally known, would affect their 
price. " 
Under the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (which 
was superseded by the Criminal Justice Act 1993) those who were or who 
had been connected with a company (e. g. the directors, the company 
secretary, employees, and professional advisers) were prohibited from 
such dealing on or, in certain circumstances, off the stock exchange if they 
had acquired the information by virtue of their connection and in 
confidence. The prohibition extended to certain unconnected persons to 
whom the information had been conveyed. 
Before 1961, the practice of insider dealing was not illegal anywhere 
in the world. In that year the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission published an opinion (Cady Roberts & Co. ) suggesting for the 
first time that an insider with undisclosed information must either 
disclose the information or refrain from trading. Insider trading was there 
held to violate the Commission's Rule 10b-5, a very general statement 
making illegal any practice that "would operate as a fraud... " in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security. U. S. courts upheld the SEC's 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 in the celebrated case of Texas Gulf Sulphur 
(1968), and the financial world has not been the same since. 
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The roots of the aversion to Insider Dealing can not be easily traced. It 
is certainly not universally agreed that insider dealing is reprehensible, for 
"while some would view it as the unacceptable face of capitalism, others 
see nothing wrong with it and indeed even think it should be 
encouraged". 1 
The starting point of this debate must be the view expressed by 
Professor Manne in his book "Insider Trading and the Stock Market"2 
(1966) which asserted that the practice is, in terms of economic efficiency, 
"positively beneficial and ought not to be prohibited. " 
Those who condemn Insider Dealing base their view mainly on the 
concepts of market integrity, morality and fairness. 
A deep paradox surrounding the justification of the Insider Dealing 
Regulation is the difficulty of singling out those harmed by it. This is one 
of the reasons that its harmfulness is doubted by some academic lawyers 
and economists. 3 
As Brenda Hannigan remarks it may not be a "victimless crime" if 
the Insider Dealing has ocurred in a face to face transaction where some 
misrepresentation or some deliberate inducement to the other party might 
be established. In many such cases the laxv could provide a remedy apart 
from the one specific insider dealing rules would but, because of no legal 
(e. g. contractual or fiduciary) relationship between the victim and the 
offender, common law offered no help. It is not possible to establish any 
relationship between the insider and the outsider in "impersonal, 
anonymous, stock exchanges. '14 
Herzel and Katz point out that as far as Insider Dealing is concerned 
not only do we lack credible plaintiffs but frequently "the only identifiable 
candidate s-for-victim demonstrably profited from the illicit trader's 
action. "5 The loss of individuals who voluntarily dealt in the market 
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would occur regardless of whether insiders acted and can not be causally 
attributed to ""the initial non-disclosure of information and the subsequent 
market readjustment on disclosure. 116 
The absence of a causal link and an identifiable victim (which may 
indicate that remedies based on compensatory rationale are not 
appropriate7) does not mean that the practice should not be regulated. 
Although there is some sense in saying that Insider Trading is a 
"victimless wrong", in an attempt at precise analysis an important 
distinction can be readily made: "Insider Trading lacks credible plaintiffs, 
not victims. "8 
In the Diatnotid v. OreainutO case, directors of a company, in breach 
of their fiduciary duties, sold their shares on the market at a favourable 
price, knowing that because of an increase in expenses profits had faRen 
drastically, before that information was made public. Subsequently, when 
the shares dropped, they were held liable to the company for the 
difference, although the company was not the party who had suffered that 
particular loss. 
According to Fuld Cj: "It is true that the complaint before us does not 
contain any allegation of damages to the corporation but this has never 
been considered to be an essential for a cause of action founded on a breach 
of fiduciary duty. This is because the function of such an action, unlike an 
ordinary tort or contract case, is not merely to compensate the plaintiff for 
wrongs committed by the defendant but, as this court declared many years 
ago 'to prevent them, by removing from agents and trustees all 
inducement to attempt dealing for their own benefit in matters which 
they have undertaken for others, or to which their agency or trust relates. " 
In relation to the potential harm to the company the same judge 
remarks: "In addition, it is pertinent to observe that, despite the lack of any 
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specific allegation of damage, it may weU be inferred that the defendant's 
actions inight have catised soine harin to the enterprise. [emphasis added] 
Although the corporation may have little concern with the day-to-day 
transactions in shares, it has a great interest in maintaining a reputation of 
integrity, an image of probity, for its management and in insuring the 
continued public acceptance and marketability of its stock. When officers 
and directors abuse their position in order to gain personal profits, the 
effect may be to cast a cloud on the corporation's name, injure stockholder 
relations and undermine public regard for the corporation's securities. " 
The Diamond case solution may not be available when insiders do not 
owe fiduciary duties. 
Informational advantages and transactional inequalities will always 
be present in the market some times based on expert knowledge, superior 
experience, foresight and diligence. 10 Despite the undeniably utopian 
nature of the idea of market egalitarianism, it is argued that it should be 
possible to remove informational advantages "achieved unfairly through 
access to information wl-dch can not be obtained by others and which in all 
probability is being used by the insider in breach of some fiduciary or other 
duty. " 11 
The primary concern of the regulators, since "'market egalitarianism 
is an unattainable goal", is to maintain investor confidence in the market 
without impairing its liquidity and efficiency. 12 
The wave of privatization in the U. K. and the relative governmental 
policies have necessitated the creation of a "clean place" in which to do 
business. The Roskill Report13 noted that "if the Government cherishes 
the vision of an equity owning democracy, then it also faces an inescapable 
duty to ensure that financial markets are honestly managed and that 
transgressors in those markets are swiftly and effectively discovered, 
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convicted and punished. " 
The catastrophic consequences of a loss of confidence in the markets - 
became apparent in the crash of 1987.14 Insider Dealing may make capital 
raising more expensive-15 It is the need to prevent this occurrence that 
among others, dictates its prohibition. 
Economic arguments still support the view that Insider Trading is 
not '**so obviously detrimental that it needs to be prohibited. "16 Professor 
Manne denies that the prohibition of Insider Trading promotes and 
maintains the efficiency (i. e. the instant adjustment of prices to 
information not previously known) of and confidence to the marketS. 17 In 
his opinion the prohibition can not enhance the flow of information to 
the market; on the contrary it inhibits the flow of information in a 
number of different -, vays: Insiders in possession of information do not 
deal. On the other hand, the prohibition, by suppressing information, 
makes it more valuable and, thus, creates an extra incentive for insiders. 
Prohibition may also have the undesirable consequence of uncertainty to 
individuals who do not deal because of doubts as to its scope and as to 
their position. 18 
Finally it is argued that insiders play a stabilising role by gradually 
easing prices towards the correct price. In Manne's view Insider Dealing 
"moves prices in the right direction towards the level correctly reflecting 
all the real facts about the company, thus ensuring that capital resources 
will, be properly allocated. "19 The problem here is that capital is incorrectly 
allocated by the majority i. e. the outsiders despite the fact that it may be 
properly allocated by insiders. 
Regarding Insider Dealing as a mechanism which instead of placing 
in jeopardy the efficient operation of the market "increases confidence in 
its pricing mechanism" is an oversimplistic approach. As Gilson & 
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Kraakman point out, the best way to achieve the beneficial effect of market 
pricing is to provide for immediate disclosure of the fact that insiders are 
dealing in order to get a much quicker market reaction. 20 
The effect of Insider Dealing on public confidence can not be clarified 
by any empirical evidence. American and British commentators suggest 
that the reactions of American and British shareholders amount to, if 
anything, complete indifference. 21 
The cost of capital raising and the difficulties involved in the relative 
procedures are inextricably linked to investor confidence in certain 
companies and markets. The question which arises in respect to investor 
confidence in companies is whether the (known or suspected) practice of 
Insider Dealing within a company has an impact on the market prestige of 
the company. Carlton & Fischel support the view that in the absence of 
any evidence that companies voluntarily take steps internally to prevent 
Insider Dealing, "it is clear that companies do not regard themselves as 
harmed in the marketS. 1122 Measures to this effect have been taken as a 
response to legal requirements (e. g. The Financial Services Act 1986) but 
not as a result of efforts to restore the company's investor confidence, 
made on the company's own initiative. 
An important criticism against the economic arguments and Manne's 
theories has been expressed by Schotland in his review of Manne's book: 23 
"Even if we found that unfettered insider trading would bring an 
economic gain, we might still forgo that gain in order to secure a stock 
market and intracorporate relationships that satisfy such non-economic 
goals as fairness, just rewards and integrity. " 
The use of "moral imperatives" to justify regulation, according to 
T Manne and economists in general, is "a consequence of frustration at the 
inability to find a justifiable basis for regulation. -24 
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The opponents of the regulation assert that "if we allow insiders 
(genuine insiders: directors, officers and employees) to trade on the basis of 
what they learn running the company, we are essentially offering them a 
special kind of compensation package. "25 Some lawyers and economists 
have argued that we should use this unusual fringe benefit. 26 Herzel & 
Katz denounce it as both an hieffective and tinpredictable method of 
compensation. 27 It is ineffective because under it an insider's 
compensation would bear little relation to his performance or usefulness. 
"Everyone holding the information would be more or less equal, be he a 
porter or chairman of the board. 1128 The method is unpredictable because 
under it neither the insiders nor the shareholders can really know in 
advance the order of magnitude of the insider's compensation. According 
to Herzel & Katz insiders would have less incentive to work hard, 
shareholders less incentive to invest and if the latter had been asked in 
advance, they would have never agreed to this type of bargain with their 
managers. 29 
The controversy on the justification of the Insider Trading 
Regulation still continues (apparently less fierce in recent yearS30). 
Professor Loss has expressed his standpoint on the argument with felicity: 
"[the strictly economic arguments against insider dealing] overlook the 
fact that it is important for the markets, as it is for the courts, not merely to 
do equity but to appear to do equity. Why should the public enter the 
markets if the rules of the game make it perfectly legitimate for insiders 
(and their friends and business associates) to play with marked cards? "31 
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b. Information and the i) General Trading Public 
ii) Shareholders 
iii) Managers 
A company is an information generator merely by its legal 
existence. 32 Although the availability of information in the public domain 
may be of vital commercial importance to a third party it has little or no 
"intrinsic monetary value and consequently professional search finns may 
conduct and report on searches at the Registry on behalf of clients quickly 
and cheaply. "33 Records required to be kept for inspection at the registered 
office, such as names of shareholderS34 and directors' interestS35, or copies 
of service contractS36 are sometimes "dauntingly difficult for the layman 
to obtain"37 and at least for some people, difficult to analyze. 
Another category of company information which is neither public, 
nor yet confidential is what a diligent observer, a "researcher" of the 
company's affairs could discover for himself or on behalf of others. 
According to Mitchell this information can be physical and intangible. 38 
Physical information is, for example the information one can get by 
observing the premises of a company as a guide to its trading activity. 
Intangible information is divided into two sub-categories, 
i. e. internally and externally generated. Company's brochures, 
advertisements, price-lists and other documents which are part of the 
promotion policy organized by its management and advertizing agents, 
and are aimed at receiving "as wide a public coverage as possible", 
constitute the internal information of the company which normally does 
not create problems of confidentiality . 
Information about a company which is collected by third persons who 
are interested in it is characterized as externally generated information. It 
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comprises expert analysis and comments which will be published and pass 
into the public domain. 39 Any person who reads regularly the financial 
pages of daily newspapers or the specialist business periodicals can acquire 
"substantial knowledge" about a certain company. 40 
Under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, s10(b) the 
level of public knowledge required to exonerate an insider is that the facts 
be "generally known". 
The extent to which mere publication is an effective method of 
making facts generally known is still an open question according to one 
commentator. 41 From the London or Edinburgh Gazette to tip sheets as 
'Tte Petuty Sliare Focits" or "Fleet Street Letter" the range and number of 
readers and the sophistication of information circulated to them varies 
dramatically. 
This second type of information (both physical and intangible) is also 
to be regarded as public and "therefore not of a character which requires its 
generators or recipients to keep it confidential on pain of penalty if they do 
not. 1142 
The test which must be satisfied is whether the public has access to 
the sources of information from which Investment Analysts make their 
predictions or informed assessors their assessments. Networked 
information (such as the one provided via the Stock Exchange Automated 
Quotations System or SEAQ to brokers and market makers) is also deemed 
to be public as soon as it is put up on the screen despite the different 
momentum in the possible reactions of professionals and private 
individuals. 
The third category of information generated by a company is that 
which is confidential. Mitchell makes a distinction between 'insiders' i. e. 
persons who are in possession of confidential information and 'outsiders', 
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these who are not. Only the first term is normally given statutory 
recognition (as by the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985) "but 
both express a concept which is readily understood both by professionals 
and lay people. " 
There is a tendency to treat the term "confidential" as synonymous to 
the term "'unpublished" despite the fact that unpublished information 
about the company is not necessarily to be treated as confidential. On the 
other hand not all information which is treated by the company as 
confidential is liable to influence the judgement of a third person, an 
"outsider" in his dealings with the company. The yardstick mainly 
adopted for the regulation of insider trading, as we shall see, is that the 
information must not only be unpublished but have a price sensitive 
character, in other. words to be capable of causing price fluctuations. 
This is the reason why the sanctions imposed on insiders for breach 
of their duties are confined to companies with public listings on 
recognised stock exchanges and issues of advertised securities. 
In recent years the so-called Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
(ECMH) has attracted a good deal of attention. According to Fama43 there 
are both weak and strong forms of ECMH; the weak form maintains that 
only 'public' information will be fully incorporated into share prices; the 
strong form maintains that privately held information will also be fully 
incorporated. Most empirical evidence tends to support the weak form, 
but not the strong: evidence that insiders can regularly outperform the 
market appears to suggest that gains from trade are always available to 
those who possess private information. Because it is of the nature of the 
information to constitute a ptiblic good, efficient private exchange may be 
impossible. 44 The most convincing version of the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis is the seini-strong. 4-5 The latter supports the view that prices 
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always reflect publicly available information and, consequently, no 
superior returns can be achieved on information that has already been 
made public. While it is possible for producers of information to obtain a 
private return by changing securities trading policies as well as by 
speculative trading in the capital market, the size of that return will be 
directly related to their ability to restrict or delay the dissemination of 
information. The social cost of that restriction will depend on the extent to 
which the information could be used to improve production plans in the 
goods market, or to improve the completeness of the market in risk- 
sharing assets. 46 
The explicit legal recognition of property rights in information, 
governing its acquisition and its use, would suggest that the rights to 
production and use of -information should be legally defined in such a way 
that the effects of transaction costs are n-dnimized. "That is to say, the legal 
placement of such rights of shareholders, managers and the general public 
should depend on the extent and cost of anticipated reallocation away 
from the legal placement. This framework can be applied to suggest a 
norinative basis for the legal treatment of the trade in securities. "47 
The parties relevant to the legal placement of rights over 
information should not be restricted to shareholders and managers but 
should also include the general trading publiC48, since disclosure of 
information to the public influences production opportunities and 
occasionally improves risk sharing arrangements. 
i) The General Trading Public 
It has been argued mainly by Manne and by Gilson and Kraakman49 
that the proscription of insider trading could inhibit or curtail the flow of 
information into the market, to the detriment of the general public. 
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This could happen in three different ways: 
Firstly it could delay information dissemination because 
knowledgeable insiders would be prevented from trading on the basis of 
information that has not been made public. This is rather a matter of 
timing of the release of information and not a question as to whether it 
%vill ever be released. 50 
Secondly the indirect effect of the proscription of insider dealing 
could be to prohibit desirable types of market activity. 
Commentators on the EC Directive on Insider Trading suggest that it 
should not be so widely drafted as to include within its scope: 
'(a) the analyst who, by his owii ititelligence atid researches, spots a 
potentially good or bad investment and deals or advises accordingly; (b) tile dealer ill 
securities who, for example, takes advantage of discrepancies ill the prices quoted ill 
London and New York'., 51 
The same Directive has been criticised as having the effect of 
preventing 'whistle blowing'. 32 The stabilisation53 practices, so common 
in the euro-bond market, could also be rendered illegal. 
Thirdly the proscription of insider trading could impose excessive 
compliance costs on the securities industry, thus affecting negatively the 
general trading public. 
The main counter-argument which can be set against the arguments 
outlined above, according to many writers is the problem of 'adverse 
selection' which arises "from the difficulties faced by market-makers in 
distinguishing insiders from outsiders [leading] to the higher bid-ask 
spreads. "54 This inevitably leads to the distortion of price signals and the 
reduction of capital market liquidity since some 'marginal traders' tend to 




It is argued that if insiders receive part of their compensation in the 
form of windfall gains from insider trading, this means that shareholders 
actually gain with insider trading, as the agent's demands for salary are 
smaller. 55 
Beyond the shortcomings of this standpoint that have been described 
in section B(a), Haddock and Macey argue that: 
'If insiders are risk averse, they will be unwilling to give tip salary equivalent 
to their expected insider trading profits in exchange for the privilege of insider 
trading. Then the shareholders may decide to forbid insider trading when the 
shareholder group contains an unusually large number of investors who are 
particularly knowledgeable about the company. But unless shareholders are goitig to 
benefit somehow if insiders are prohibited from trading, they will prefer to permit 
insiders to trade and to share the trading gains in the form of lower wage rates for 
insider managers'. 56 
The reasons why shareholders would be interested in prohibiting 
insider trading are somewhat obscure. "Moral hazard occurring through 
insiders profiting from bad news"57 is a rather debatable problem. The 
opportunism practised by insiders in managerial teams and problems of 
allocation of property rights among the members of those teams may 
increase "policing" costs especially in the absence of legislation, thereby 
prejudicing the position of shareholders. 
iii) Managers. 
The practice of insider trading by managers is inextricably linked with 
private gains which have also been christened as 'compensation' and 
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'incentives'. The 'compensation package' theories have been criticised as 
both ineffective and unpredictable. 
On the other hand the proscription of insider dealing should be 
carefully drafted so as to avoid any substantial renegotiation costs on the 
part of particular groups and member states covered by the legislation. 58 A 
status-based regulation should not neglect the possibility of using 
disclosure of identity to ensure efficiency in capital markets. 
Moreover any harmonization effort on an EU level must take into 
account the differing enviroranents existing in member states as regards 
the roles of managers and of shareholders in the decision and risk-taking. 
c. Arguments from the Economic Theory. 
An economic foundation for the insider regulation should meet two 
requirements. "First, it should explain how insider regulation increases 
welfare and, second, it should be general in the sense that it can be used in 
any securities market. "59 
The detection of an increase or decrease in welfare requires 
"aggregating utilily changes experienced by different people. "60 It is 
impossible therefore to establish whether insider regulation increases or 
decreases welfare if the analysis does not go beyond the redistributory 
effects of insider dealing transfers. The latter constitute a most popular 
approach to the justification of insider dealing regulation, which for the 
present purposes is of no value. 
The second requirement excludes the takeover incentive approach. It 
is generally admitted that one of the the objectives of insider regulation is 
the protection of the incentive of takeover bidders. In the capital markets 
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where unfriendly takeovers are a common feature this approach offers a 
basis for insider regulation, but this is not the case for markets where 
changes in corporate control do not work by means of takeovers. 
Consequently, the arguments for and against insider dealing 
regulation should be mainly based on the investor and market-maker 
reaction approach, in an effort to present a case against insider trading and 
for government regulation. 
Inforinatiotial asyininetry as to the value of securities (or any 
durable goods in general) may lead to movements of these securities. The 
ultimate result of these movements is a transfer of wealth. 
StiItzel "clearly defines the kind of informational asymmetry on 
which his analysis is based by comparing redistributional insider 
transactions witlý playing roulette at a casino where the chips are put 
down after the ball comes to rest, but where only some gamblers have the 
privilege to know the winning number before they decide on their bets. "61 
Thus, unpublished inside information that will have an impact on price 
when published is an informational advantage with immediate value. 
In addition to the fact that stock and claims on stocks such as 
warrants and options are durable goods and therefore in a "Prominent 
position among the goods moving in response to informational 
asymmetry"62, they are highly price sensitive to company information 
because they represent "capitalized residual company income. "63 
StUtzel makes the assumption that insiders and outsiders are two 
distinct groups. Insiders will gain as a group at the expense of the outsider 
group. 64 Schmidt goes one step further specifying that the reaction of 
investors depends on whether insiders will trade or abstain. 6-5 
The mere existence of inside information may not influence an 
individual outsider if he is convinced that no insider trading is taking 
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place "since he expects to gain and lose about equal amounts in future 
transactions due to late disclosure, and he may or may not react, 
depending on the number of transactions he engages in and other 
factors. "66 
The knowledge that insiders will trade on inside information 
drastically influences the reactions of investors. Since the individual 
outsider will expect to lose more than he gains in future transactions he 
will be willing to "pay less for the share of a given company if inside 
information and insider trading exist than in a situation with prompt 
disclosure. "ý7 All uncertainty (including the possibility of insider dealing) 
incurs additional cost; expected returns on investments are, therefore, 
reduced. 
Hartmut Schmidt- explains the effect of insider trading by comparing 
the two different positions, i. e. the payoffs of a share that the investor 
expects in a situation without insider trading as a position with positive 
expected value for which the position would pay a certain price (position 
B) as opposed to a position A encompassing all the payoff-effects of inside 
information and insider trading, i. e. expected losses to outsiders. "Position 
A has a negative expected value and the investor would 'purchase' it only 
at a negative price. "68 
Positions A and B are inseparable in markets with inside information 
and insider trading. The investor protects himself by paying less for AB 
than he would pay for B and at the time of purchase he will try to make 
alternative choices (this in all probability would involve an alternative 
jurisdiction). 
The threat of inside information and insider dealing increases 
transaction costs (e. g. wider bid-offer spread), which lead to lower share 
prices and, thus, to higher cost of capital of the issuing company. In that 
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line of reasoning, issuers and economic policy makers do have "an 
incentive to restrict insider trading. "69 
The inference is readily drawn that a higher cost of capital "curtails 
investment and thus weakens the growth of the economy" thereby 
decreasing welfare. ý According to Hartmut Schmidt the reasoning of 
insider regulation rests primarily on the following assumptions: 70 
1. Market participants are rational and engage in a substantial number 
of transactions . 
2. Insiders possess from time to time undoubtedly valuable 
unpublished information. 
3. Insiders and outsiders are two distinct groups. 
Unvestment or consumption alternatives are available that are not 
affected by insider trading. 
S. Outsiders derive no benefits whatsoever from insider trading. 
6. Outsiders are needed to clear the market for shares. 
7. Real investment in an economy is inversely related to the cost of 
capital . 
The same fine of reasoning mutatis mutandis will be followed in the 
analysis of market-maker reactions. 
A market-maker, according to H. Schmidt, is a "dealer who quotes bid 
and ask throughout the day and who wants to profit from buying at his bid 
and selling at his ask. "71 
Market-makers have a strong incentive to try to straddle the 
equilibrium price, the price that clears the market. If his quote was above 
this price, he would accumulate a long position; if it was below he would 
seH and end up xvith a short position. 
Market-makers, buy and sell securities, hold them for preferably short 
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periods, profit from this dealing and cause trading losses to outsiders as a 
group which would not have occurred if there had been no market-maker 
trading. 72 
The differentiating point between market-makers and insiders is that 
the former render a service, "the service of immediate execution of 
investors' orderS. "73 
An investor who wants to sell may do so at a bid; in exchange for the W 
difference between the equilibrium price and the bid, without having to 
wait for a corresponding buy order and to suffer from price fluctuations 
during the waiting period. Potential buyers can benefit from the service of 
market-makers by paying the difference between ask and equilibrium 
price. 
This "bid-ask spread" or according to H. Schmidt the ex ante "cost of 
immediacy" may increase transaction costs but can also contribute to the 
"marketability" or "liquidity" of the shares. 74 
Treynor suggests that assumption 3 should be superseded by 3* with 
the following wording: Insiders, otitsiders and inarket-inakers are three 
distinct groitps and all trading goes throtigh inarket-inakers. 75 
Market-makers normally lose to insiders for two main reasons. 
Firstly because insiders Will trade with them only if, as H. Schmidt puts it, 
"they anticipate a gross trading gain in excess of the cost of immediacy that 
they have to incur" and secondly because market-makers do not know 
Whether they deal or not with insiders at the time of the transaction. 76 
The expected reaction of a market-maker is to quote a wider bid-ask 
spread and only if he is lucky77 Will tl-ds solution partly compensate him 
for the additional risk he has to assume at the expense of outsiders. 
Treynor's proposition leads to the conclusion that insider trading 
increases, because investors react to the additional transaction costs, the 
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cost of capital which provides an incentive for companies or a challenge 
for governments to impose insider trading restrictions. 78 A similar 
conclusion has already been stated in regard to the investor reaction 
approach. 
Amihud and Mendelson point out that the repetitious and additive 
nature of transaction costs makes them a major determinant of asset prices 
because in contrast to risk, they never cancel out in a portfolio-79 Amihud 
and Mendelson also argue that a firm will voluntarily expend resources to 
disclose information and restrict insider trading in an effort to avert an 
increase of the cost of capital. 
King and Roell point to the high sensitivity of trading volume to 
changes of transaction costs and suggest that stock exchanges and their 
members have a "strong interest in cracking down on insider trading. "SO 
According to H. Schmidt this is plausible if commission business is 
profitable, if exchange members are outsiders or market-makers and if 
assumption 3* holds. 81 
The major shortcoming of the market-maker approach can be traced 
in the case of markets organized on the auction principle82, where 
transactions are effected between outsiders and insiders without the 
intervention of market makers, and, therefore, the market-maker 
approach "fails to provide a rationale for insider regulation. "83 In this 
particular case the necessary justification can be provided by the investor 
reaction approach. 
In a market where all trading goes through market-makers it is more 
difficult84 to apply the investor reaction approach because outsiders never 
trade with insiders and it is more difficult to trace individual or group 
losses to insider information. Here the market-maker approach appears 
more suitable for rendering an economic foundation. 
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A recent tendency of national markets is to combine the features of 
market-makers (financial intermediaries) and auction (mainly in 
countries organized on the universal bank principle which involves not 
only services related to loans and savings but also those related to making 
investments in companies) with a view to meeting the global competition 
demandS. 85 
The reactions of both market-makers and investors determine the 
effect of insider dealing on the cost of capital. Consequently, the two 
approaches should be perceived as mutually complementary. 
Under the assumptions which provide the theoretical ground for this 
analysis, market-makers and investors, being the prime victims of insider 
dealing will react by protecting themselves (assumption 1,3 & 3*, 4). H. 
Schmidt reaches the rather questionable conclusion that in these 
particular cases there is no need for government regulation against insider 
dealing. The problem, according to the same writer is that the prime 
victims pass their losses on to society and public companies, the ultimate 
ViCtiMS. 86 The question which then arises is whether insider regulation 
should be better left to companies instead of governmental authorities, in 
view of the fact that companies have the incentive and they are apparently 
"in an excellent position to restrict insider trading. "87 
The crucial question for a public company is whether the private gain 
from insider transactions would exceed private costs incurred by the 
enforcement of these restrictions. If company A imposed a ban on insider 
trading and incurred the relative cost, "the price of shares would rise, 
provided that private costs ..... are less than the gross private gain, i. e. in 
this case the effect of of insider trading on the share price multiplied by the 
number of outstanding shares. Suppose A's programme is disclosed to the 
market, the share price rises accordingly and the net private gain (G) 
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results as expected. "88 
Easterbrook supports the view that this is most unlikely to happen 
because of free riders. If companies of aB type manage to copy successfully 
the announcement of A-type firms but not the enforcement of insider 
restrictions they will "gain and take a free ride. "89 In that case both gross 
private gains and incentive for anti-insider programmes disappear because 
investors will not be able to distinguish between the two types of 
companies and they will, therefore, be more reluctant in investing. 
H. Schmidt points out that the free rider scenario is what one would 
expect because of the difficulties and the cost involved in any company's 
efforts to eliminate insider dealing. 90 
Bad and good transactions (that is to say transactions of insiders 
where their purpose is. not to gain from doubtlessly valuable unpublished 
information) can not be easily distinguished. Easterbrook argues that 
managers have the incentive and the ability not to observe any kind of 
insider restrictions. 91 Even in the absence of free riding, investors can not 
reasonably expect any insider regulation programme to be fully effective. 
These arguments point to the direction that "the initiation and 
enforcement of anti-insider programmes by individual public companies 
is rather unlikely. "92 
One possible solution is provided by public listing on an exchange 
and the use of the exchange computers to filter out questionable trades. 
Even if companies are able to impose penalties as a sanction to insider 
dealing that may be not severe enough to produce the desirable deterrence. 
In the case of imprisonment government regulation is needed. 93 
The additional assumptions that underly the argumentation up to 
this point should be noted: 94 
1. Market participants are rational and engage in a substantial number 
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of transactions. 
2. Insiders possess from time to time doubtlessly valuable 
unpublished information. 
Mnsiders and outsiders are two distinct groups. 
3*. Insiders, outsiders and market-makers are three distinct groups 
and all trading goes through market-makers. 
Unvestment or consumption alternatives are available that are not 
affected by insider trading. 
S. Outsiders derive no benefits whatsoever from insider trading. 
6. Outsiders are needed to clear the market for shares. 
7. Real investment in an economy is inversely related to the cost of 
capital. 
8. Enforcement of insider trading restrictions is very difficult and 
costly. 
9. Punishment is an efficient method of enforcement and compliance 
increases with the severity of the penalty. 
The validity of assumption 9 has been challenged by empirical 
studies on U. S. data. Seyhun examined the impact of the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984 which increased considerably civil fine to three 
times the amount of the profit and the maximum criminal fines in s. 32 
of the Securities and Exchange Act from $10,000 to $200,000.95 The number 
of all open market insider transactions filed by executives (officers, 
directors, etc. ) indicates that the latter have increased their trading activity. 
Seyhun concludes that now a large volume of insider trading is more 
likely to be motivated by important non public information and finds, 
therefore, no observable additional deterrent. 
Gupta and Misra studied the effect of the SEC crackdown on takeover 
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insiders in 1986, which led to the arrests of Levine, Boesky and others. 96 
They conclude that insider trading is not a significant contributor to 'pre- 
announcement price run-ups', comparing price and volume run-up 
patterns in takeovers before and after May 1986. H. Schmidt correctly 
remarks that "the evidence presented by Gupta and Misra would also be 
consistent with the conclusion that insiders were not deterred by the 1986 
SEC actions. " 
A study of the changes in volume and profitability of insider trading 
that may have been caused by the Cady, Roberts decision in November 
1961 and the April 1965 Texas Gitif Stilphtir decision based on insider 
reports to the SEC, reaches the same conclusion. 97 
The problem with all the findings based on SEC filings is that they are 
biased toward finding. no effect since they 'look only at. data that insiders 
voluntarily disclose'; as Easterbrook points out 'it is unlikely that insiders 
file reports condemning themselves. 98 
Gupta and Misra have suggested that the run-up 'could well be an 
unbiased market response to publicly available information that increases 
the probability of a takeover. '99 
Any further analysis on the validity of assumption 9 appears to be 
beyond the scope of this paper. It will be taken for granted that assumption 
9 holds in order to proceed with considering the problem of possible 
benefits of insider trading to non insiders (i. e. assumption 5). 
In an effort to examine the potential benefit of insider trading to non- 
insiders and to clarify the concept of inside information H. Schmidt makes 
the distinction between model and event information: 100 
"Event information is inforiization on observable facts such as progress hi the 
developinent of a new product on the current level of sales or interest rates. Model 
information is inforniation on valuation niodels or on tratislatioti tizodels. Models for 
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the valuation of shares usually discount future cash returns to shareholders. 
Translation models translate event injornzation into the inputs needed by valitation 
inodels, e. g. they translate changes itz sales or wages into changes of cash return to 
shareholders. " 
It is most probable that executives do have superior translation 
model information which may be implicitly related, in part, in the regular 
disclosures of a company but because of its complexity it can not be "fully 
communicated to outsiders. "101 
In this case executives can trade with outsiders, on this information, 
and their transactions can have an impact on share prices so as to get them 
in line with economic reality. As H. Schmidt puts it: "insider trading may 
eliminate distortion in relative share prices. "102 
At first glance this could be a benefit of insider trading at least on 
model translation information, but under the condition that the cost, 
which would ultimately be borne by public companies and society, is 
smaller than the benefit. 
If the cost is higher than the benefit, share price level falls and the 
cost of capital rises in comparison with a situation where insider trading is 
restricted and some distortion occurs. In this particular case it can hardly 
be argued that insider trading on model information should prevail. 
In recent years a more cautious approach is adopted by regulators and 
scholars: 103 
Spectacular and sudden losses to insiders are most likely to produce 
the strongest investor and market-maker reactions and may even have 
disruptive effects whereas the excess returns of insider transactions 
reported to the SEC during the first months after the transaction are on 
average 1%. 104 In the latter case the process by which the corresponding 
losses are transferred from the prime victim to the ultimate victim can 
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probably take care of these losses without any disruptions of market-maker 
and investor activities and, therefore, a less than proportionate reaction of 
the prime victim (market-maker or investor) compared with spectacular 
and sudden losses. 105 If regulation and enforcement focus on insider 
transactions yielding "sudden and very substantial rates of excess return" 
as H. Schmidt points out, much of the marginal possible gross gain from 
regulation can be captured. According to the same commentator such 
transactions are motivated by undisclosed event information. 106 
In addition to the 'undistorted relative share prices' theory on the 
possible benefits from insider trading to non insiders, there is the 
'compensation package' theory which has been sufficiently covered in 
previous paragraphs. 
The above argumentation seems to point to the conclusion that has 
been stated by Carlton and Fischel who claim that the 'apparent absence of 
widespread prohibitions of insider trading in employment contracts and 
corporate charters and the existence of common law rules permitting 
insider trading create a strong presumption that the practice may be 
beneficial in some circumstances. '107 
H. Schmidt remarks with felicity that this proposition although it is 
not as convincing as it may appear at first glance, should not be neglected 
in the regulatory debate. 108 At this point he compares the German insider 
regulation (i. e. the legislation of his jurisdiction) with insider restrictions 
in the United Kingdom and in Ireland. 
Whereas in the U. K. and in Ireland all companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange have been voluntarily accepting insider measures beyond what 
is legally required and relevant private restrictions are also included in 
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and in the Granville Market 
General Undertaking, in Germany the matter was, until recently, dealt 
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with in employment contracts. 109 It is also noteworthy that the German 
insider rules were not tied into a listing package that a company must 
accept or reject as a whole, but it might at any time decide to discontinue 
the insider restrictions without affecting its status as a listed company. 
However, no such motion has ever been presented at a general meeting 
and this can be an indication as to the ultimate 'net cost'110 to outsiders. 
The only final conclusion of universal application that seems 
inevitable is that there is no economic foundation for inwidatory insider 
regulation. On the other hand there is no reliable evidence so far to 
support the possibly beneficial results of noncompulsory insider 
regulation. 
d. The American Experience (Related Legal Theories) 
The United States enjoys the reputation of having the most 
comprehensive and expansive system of securities regulation in the 
ivorld. 111 Abuses in securities transactions that were considered 
instrumental in precipitating the stock market crash of 1929 necessitated 
efforts to control, among others, insider trading transactions. In the early 
1930s the common law prohibited fraudulent transactions in securities 
markets. Prior to the Depression, insider trading actions were 
uncommon. 112 In 1933, Congress passed the Securities Act, followed in 
1934 by the Securities Exchange Act. 113 The 1934 Act, whose goals, as 
President Roosevelt noted, were to restore honesty and public confidence 
in the securities market, 114 addressed insider trading indirectly through 
section 16(b) strict liability and through section 10(b) liability for fraud. 115 
An analysis of the United States regulation on Insider Trading provides, 
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according to one commentator, helpful insights for analyzing the EC 
Directive. 116 
The principal source of federal regulation of insider dealing in the 
United States is Rule lOb-5 which was promulgated pursuant to the 1934 
Act. In addition to the "broad sweep"117 proscription of Rule 10b-5 , Rule 
14e-3 (promulgated pursuant to the 1934 Act) and section 16(b) of the 1934 
Act, also regulate insider trading. 
Rule 14e-3 attempts to restrict insider trading in the context of tender 
offers by prohibiting anyone who possesses information relating to a 
tender offer from trading in the target company securities if (1)the bidder 
has taken a substantial step toward commencement of a tender offer (a US 
practice of offering securities to the public by inviting them to tender a 
price; the securities are then sold to the highest bidder); (2)the person 
possessing the information knows or has reason to know that the 
information came from the bidder or target company; and (3)the person 
possessing the information knows or has reason to know that the 
information is non-public. In a Rule 14e-3 action there is no requirement 
that a fiduciary relationship exist between the trader or tipper and the 
target company's shareholders. 1 18 As it will be shown, Rule 14e-3 was the 
response119 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC) 
to the strict statutory construction of Rule 10b-5 in the Chiarella v. United 
States 120 case. 
Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits "short-swing" profits by 
insiders regardless of the nature of the information utilized to make the 
trade. The objective of this proscription is to prevent insider trading on 
the part of designated insiders: officers, directors and major shareholders. 
Steven R. Salbu supports that this approach creates an "irrebuttable 
presumption of unfair use of information when insiders turn a fast profit 
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by either the purchase or sale of securities. " 121 Under section 16(b) profits 
are recoverable "irrespective of any intention on the part of such 
beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of 
holding the security purchased ..... for a period exceeding six months. "122 
Only a corporation or a shareholder suing derivatively may bring a section 
16(b) action since the SEC lacks authority to enforce section 16(b). 
Rule 10-5, as already mentioned, constitutes the more important 
and more commonly used123 proscription of insider trading for both the 
SEC and private investors. It is a general provision prol-dbiting "fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. " The rule states: 124 
"it shall be unlartful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
ineans or instrumentality of interstate conn? zerce, or of the nzail5, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to inake any untriie statement of a material fact or oinit to state a inaterial 
fact necessanj in order to make the statements inade, in the light of the circumstances 
under WhiCh they were inade, not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fiaud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. " 
In the absence of a specific reference to insider trading, courts have to 
construe this rule broadly so as to prohibit insider trading when in 
possession of material, non-public information. This is one of the reasons 
why the definition of insider trading liability has mainly developed 
through case law. 125 
The enforcement of Rule 10b-5 has also required substantial judicial 
interpretation of the definition of fraud because trading is typically made 
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"in the absence of express statements in which misrepresentation can be 
found. "126 It was made necessary, therefore, "to establish the conditions 
under ivWch fraud can be inferred from silent trading. "127 
The major strength of Rule 10b-5 is its breadth which gave United 
States courts the possibility of applying it to insider trading violations. in 
1946 the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania128 
created private causes of action (i. e. mainly damages) for insider trading. 
More recently the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of these private 
claims. 129 United States Courts have expanded the scope of the Rule to 
reach non-insiders such as tippees and, in some situations lawyers and 
accountants of corporations. 130 Amy E. Stutz remarks that the weakness of 
Rule 10b-5 is found in its strength, in view of the fact that United States 
Courts have manipulated and expanded the reach of Rule 10b-5 
substantially on an ad hoc basis. 131 
The Securities and Exchange Commission construed the antifraud 
I 
provisions of the 1934 Act broadly in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 132 The 
Commission held that Rule 10b-5'can apply to corporate outsiders who 
trade on information unavailable to the public. The so called "disclose or 
abstain ritle" originates in this case which, according to Reinier Kraakman 
is the best known and most ambiguous "sentence in the corpits of insider 
trading case law. "133 In the Commission's words the rationale for 
invoking Rule 10b-5 offered by Cady, Roberts & Co, (the first SEC decision 
to address insider trading on the open market) rested on two principal 
elements: 134 
'First, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and not for the 
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a 
parhj takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with 
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whoin lie is dealing., 135 
The "disclose or abstain rule" requires anyone possessing material, 
non-public information about a corporation to refrain from trading in the 
securities of that corporation or to disclose the information to the market. 
The Second Circuit supported the Commission in its expansive reading of 
Rule lOb-5 in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpluir CO. 136, stating that anyone in 
possession of inside information is required either to disclose the 
information publicly or to refrain from trading in relevant securities. In 
the opinion of Salbu Texas Gtilf Sulphur contains "the most liberal 
interpretation of the 1934 Act to date, evincing a philosophy that any 
trading on material information not available to the public is inherently 
unfair and destructive to the efficiency of securities marketS. "137 
The theoretical system that underlies the Cady and the Texas Gulf 
Stilphtir cases has been christened "Eqtial Access Theory" by Kraakman 
who supports that the main doctrinal advantage of this theory is the 
creation of a "simple rule against exploiting almost all informational 
disparities that are popularly perceived to give an unfair trading 
advantage. "138 According to the same commentator the theory could also 
incriminate tippees and financial printers for violating their obligations to 
disclose or abstain regardless of whether the information originates 
outside the company, since the "essence of wrongdoing lies in exploiting 
an informational advantage over other traders. "139 
The Equal Access Theory and the "wholesale allocation of trading 
rights in non-public information to investors at large, except where 
informed traders earn an exclusive right to private information the hard 
way, through their own research and analysis"140, was at odds with the 
Supreme Court's own effort during the seventies to delimit liability under 
Rule 10b-5. The first insider trading case in the Supreme Court signaled 
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the end of the "Expansion Era"141 of judicial interpretation by rejecting the 
equal access theory and restricting "the previously wide net of liability 
derived from Texas Gtilf Sidphur. It was in the Chiarella v. United 
StateS142 case where the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction of a financial printer who deciphered the code names of target 
companies in a tender offer and made a profit of $30,000. The Court held 
that the duty to disclose under Rule lOb-5 "does not arise from the mere 
possession of non-public market information, "l 43 and that there is a duty 
to disclose only if a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties to the 
transaction. 144 The Court did not find this relationship existing between 
Chiarella and the sellers of the target company stock. 145 In response to 
Chiarella's limitation of liability under Rule 10b-5, the SEC promulgated 
Rule 14e-3 pursuant to section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, prohibiting both 
insiders and outsiders from trading on material, non-public information 
relating to corporate tender offers. The extent to which Rule 14e-3 
augments the "post-Chiarella efficacy of insider trading laws is still 
uncertain. "146 The issue is currently being addressed by the Second Circuit 
in United States v. Chestinan. 147 
Tippee liability is similarly limited. It is based on a fiduciary duty of 
the insider to the corporation's shareholders, a duty which is breached by 
the insider divulging such information to the tippee. 148 In Dirks v. SEC, 149 
Dirks, a securities analyst received a tip from a former officer of Equity 
Funding of America (EFA) that the company's assets were overstated. 
Dirks, the tippee, disclosed the information to his clients. The Supreme 
Court held that the former EFA officer -the tipper- did not breach the duty 
to disclose because he did not seek a personal gain and outlined the scope 
of this duty: 
The test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, 
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froin this disclosure. Absent some personal gaitt, there has been no breach of dlity to 
stockbrokers. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach lby 
the tippeel., 750 
The Court has not defined the scope of this benefit requirement. 
Lower courts, however, have required the benefit to be a personal one 
which enriches the insider monetarily. 151 Finally, in order to find the 
tiPpee liable for trading on such information conveyed by the insider, the 
tippee must have actual or constructive knowledge that the insider 
breached his fiduciary duty by disclosing such information. 152 
The "Fiduciary Duty Theory"153, as the reasonings in the Chiarella 
and the Dirks cases have been named by Kraakman, could not cover the 
It quasi-insider", 154 who does not fit the traditional corporation law notion 
of a person who owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a 
corporation. 155 Lower courts have developed the misappropriation theory 
156 in such circumstances. Although the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit upheld the misappropriation theory, 157 the United 
States Supreme Court has not resolved the issue. '-58 Chief Justice Burger 
first introduced the misappropriation theory in his dissent in Chiarella. 159 
Under this theory, a person who has misappropriated, or "stolen", non- 
public information has an absolute duty to disclose the information or 
abstain from trading. Consequently, liability is extended to persons 
possessing material non-public information who use the information in 
violation of a duty owned to someone other than the shareholders of the 
corporation whose securities were traded. 160 Such a person has in effect 
stolen information in the context of a relationship of trust and confidence 
between the trader and the source of the information. This requisite 
relationship typically exists between an employee and employer, or an 
investment advisor and a client. 161 
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The United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit in United States v. 
NezvinanI62 adopted this theory in holding that the use of confidential 
information by an employee breaches the employee's fiduciary duty to the 
employer and therefore constitutes fraud, triggering Rule 10b-5.163 
In Carpenter v. United States, 164 the Supreme Court examined 
trading by R. Foster Winans, author of the "Heard on the Street" column 
of the Wall Street jotirnal, and alleged tippees employed by Kidder 
Peabody. Winans and the tippees were accused of using information 
contained in articles for future publication in Winans' column. 165 The 
Court reached a deadlock of 4-4 on the issues of insider trading and 
misappropriation, affirming the lower court's conviction on separate 
issues of mail fraud. SalbU166 claims that, at present, trades made by 
insiders using publicly unavailable information are prohibited under 
American Law only with proof that the insider traded on material non- 
public information in violation of a fiduciary duty. 
A considerable amount of criticism has been leveled against the 
misappropriation theory. Langevoort characterizes it as "awkward at best, 
essentially federalizing the law of corporate intellectual property and 
employee responsibility for securities law purposes without any real 
justification, except in terms of result -a means of permitting the SEC to 
reach what intuitively are abusive trading practices that were thought to 
be unreachable under the post-Chiarella fraud on the marketplace 
theory. "167 
Kraakman examines the question whether the misappropriation 
theory's extended ban will survive the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. 168 
He supposes that the theory's chances of survival may have improved 
since the enactment of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA). "Without making any explicit 
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endorsements, ITSFEA seems to bolster the misappropriation theory 
indirectly by including a provision that permits contemporaneous public 
traders to bring a private action against market insiders even when they 
would lack standing to sue under the misappropriation case law. "169 
The developments in the American insider trading doctrine that the 
past decade has witnessed should not be simply perceived as an extended 
discussion of the legal concept of fraud which "the Supreme Court has 
identified as the operative core of Rule lOb-5. "170 The fact that the equal 
access theory has been superseded by the fiduciary duty and 
misappropriation theories reveals a choice against a "market-centered 
response to insider trading that is based on global assertions about the 
fairness or efficiency of informational disparities in the market. "171 The 
fiduciary duty and misappropriation theories already reach most conduct 
that would be condemned by the equal access theory or by a position-based 
definition of regulated insiders, such as the formulation adopted by the 
European Community Directive which shifts the emphasis back to the 
securities market as will be shown in the analysis of the European 
approach (under e). The main problem that doctrinal concerns may pose is 
that they could distract law-makers from the real issue of "how best to 
allocate trading rights over the range of individual circumstances in 
which trading infon-nation is produced. "172 
It has been made clear, so far, that the United States Congress 
expanded its regulation of the United States securities markets through 
the years to meet changes in "marketplace" trading. 173 Section 10(b) was 
originally intended only as a general prohibition of deceitful or 
manipulative practices. 174 As Amy E. Stutz points out: 'when section 10(b) 
was enacted in 1934, individuals dominated trading. ' Courts interpreted 
broadly the language of both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in order to 
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provide a legal basis for holding tippees as well as primary insiders guilty 
of insider trading and meet the changing needs of the market. The broad 
scope and flexibility of these rules have been proved to be their weakness 
and make them susceptible to judicial abuse. The latter possibility becomes 
particularly obvious in the light of the ad hoc (even piecemeal) basis on 
which courts usually confront them. 
The Supreme Court affirmed, recently the misappropriation theory 
in United States v O'Hagan (No 96-842,1997 US LEXIS 4033 1997). 
O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm retained by Grand Metropolitan plc as 
a local counsel in connection with their proposed takeover bid for 
Pillsbury. Although not directly involved in the transaction, Mr O'Hagan 
nevertheless obtained non-public information from a fellow partner who 
was and bought both stock and call options in Pillsbury. On the 
announcement of the tender offer, the Pillsbury stock rose and O'Hagan 
realised a profit of $4.3m. SEC noticed Mr O'Hagan's trading activity and 
he was subsequently convicted on 57 counts and sentenced to 41 months' 
imprisom-nent on the basis of his violation of s. 10(b), as construed under 
the misappropriation theory. 
The Court of Appeals of the 8th Circuit reversed all of the 
convictions on a majority decision, holding that criminal liability under 
s. 10(b) could not rest on the misappropriation theory. This decision left the 
law on insider dealing in a shambles. 17-9 This was the position faced by the 
Supreme Court the Majority of whom in effect restored the decision of the 
original District Court by upholding the misappropriation theory as 
complementary to the classical theory. Both theories, according to the 
decision are bases-for conviction under r. 10b-5. 
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e. The European Approach. The fiduciary implication or the journey 
from the corporate to the securities market approach. 
The American experience on securities regulation can offer two 
undeniably useful lessons to the EC legislator: A 'broad, flexible approach 
to the regulation of insider trading"176 is desirable but a "clear definition 
of terms"177 is nonetheless necessary to prevent judicial abuse. As it will 
be shown later the relative EC Directive has (according to the majority of 
commentators) accomplished the aforementioned objectives whereas its 
main shortcomings rest on the sector of enforcement and sanctions. 
A study of the legal theory that underlies the Insider Regulation in 
Europe should not be simply perceived either as an attempt to 
comprehend the catises that led most European countries to promulgate 
laws against the abusive use of privileged insider information or as a 
discussion of "the merits and the demerits of insiders' actions". 178 As 
Alain Viandier remarks, most specialists, when they try to highlight the 
rational bases of the regulation, are satisfied with catch words such as 
feqitality, loyalty and efficiency' before proceeding with the examination 
of the incriminating conditions. 179 
The study of P. Lascoumes on 'the interests protected by the new 
federal law on insider trading (art 161 Of the Swiss penal code)'180., which is 
in line with R. Ihering and the TUbingen School of 
'Interessenjurisprtidenz'181, provides an ideal point of departure for 
reflection on the European theoretical justification of insider dealing 
regulation. According to Lascoumes' study, the regulation on insider 
trading is aiming at the protection of the interests of "the company issuing 
shares whose price may be affected by privileged information and market 
information. "182 According to Viandier183 there is a'disparity between the 
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advertized basis and the actual setup, as if the basis had a merely evocative 
value and no real working quality at all' when it comes to examining the 
regulations. 
The traditional argument pro regulation, focusing on the confidence 
of the investing public has gained new force as a result of the public 
attention which the relatively recent insider scandals have increased. 184 In 
most of the European securities and capital market regulation systems the 
demands for fairness and for a level playing field are winning 
through. 185 Professor Hopt claims that 'from a legal policy view, the 
balance of the scale - taking into account Europe 1992 and the desirability 
Of Well-ftinctioning international financial inarkets - is pro regulation of 
insider dealing and, in that case, pro European harmonization of insider 
law. '186 
The above 'dualist presentation', i. e. the efforts to justify the insider 
regulation either by the necessity to protect companies or by the demand to 
protect the market has been branded by Viandier as 'undoubtedly 
simplistic'. In the latter's opinion the concept of information as property 
should not be totally ignored. 
The evolution of the, otherwise lacking the benefit of strong 
historical antecedents in national fo ral 87, legal theory of insider regulation 
in Europe will be followed along three successive points: the protection of 
the company (inextricably linked to the fiduciary theory), the protection of 
the market and, finally, the protection of information. 188 
i) Protection of the CompMy. 
In his study on the development of UK insider law and the possible 
impact of the EC Insider Dealing Directive on the British legislation, P. L. 
Davies189 exposes the uncertainty as to 'whether the purpose of the insider 
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trading laws was to strengthen the controls already imposed by equity on 
certain relationships in the corporate sphere because of their. fiduciary 
character, or whether the purpose was not rather to regulate relationships 
in the securities markets, irrespective of whether these had previously 
been characterized by the common law as having a fiduciary character'. 190 
In the company law or fiduciary model of insider trading laws, the 
paradigm case is that of the director of a company who trades in the shares 
of the company, making abusive use of the privileged information he has 
obtained by reason of his fiduciary relationship with the company. The 
main constituting elements of the illegal act are the deliberate exploitation 
of unpublished price-sensitive information obtained through a privileged 
relationship and the purpose to make a profit or avoid a loss by dealing in 
securities the price of which would be substantially influenced by the 
public disclosure of this information. 191 
The French Commission of Bourse Operations (COB) stated as early 
as 1976 that 'the company managers are mandated by the shareholders, 
they are accountable to them for the future of the firm, and the use for any 
personal reasons of important information - which is an element of 
common patrimony - can only be seen as disloyal behaviour. '192 Viandier 
observes that most of the relative legal texts in Europe 'bear the trace of 
influence of the fiduciary explanation', and the latter is more than 
obvious in preparatory documents. In the project-draft for art 161 of the 
Swiss penal code there is also a fiduciary duty theoretical basis. According 
to the quotation of Viandier the document presents the insider as a person 
'violating his duties towards the company (and) betraying the relationsl-dp 
of trust with a firm. 1193 This is also clear in the early discussions in the 
UK194. The Jenkins Committee195, in an attempt not strictly within the 
fiduciary duty approach, wished to provide a civil remedy for the other 
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party who traded with the insider, not only had to confront the traditional 
reluctance of English company law to recognize that directors owed 
fiduciary duties to individual shareholders but also with the basic rule in 
English Law of Caveat Einptor. According to the analysis of Davies it was 
doubtful whether the Committee saw this proposal as simply extending to 
a new range of beneficiaries the fiduciary duties traditionally owed by 
directors to their companies or whether they saw it as a first step towards 
the general regulation of relations between and among market traders. 196 
The civil sanctions proposals came under attack by the JUSTICE 
Committee which argued that, in the case of Stock Exchange trading, 
where the matching of any particular vendor with any particular 
purchaser was made entirely by chance, 'there is no obvious justification 
for giving a vendor who happens to have sold shares to an insider a 
remedy which is not available to the vendors who have sold similar 
shares at the same time and at the same price to outsiders'. 197 Perhaps 
because of this attack the proposals were never enacted. 
In Chase Manhattaii Eqtdties Ltd v Goodman198 Knox J interpreted 
section 8(3) of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, which 
provides that no transaction is void or voidable by reason only that it was 
entered into in contravention of sec. 1 of the Act, making the remark that: 
"if the premise that Parliament by enacting sec. 8(3) provided that no civil 
consequences should J107V front itiftingements of lite 1985 Act then indeed Would be a 
strong indication that the court should not prevent the sale agreement from being 
completed. It does not however necessarily follow that because Parliament has said 
that )to transaction is void or voidable by reason ottly of an infringement of sec. 7, 
therefore such a transaction is not to be regarded as illegal. Tile illegality is there by 
operation of lazu and lite provisions of sec. 8(3) prevent what would otherwise be the 
consequences that transactions on the Stock Exchange would need to be nnivound. "199 
1 
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According to Knox j the purpose of sec. 8(3) is to protect the workings 
of the Stock Exchange and prevent completed transactions from being 
unwound. On the other hand, Knox J points out that where Parliament 
desires an enactment imposing criminal penalties not to have 
consequences in civil law it does so in terms. Finally he concludes: 
"The problem has to be solved Inj an identification of the purpose of Parliament 
in choosing the words actually used in sec. 8(3) rather than providing for transactions 
not to be enforceable in tile stated circuinstances. Unenforceable and voidable 
contracts are different in inany respects and Parliantent inust be takell to have 
appreciated this. A principal factor which the Parliatyient niust have had in view in 
enacting sec. 8(3), inter alia, was to prevent the disruption of coinpleted Stock 
Exchange transactions. The arguntent in javour of the parliaillentary intention having 
been wider resides principally in the fact that sec. 8(3), inter alia, prevents an 
agreetnent to sell securitiesfroin being voidable solely oil the ground of infritzgetnents 
of the Act and that is not litnited to coinpleted transactions. Nevertheless I conclude 
that within the narrowfield of refusing to lend the court's assistance at tile suit of a 
person guilty of critninal conduct, there reinains rooin for tile applicatioll of tile ex 
turpi causa doctrine. I take into account that tile niachinery of the Stock Exchange 
has not operated in relation to the sale agreement and that only the parties to the 
original dealing which is tainted by illegality [emphasis added] are involved. Tile 
sale agreement is therefore in nzy view unenforceable. Since tile body with tile legal 
title to the shares which were involved in the illegality is before the court and 
subinits to do what is directed I take the view that I should inake the sought in para. 
I(A) of the relief prayed for in the stateinent of clahn subject to altering tile 
expression therein 'unlauful contrary to' to 'unenforceable because it was tainted in 
its creation by an infringeinent of. No question of dainages itz iny judgeinent arises and 
the counterclainiS will be disinissed. -200 
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In France there has been an effort to deepen the fiduciary approach by 
obliging the perpetrator of insider dealing to pay back to the company the 
profits made on inside information and by imposing penalties. This was 
the case according to the former wording of the French Ordinance of 28 
September 1967.201 This effort was very soon abandoned, 202 and the 
sanction of paying back profits was replaced by post facto criminal penalties 
for persons effecting transactions on the basis of privileged information. It 
should be noted that the scope of the Ordinance is not confined to persons 
holding a fiduciary relationship with the company but is directed past the 
company managers at those people, whatever their relationship with the 
company, 'who while exercising their profession or their function hold 
privileged information. '203 
The French regulation is rather the rule than the exception at least 
among EC Member States' regulations. Many such regulations similarly 
adopt an insider definition which goes beyond fiduciary relationshipS. 204 
The English legislators took the view that the definition of 'insider' 
should be wide, so as to include not merely directors but also employees of 
the company and 'other persons having access, in the course of their 
employment, business or profession, to confidential information relating 
to the company . '20,5 Davies argues that in the case of British legislation: 
I rather the extension of the list of people brought within the insider dealing 
prohibition resulted froin, not an abandonment of the fiduciary theory, but rather 
froin a more sophisticated application of it, in particular fi-oin a recognition that 
circumstances can arise in which people other thatz directors owe fiduciary ditties to 
the company. The focus was still on the insider1company relationship, it had not 
been transferred to the relationship between the insider and other traders., 206 
This is a justified criticism as regards the theories underlying British 
insider dealing statutes. In the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 
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1985 the incrimination for insider trading concerns the managers, the 
persons holding the information by virtue of being connected with the 
company, those planning a takeover and the public servant, 207 whereas 
the wording of the Belgian counterpart embraces all those who know 
'through function or profession' information that might noticeably 
influence the value of securitieS. 208 The EC harmonization effort in the 
Insider Dealing directive also distances itself from the fiduciary duty 
theory and defines as insider: 
'any person who by virtue of his membership in the administrative, 
managerial or supervisory bodies of a company, or because lie has access to such 
information in the course of his employment, profession or ditties., 209 
Viandier remarks that in the regulation studied there is no (or, better, 
there is no more) provision for repayment of profits and claims that this 
weakens the fiduciary explanation. 21 0 In other words, if the emphasis was 
placed on the prediction of the company interests, 'how are we to 
understand that any damages incurred are not repaired forthwith? '211 
Farrar supports that a possible recovery by the company would be a 
'windfall' on the grounds that the company has not been harmed by the 
transactionS212 and this is probably the idea which underlies insider 
regulations in most Community countries. 
The role that the fiduciary implication can play in current European 
legislation seems purely that of a theoretical ruler. It is no longer the case 
that the line must be drawn between fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries but, 
without any illusions of having reached a definite conclusion, between 
the 'chance insider' and the insider through 'profession or fitnction. ' 273 
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ii) Protection of the Market. 
The focus of attention of European insider legislation, unlike its 
American counterpart (at least as regards case law) has moved from the 
interests of the company to the protection of the inarket and the 
confidence of investors which is inextricably linked to the smooth 
operation of the market. 
The market efficiency arguments and the concept of market 
egalitarianism (according to the Americans) or equity (according to the 
British) are reexamined by Farrar214 as a possible justification for insider 
regulation. The rapid assimilation of all available market information 
about a company and the reflection of that information into the share 
price, 'enables resources to be sufficiently allocated', and contributes, 
therefore, to the creation of an efficient stock market. 215 On the other 
hand, the law should try to ensure that all investors (or future investors) 
are placed on an equal footing. These are in simple terms the two ideas 
which justify the safeguarding of the market: The efficiency of operating 
and the equality of operators. 216 
In the preparatory stage for the drafting of the Insider Dealing 
Directive competence was shared between the Commission's Directorate- 
General XV for Financial Institutions and Taxation and the Directorate- 
General III which is in charge of company law harmonization. The fact 
that responsibility remained finally with DGAV 'predetermined in a way 
the abolition of a merely corporate law approach to the insider problem' 
and the selection of a market-oriented solution as K. Hopt observes. 217 
The theoretical foundation of the Directive218 for rendering insider 
dealing illegal is the view that insider dealing undermines the confidence 
which investors should be able to have in the market. 219 For an effective 
market in securities, according to the Preamble, every measure should be 
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taken to ensure that the market runs smoothly and that, to a large extent, 
depends on investor confidence. The arguments and the conclusions of 
economic theory and research seem to have had only some vague 
influence on the justifications presented in the Preamble of the Directive. 
The Directive should be studied in the context of the general EC 
ideology on stock-market transactions which is embedded in the 
Commission Recommendation of 25 July 1977 concerning a European 
code of conduct relating to transactions in transferable securities 
(77/ 534/EEC). This code contains principles relating to the proper use of 
price sensitive information and its objective is to establish standards of 
ethical behaviour throughout the Community, to promote the effective 
functioning of securities markets and to safeguard the public interest. On 
insider dealing the code stated: 
'Any Persoll 7VII0 comes into possession of information, in exercising his 
profession or camjing out his duties, which is not public and Which relates to a 
company or to the market in its securities or to any event of general interest to the 
market, Which is price sensitive, should refrain fi-om carrying out, directlY or 
indirectly any transaction in which such information is used, and should reftain from 
giving the information to another person so that lie may profit from it before the 
information becomes public. ' 
The features that differentiate the approach of the Directive from the 
previous approach of the existing Member States insider regulations stem 
from the definition of insider and the definition of information. The first 
thing to note is that the requirement of confidentiality has gone. 
Information must just be precise, non-public and price sensitive. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the information need not be acquired by virtue of a 
relationship with the coinpany. As Davies concludes: 
'Obviously, issuers of securities do benefit indirectly if the markets ill U711 
Of 
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their securities are traded are 'clean', but it might be thought that tile main purpose 
of insider dealing Ia7VS iS not to prevent companies being overreached by 
fidnciaries. '220 
The influence of the finality of market protection is a fact in many 
European insider regulations (EU and non-EU). The French equality 
theory, an improved version of the American equal access theory, 
prohibits all insider transactions that infringe upon either market integrity 
or the igalitj Wale (ideal equality) of investors. 221 Thus, French law 
moves one step beyond U. S. law and the equal access theory, to address 
explicitly the entire market place, not merely shareholders of a particular 
issuer. Some commentators even perceive the French approach as part of 
the democratic tradition of the country, 222 or remark that: 
Ta volonti de Ynoraliser le nzarchi boursier ripond h une prioccupation, sition h 
une hantisse aussi ancienne que l' institution de la Bourse elle-in6ine. '223 ('7"he will to 
moralize the financial markets corresponds to a preoccupation, if not an obsessive 
fear, as old as the Stock Exchange ifself., 224) 
According to the Belgian law definition of privileged information 
this is not any information, but information liable to have an influence 
on stock-exchange priceS. 225 The law of 9 March 1989 refers to information 
I which, if it was made public, would be, due to its exactitude and certainty, 
such as to influence noticeably the value of securities quoted on the 
official listing. '226 
In British law there has been an ambiguity between the goal of the 
protection of companies against abuse by fiduciaries and quasi-fiduciaries 
and the goal of market protection. 227 The definition of inside information 
as 'unpublished price-sensitive information' is indicative of market 
protection tendencies and, as Davies succinctly puts it, 'the EC Directive is 
merely pushing British law down a road it has already shown considerable 
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willingness to tread. '228 
The Swiss penal code (Art 161) follows the EC tendencies by requiring 
information to be liable to have a noticeable influence on the price. 229 
It should be stressed that the broader definition of information and, 
perhaps, the most market-oriented one can be found in the Convention 
on Insider Trading of the Council of Europe. 230 The definition of the 
Convention is broader than the ones of the English Company Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [s. 10(a)] and the EC Directive in two respeCtS: 231 
First, it contains no requirement of 'specificity'. According to both the U. K. 
Act and the Directive, as well as the laws of other Member States, the 
information must be specific, that is, have a degree of certainty and refer to 
specific matters or be of sufficiently precise and certain character. Secondly, 
the Convention refers to information wl-dch if it were disclosed would be 
likely to have an effect on the 'stock market', in contrast with most 
Member State regulations which follow to a larger or a lesser extent the 
U. K. model and require information to have a substantial effect on the 
price of securities in question if made public. 
The main weakness of the market protection theoretical basis is that 
it confines protection to publicly recognized investment security 
markets. 232 The EC Directive envisages the possibility of extending the 
regulation to operations performed 'outside the market' despite the 
reference to the interests of the market in the 'recitals'. The reasons for 
limiting regulations to 'controlled' markets are easy to understand. Listing 
requirements and investigation possibilities are among the most 
prominent. But, as Viandier animadverts, the administrative capacity is 
neither a criterion nor a condition but rather a quality for the existence, of 
the market. 233 The market-protection theory is not discredited by 
examining its weaknesses, but rather the realization of its inefficiencies is 
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an incitement to further analysis of information in its own right. 
iii) Protection of Information (an alternative Market Regime) 
Information as immaterial property can be the object of rights, it can 
be appropriated, usurped and protected. Mis appropriation or usurpation of 
information can 'give rise to civil, even penal, sanctions as in the case of 
the professional secret or the industrial secret. '234 
The idea of conceiving information as a 'patrimonial' value, a 
property, has attracted attention in the Carpenter caSe235 in the context of 
the application of the mail and fraud statutes. The idea is present in the 
reports of the French Bourse Opera tions Commission (COB) for 1976236, 
where the standpoint that information is a common patrimonial as well 
as a corporate element is adopted. 237 
The special nature of information and the realization that it is not 
'the professions, the functions or some kind of fiduciary duty that 
designates [persons] as insiders; it is more simply the nature of 
information they hold. '238 The stock-exchange information is a property 
only to be used collectively. 239 The (of common notoriety) alternatives are 
to refrain from playing or to disclose. 
In the (British) DT1 consultative document on the implementation of 
the EC Directive it is stressed that 'as one of the objectives of the law is to 
prevent the misuse of inside information it is important that the 
definition of insider cover all those who are likely to have insider 
inform a tion. '240 This possibility is quickly rejected by Davies because the 
enactment of such as proposition 'could cause damaging uncertainty in 
the markets, as individuals attempted to identify whether or not they were 
covered. '241 Davies rightly argues that the uncertainty that this proposal 
might generate would not be productive of any greater uncertainty than 
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the current (British) ruleS. 242 
The relaxing of the requirement of confidentiality of information and 
of the relationship of the insider with the company that the EC Directive 
has achieved make more important the questions of whether the 
information is price sensitive and, especially, whether it is public. 
The nature of information will be critical for the incrimination of 
tippees. The latter, that is, must be aware of the sensitive nature of the 
information communicated. The special nature of information basis will 
enable the outlawing of insider trading whatever the place of operation is, 
in or outside the market, overcoming, thus, the weakness of the strict 
market-protection approach and demonstrating that 'the market, if it 
simplifies prohibition by setting up a practical structure, has no virtue of 
its own. '243 
Unlike the direction that the American courts and legislator have 
taken, the evolution of insider regulation on an EC level has followed in 
rough terms similar stages. The strictly corpora te-company protection 
approach embedded in the fiduciary duty theory, which favoured a mild 
regulation and perpetuated inelegant incoherence in the insider 
regulation environment, 244 has been superseded by the trend towards 
market protection. 
In recent years the role of the notion of protected information is 
becoming increasingly apparent in regulation initiatives. 245 The future 
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C. The European Insider Dealing Directivel 
Analysis 
The application of the Directive is determined by the presence of cer- 
tain elements which constitute "insider dealing". Specific conditions con- 
cerning persons who have special duties, the nature of the information 
these persons possess and the securities to which this information relates 
are of critical importance. 2 
1. Insiders 
The possession of "inside information" is a conditio sine qtia non for 
the application of the insider dealing prohibition but "if everybody who 
got hold of a piece of inside information had to be considered as an in- 
sider", as Professor Hopt remarks, "this would hamper even disclosure to 
the public. "3 The concept of insider should be, therefore, modified beyond 
the mere possession of inside information. Every insider regulation must 
fulfil this requirement. 
Insiders are usually classified into two categories: firstly, those in 
direct contact with inside information by status or profession and, 
secondly, those who get to know the inside information from the persons 
of the first category. The first category are called pritnary and the second 
secondary insiders. The distinction is not made by the text of the Directive 
but has been used in the preparatory work and is used by many 
commentators. 4 The terms coinpany insiders, for the first category, and 
tippees for the second have also been used. In the opinion of Hopt the 
tenn company insiders is too narrow for the scope of the Directive and the 
term professional insiders could be an appropriate alternative given that 
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the Directive extends the first category of insiders beyond the company 
insiders including the shareholders of the company and, generally, all 
those who get access to inside information by their status or profession. 5 
The practical importance of the distinction between priinary and 
secotidary insiders is that each group falls into the scope of application of 
certain different rules. 6 At this point it should be noted that primary 
insiders can be natural persons or legal entities as specified in Article 2(2) 
of the Directive. In that case the Directive applies to the natural persons 
Nvho take part in the decision to carry out the transaction for the account of 
the legal person concerned. 7 
a) primary insiders 
Primary insiders are defined by the Directive in Article 2(1) as follows: 
4persons possessing inside inforitiationi by virtite of their nienibership of tile 
administrative, inanagetnent or supervisory bodies of tile issiter, 
-1persons possessing inside inforination] by viritte of their holding in file capital of 
the issiter, 
4persons possessing inside inforniationi because they have access to such inforillatioll 
by virtite of the exercise of their einployment, profession or ditties 
The two first sub-categories were introduced in the final draft 
following a German demand, apparently reiterating the issuer-related in- 
sider concept which underlies the German Insider Trading Guidelines. 
This view aims at penalising the misuse of information which has been 
entrusted to someone, or which he knows because of his position in the 
company. As the French Coininission des opirations de botirse succintly 
put it, this information constitutes "an eleinent of coininon patriinony. "8 
If the wording of the definition loosened this connection to the issuer, the 
prohibition would be unlimited and eventually lead to the 
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criminalization of securities trading. 9 
According to the Directive, among primary insiders are those who 
possess inside information by virtue of their ineinbership of the 
adininistrative, inanageinent or supervisory bodies of the issuer, of the 
securities concerned. This enumeration is an effort to include all members 
of different boards existing in the company law of various Member States. 
In Germany there is the dual board system (management board and 
supervisory board). In France the unitary board with the president at the 
top (P. D. G. ) is prevailing but the option for the dual system is open. The 
scope of the Directive is broad enough as to cover insiders from all these 
systems. 10 In addition managers of firms other than joint-stock companies 
which may issue, e. g. debt securities are caught by the Directive. 
French commentators analysing the community legislation in the 
light of the relative "ordonnance"Il support the view that the Directive 
imposes on company directors a presitinption of knowledge of the 
privileged information. 12 This presumption seems to have been 
influenced by the idea that these particular persons would be more 
tempted to make use of the information they are banned from using. A 
reasonable objection could be that the directors are not always well 
informed of the situation of their companies, and the relative 
presumption could be, in certain cases, unjustified. 13 The analysis, 
nevertheless, of the French "Ittrisprtidence" reveals that one fourth of the 
known insider dealing cases since 1975 involve persons from the 
administrative board of companies Onandataires). 14 
A question directly related to the presumption that the Directive 
imposes on directors is whether this presumption is a rebtittable or an 
irrebitttable one. 15 Although the Directive makes the distinction between 
the persons who have qualities of "ineinbership of the adininistrative, 
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inanageinent or stipervisory bodies of the isstier" and those have access to 
insider information "by virtite of the exercise of [their] einployinent, 
profession or ditties", 16 it demands, in both cases, that these persons take 
advantage of "that inforination zvith fidl knowledge of tile facts"" 17 for the 
act to be reprehensible. 18 The presumption of knowledge can, therefore, be 
rebutted by all suspect insiders if they prove that they have not taken 
advantage of the information they possessed or that when doing so they 
did not have full knowledge of the facts. 
The Directive goes further and includes as a second group of primary 
insiders persons who possess inside information by virtue of their holding 
in the capital of the issiter. The prohibition applies to all shareholders 
irrespective to the amount of their participation on the condition that they 
possess information by- virtite of their shareholding, which implicitly sets 
a minimum which may vary according to the circumstances. Hopt 
suggests that if Member States introduce a registration system for company 
insiders "they are free and well advised to limit the registration bureau- 
cracy to major shareholders for example from 10 per cent up. "19 It should 
be noted, however, that under the UK Companies Act 1985 all 
shareholders with an interest of at least 3 per cent of all the issued shares 
of the company, or all the issued shares of the same class, which carry the 
right to vote in all circumstances, have a duty to notify the company of 
their interestS. 20 
In the case of shareholders the argument for the rebuttable 
presumption set by the Directive is particularly strong: It would be 
inconceivable to impose on everyone, who has acquired shares of a 
company, a presumption of knowledge of the inside information without 
permitting him to bring evidence of his ignorance. This particularly 
convincing argument considering shareholders reinforces the 
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interpretation according to which directors are also subject to a simple 
presumption 21 
Many insider regulations cover expressly ineinbers of the saine groiip 
of coinpanies. 22 Under the Directive members of the same group of 
companies will sometimes be covered already as primary insiders by 
virtue of their shareholdings. This is the case in parent companies and 
also for the subsidiaries in reciprocal holdings. But if the situation is more 
complicated, if, for example there is a line of parent - sitbsidiary - 
stibsidiary or a horizontal line of holdings, difficulties may arise. The 
wording of Art 2(1) of the Directive expressly demands a direct holding. In 
national legal systems which have adopted criminal sanctions against 
insiders there will not always be the possibility of analogies against 
members of the same group of companies since national legal systems do 
not permit analogies to the detriment of the accused. In all probability, 
these members of the same group, who will not be caught by the 
prohibition regarding primary insiders, can be subject to insider dealing 
prohibition as secondary insiders. 23 
The first two categories are delimited by the terms "of the issiter". 
The first question which the use of these terms raises, is whether persons, 
who at the time of trading do not belong to the issuer anymore, can have 
insider status. It can be easily inferred from the fact that the insider must 
know the information by virtite of his connection with the issuer, that 
this question should be answered in the affirmative. The same solution 
has been followed by Great Britain and Germany. It is also uncertain 
whether persons who have never belonged to the issiter but are members 
of another (possibly affiliated) company can be insiders. The problem in 
this particular case is aggravated by the word "the" issuer, which restricts 
the prohibition to the insiders who are connected with the company 
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whose securities are actually traded. It should be noted that Members are 
free to "extend the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 2. " 
The most controversial point of the Directive is the large definition 
of the third, and broadest in scope, category of primary insiders. With a 
rather general clause all persons who have access to inside inforination by 
virttie of Hie exercise of tIzeir einployinent, profession or ditties can be in- 
siders. This group has been correctly characterised as heterogeneous. It em- 
braces people having a contractual relationship with the issuer or 
company-connected persons such as employees or auditors of the 
company aswell as people with no connection at all with the issuer such 
as e. g. members of the central bank, the press, or stock exchanges. The only 
condition imposed on insiders of this category is that they have access to 
inside information by virtue of their stattiS. 24 French commentators have 
proposed the distinction between "in ternal " insiders (initijs internes) and 
11 external" insiders (initijs externes) according to the criterion of their 
employment by the issuing company. 25 
The enumeration covers in the first place "all persons having entered 
into a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship with the issuer", i. e. 
internal insiders. As Bergmans observes, since the Directive does not 
require the breach of duty or the misappropriation of information, 
consequently, even lawfully acquired inside information may not be used 
under the prohibition. 26 The emphasis has been rightly moved from the 
way the information was acquired to the way it was used. 
Commentators seem to agree on the point that the access to 
information must be a direct corollary of the exercise of their 
employment, 27 because the Directive uses again the terms "by virtite" 
instead of "on Me occasion. " 
The Directive does not contain a qualification as to the group of 
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einployees of the issuers who are covered. It should be noted that most in- 
sider regulations are rather restrictive "either by enumeration, seniority or 
sometimes even salary. "28 Professor Hopt refers to the German voluntary 
Insider Trading Guidelines which cover only the employees who by virtue 
of their job habittially get to know inside information. 29 The Directive sets 
the precondition that the employees have access to inside information by 
virtue of their employment. This must simply mean that the access to 
inside information is a conseqttenceN of the position but this particular 
position should not necessarily give organisatiotial or regidar access to in- 
side information. Even incidental access could be adequate. Again Hopt 
suggests that the legislators of the Member States should consider a 
registration system limited to "employees who Itabiffially get inside 
information. "31 This solution would unnecessarily limit the scope of the 
regulation for the sake of certainty. 
External insiders can be defined as the group of persons external to 
the issuing company who have access to inside information because of the 
exercise of their profession or duties. The French jurisprudence has 
notably considered as external insiders an architect, a journalist, a banker 
and a "head hunter. " 
Atiditors are among the persons who could fall into the scope of 
application of the Directive because the auditing task makes them primary 
(external) insiders by virtue of their profession, since at least in the 
civilian legal systems the status of a company organ and the independence 
necessary for fulfilling the auditing task are incompatible. 32 All persons 
who have business relations with the issuer can be insiders if they get in- 
side information by virtue of the exercise of their profession. If they act 
'without remuneration or in their private capacity', they can be primary 
insiders by virtue of their dutieS. 33 
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Most of the aforementioned persons have a contractual or quasi-con- 
tractual relationship with the issuer which in a considerable number of 
cases establishes a special fiduciary duty towards the issuer. Prof. Hopt 
observes that some professionals may have a contractual relationship with 
the issuer which is not of a fiduciary character (e. g. in vendor-buyer 
relations) or some persons may have no contractual relationship with the 
issuer at all and, nevertheless, be able to be primary insiders because, as 
will be seen, under the Directive the concept of inside information 
includes also inside information which influences only the market as 
such. 34 Consequently, 'members of the central bank, the press, the 
parliament, the ministry of economics and of other institutions, 
committees and bodies who possess inside information because of their 
profession or their duties'35 can be primary insiders if. they make use of 
non-publicly available price-sensitive information. 
b) secondary insiders 
The Directive prohibits all primary insiders in possession of inside 
information from (Art. 3): 
"(a) disclosing that inside information to any third party unless such disclosure is 
inade in the normal course of the exercise ofhis employntent, profession or duties; 
(b) recommending or procuring a third party, oil the basis of that inside information, 
to acquire or dispose of transferable securities adinitted to trading oil its securities 
markets as referred to in Article 1 (2) in fine. " 
It is not clear whether the Directive requires "knowing" behaviour by 
the "tipper"36, but it seems certain that Art. 3 refers to Art. 1 as a whole 
imposing, thus, the same standard of liability on both the "tipper" and the 
"trader. " 
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The disclosiire prohibition is delimited by an exception if such 
disclosure is made in the normal course of the primary insider's 
employment, profession or duties. This exception does not apply in the 
cases of recoininetidation and proctiration where tipping is possible 
without disclosing the inside information to the third party. 
The necessity for leaving intact the "normal information flow in 
business and professional contacts"37, dictates its exclusion from the 
prohibition. The Directive cannot and, perhaps, should not specify what 
the normal course of the exercise of the employment, profession or duties 
of the primary insider (bank, broker, solicitor, auditor, fiduciary etc. ) is. 
The important thing is that the Directive should let all relevant 
professionals do their job. It is for the law governing the rights and duties 
of these professionals and their clients to decide on the confidential nature 
of information. Gaillard and Pingel remark that, as has already happened 
in the French legislation, it will not be always easy to know what is the 
confidential" information which could be communicated to a third 
person in the normal exercise of -a certain profession and, therefore, 
questions of interpretation may arise. 38 
The distinction between disclosure and recommendation will. be very 
difficult to apply in the case of professional securities advisers. 39 Even if a 
tip from the latter, which contains unpublished information, does not 
constitute disclosure, it will most probably amount to recommendation. 
The importance of distinguishing primary and secondary insiders 
cannot be overemphasised especially in the previous case. Secondary 
insiders are not prohibited from tipping40, unless the legislation of the 
particular Member State adopts more stringent provisions and imposes 
the prohibitions laid down in Article 3 on the persons referred to in 
Article 441. As Bergmans remarks 'it would be up to the client-tippee then 
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to appreciate whether he would be liable as a secondary insider. '42 In 
countries with a tiniversal or all-ptirpose banking system (i. e. the banking 
that involves not only services related to loans and savings but also those 
involved in making investments in companies), as Professor Hopt states, 
the content and scope of these rights and duties may be rather 
controversial, 43 in view of the conflicts of interests inherent to the system. 
The same commentator takes the argument one step further claiming that 
under certain circumstances the banks may have a duty to disclose inside 
information to their clients in order to keep them from being damaged 
wrongfully. 44 
The Directive may not be applicable in the case of front-rimnitig 
where an investment adviser is about to issue public investment advice 
based on publicly available data and trades on the securities concerned 
ahead of his clients and the public. This practice is clearly undesirable 
irrespective of its legal evaluation. It has been proposed that even if the 
content of the advice is public knowledge, according to the Preamble of the 
Directive, 'the fact that the investment adviser will issue the advice and 
thereby exert a certain influence on the appreciation of a security is inside 
information. '4.5 The sanctioning of this behaviour will be further 
examined in relation to the definition of public information. 
Article 4 of the Directive treats secotidary ittsiders or tippees in a less 
strict manner than the primary ones. It states that: 
"Each Member State shall also impose the prohibition provided for in Article 2 oil 
any person other than those referred to in that Article who with full knowledge of 
the facts possesses inside information, the direct or indirect source of which could not 
be other than a person referred to in Article 2. " 
It has already been mentioned that for secondary insiders the tipping 
prohibition of Article 3, as specified by Article 6 sentence 2, is optional. 
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The Directive does not use either the tenn secondary insider or tippee 
but sets as its only prerequisite that the person with full knowledge of the 
facts possess information the direct or indirect source of which could not 
be other than a primary insider. It is evident from the wording of Article 4 
that a tip between the primary and the secondary insider is not essential. 
The term tippee is not, therefore, in this particular case, fully correct. 46 The 
whole chain between the primary and the secondary insider is caught by 
the provision. What must be established is that the (not yet public) 
information emanates from a primary insider. No specific person needs to 
be incriminated, neither does the way information was leaked have to be 
detected. The secondary insider must, nevertheless, be conscious of the 
connection of the particular information with primary insiders, since full 
knowledge of the facts is necessary. 
On the point which was last raised Bergmans remarks that it is not 
'devoid of uncertainties', especially as it is contingent upon the judgement 
of the person in possession of inside information to 'appreciate whether 
its direct or indirect source can be other than a primary insider. '47 The 
latter will be a rather rare occurrence considering the breadth of the 
definition of primary insiders. 48 Thus, the Directive imposes on people, 
who obtained or may obtain information, a duty to evaluate it. This duty 
does not appear to cease before the person in possession of the relevant 
information trades on it or before that information becomes public. If, 
before trading, he 'becomes aware that he holds inside information'49, he 
should abstain or be subject to the prohibition. 
The only importance of the length of the chain between the primary 
and the secondary insider seems to be the probable loss of the inside 
character of the information which is due to the fact that, along the chain, 
more people are likely to know it without being aware of the relevant 
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facts. 50 Bergmans observes that securities professionals such as analysts, 
advisors, could be put in a delicate position as "secondary or tertiary 
tippees" on the line, since they could risk rendering their clients secondary 
insiders. 51 As already mentioned, secondary insiders are not prohibited 
from disclosing in the course of profession or procuring52, and this could 
to a certain extent secure the unimpeded conduct of their business. 
For the insider dealing prohibition for secondary insiders it does not 
matter whether the primary insider has made a legal or an illegal 
disclosure of the inside information. 53 The distinction of Article 3 is not 
made in the case of Article 4. The only decisive element is that the source 
of the relevant information could only be traced to a primary insider. As 
Professor Hopt remarks, a person who receives inside information 
without breaking the law has not automatically the right to use it on the 
securities markets. According to the Directive, even if a person has 
overheard, by chance, the conversation of a primary insider with others, as 
in the notorious hypothetical case of the taxi driver who listens to a 
conversation between company directors on the back seats, he can be a 
secondary insider. 54 On the other hand it has been observed that a person 
who steals information from the books in the company without the 
involvement of a primary insider does not seem to fall within the scope of 
Article 4. This distinction may lead to controversial solutions. Treating 
both cases alike would be advisable, therefore, to the Commission and 
Member States legislators. 
2. Inside Information 
The key concept of each insider regulation is the definition of inside 
information. This definition influences the determination of the 
-103- 
prohibitions and the obligations set out in an insider regulation. 
According to Article 1(1) of the Directive: 
" 'ittside inforniatiott' shall inean infOrmation which [11 has not been made public 121 
of a precise nature [31 relating to one or several issiters of transferable securities, 
which, 141 if it were made public would be likeh to have a significant effect on the Y 
price of the transferable security or securities in question. " 
The concept of inside information is, therefore, determined by the 
cumulative combination of 'different parameters delineating its scope'55: 
a) status 
The information must not have been made public. This formula is 
less ambiguous than the one of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) 
Act 1985 which required that the information must 'not be generally 
known to these persorls accustomed or likely to deal in the company's 
securities'. 56 It is irrelevant whether the information is confidential, not 
to be published or to be disclosed later on. Yet the meaning of having been 
made public can be interpreted in two different ways: either that the 
information is generally available or accessible to the public or that the 
information must actually be known by the investing public. 57 As 
Professor Hopt remarks the difference is subtle but important. 58 If the 
mere fact of giving the information to the public sufficed, the board 
members would be allowed to give telephone orders to their broker as 
soon as the news have been disclosed in the general assembly. Especially 
under a civil law concept the fact that the information was given away by a 
telegram or a letter to the stock exchange-99 would be considered sufficient. 
It can be reasonably assumed that the intention of the Directive is not 
to allow insiders to beat the news by trading immediately, ahead of the 
general public. 60 The first interpretation, therefore, would result in giving 
the insiders a short period of time in which they can use their 
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information, which is no longer inside information. Insiders could also 
avoid liability if the recently made public information is still restricted to a 
limited circle of persons. 
The second interpretation is preferable, as pointed out by Hopt6l, 
because it does not allow the insider to beat the news. The German 
version of the Directive undoubtedly supports the second interpretation 
since it uses the words "nicht bffentlich bekantit" i. e. not publicly known. 
But there is still considerable uncertainty as to the moment from which 
the information can be considered public. Some writers adopt a more 
cautious approach and claim that the information must not only be 
announced but must also be assimilated62 or that the insiders must respect 
a certain waiting period in order to allow "not only the information to be 
disseminated by mass media or specialised publications, but also the public 
to react and prices to adapt to the news. "63 Apparently, the latter view has 
been followed by some insider regulations which require the insider to 
wait until the information has been absorbed and evaluated by the stock 
exchange and the public, whereas some others ask for a more practical 24 
hours waiting period after disclosure. 64 
The most convincing interpretation of Article 1(1) seems to be the 
one advanced by Prof. Hopt: "the mere fact of giving the information away 
to the public is not sufficient, but it is necessary that the information is 
available to the investing public ticker or by having been reported by 
public media such as television, radio or the economic press. "65 With the 
massive development in the last decade of information technology in the 
securities industry and the advent of screen dealing as the norm in the 
major markets, it may be that when the announcement 'hits the screen' it 
has effectively been made public and the insider may be free to deal. 66 
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b) nature 
The information must be of a precise nature. This is an attempt to 
distinguish rumour or idle speculation from hard fact. Rumours and 
speculations are a very common occurrence in the market and they play a 
useful economic role. A market participant should not be barred from 
trading based on a rumour or a personal deduction from rumours or facts 
that do not constitute inside information. 67 
In addition, the information must be likely to have a significalit effect 
oiz the price of the securities if it were inade public. This qualitative test 
exists in all insider regulations. Inside information must have a price- 
sensitive impact. 
The probable effect of information to the price of securities must be 
judged at the time of t4e insider dealing transaction and it will be a rather 
difficult task to make such a prognosis. The actual influence of the 
publication of the information on the stock-exchange quotations has been 
correctly criticized as irrelevant since it can depend on many reasons and 
coincidences. 68 The actual, nevertheless, price change observed after 
publication will be a useful indicator which should be taken into account 
in evaluating the significance of the impact. 
The task of assessing the price-sensitive effect of inside information is 
subject to the further qualification that this effect must be significant. Only 
inside information with probable significant effects on the price is 
considered. This 'significance' test has been criticised as vague. 69 Member 
States will find difficulties in defining what is a significant price increase 
in any detail. The significance of the price change may vary from share to 
share and it will be, therefore, impossible to set a universal standard. 
c) object of information 
The information must relate to one or several issuers of transferable 
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sectirities or to one or several transferable sectirities. Firstly, on in- 
formation relating to the isstier the Commission underlined that it can be 
either internal or external information. 70 It cited as an example of internal 
information increases or cuts in dividends and as an example of external 
information a take-over bid concerning the company. 71 
Secondly, regarding information relating to the seciirities (as opposed 
to the information concerning the company itself) the Commission 
stresses that it can comprise information on the situation or the prospects 
of the securities in question as well as information that can influence only 
the market as such. 72 
The decision, for example, not to grant subscription rights, planning 
measures for watering down the value of a stock or even a decision of the 
board of the stock exchange concerning 'listing can be inýOrmation which is 
relating to one or several securities. 73 Information which is likely to 
influence the market as such could be, for example, the decision of the 
central bank to change the discount or bank rate. 74 
The definition of inside information in Article 1(1) has been 
characterised as 'extremely far-reaching'7-5 because it can also sanction 
trading on the basis of political news or even economic news from foreign 
countries. The distinction of market-related news with a probable impact 
on economic life from clearly political news with a similar impact is 
almost impossible. Limits to the broad scope of the definition should be 
looked for in the concept of insider and the prohibitions or duties imposed 
on them by the Directive. 76 On the other hand the breadth of the 
definition of privileged information offers the possibility to national 




If the information has actually been made public it is of no 
importance who published it or whether its publication was a result of a 
breach of duty or a violation of law. Anyone can trade on it and only the 
persons responsible for its illegal publication will have to face sanctions. 
The Preamble of the Directive expressly states that estitnates 
developed froin ptiblicly available data cannot be regarded as inside 
information and, consequently any transaction based thereupon does not 
constitute insider dealing. This clarifies the situation regarding portfolio 
analysts or investment advisers. Their business is to use all information 
available about the securities they are dealing with. As long as they do not 
make use of information which has not been made public they win not be 
liable and they will no. t take the risk of rendering secondary insiders the 
clients they are advising. 
In the Preamble there is also provision for the case of take-over bids. 
The mere acquisition or disposal of transferable securities, according to the 
statements of the Council, does not constitute in itself the use of inside 
information, since the acquisition or disposal of transferable securities 
necessarily involves a prior decision to acquire or to dispose taken by the 
person who undertakes one or other of these operations. If the elements of 
the Directive were taken literally the prospective bidders would be barred 
from buying shares ahead of the public announcement of the bid. 78 This 
,, vould create problems in connection with take-over rules that, normally, 
allow the bidder to buy up shares silently up to the percentage as of which 
there is mandatory disclosure. 79 Considering the probability of insider 
dealing arising in take-over contexts, the efficiency of the Directive in 
harmonising take-over laws of Member States is of undeniable 
importance. 
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3. Transferable securities 
In contrast to Article 5 of the 1988 draft Directive, the definition of 
transferable securities in Article 1(2) of the Directive embraces practically 
all forms of securities traded in the markets. These are: 
"(a) shares and debt securities, as well as securities equivalent to shares and debt 
securities; 
(b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securities referred to in (a); 
(Ofittures contracts, options and fittancial fit tures in respect of securities referred to in 
(a); 
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in (a), 
when admitted to trading on a market which is regulated and supervised by 
authorities recognised. by public bodies, operates regularly and is accessible directly 
or indirectly to the public. -80 
Although exhaustive lists always arouse the suspicion of 
incompleteness8l, the list contained in the Directive provides better 
protection for investors than the draft directives which mentioned only 
stock, debt and transferable options with respect to them. 82 The extension 
of the scope of the definition was Proposed by the Council of the European 
Communities and seems reasonable since insider dealing can also occur in 
relation to such financial instruments, even though, as Prof. Hopt has 
pointed out, it may be more indirect or 'more difficult to trace because the 
trading may be done in separate markets. '83 
The transferable securities in question are covered when 'adinitted to 
trading on a inarket which is regidated and sitpervised by atithorities 
recognised by ptiblic bodies, operates regtilarly and is accessible directly or 
indirectly to the ptiblic. ' This broad definition is an attempt to include 
different types of markets existing in the European countries avoiding, 
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thus, the 'pitfalls' of requiring either official listing or 'stock exchange'. 84 
Markets such as the "second inarchi" in France, the "tinlisted sectirities 
inarket" in Great Britain, the "inercato ristretto" in Italy, the "paralili 
agora" in Greece, the "Freiverkelir" and the "geregelter Markt" in 
Germany are, therefore, covered by the definition. 85 This is particularly 
important for new forms of financial markets which lack some of the 
traditional elements of the stock exchange concept, as, for example, in 
computerised securities markets where market participants are not 
physically present at a single place, 86 and will probably achieve to a great 
extent the aim of unifon-nity in the insider regulations of Member States. 
It should be noted that Article 2(3) of the Directive gives Member 
States the opportunity to exclude over-the-counter sales, i. e. sales without 
the involvement of a professional intermediary, from the prohibition of 
insider dealing. The argument has been advanced that insider dealing on 
smaller markets in the shares of small or medium-sized companies may 
be of much higher intensity and lead to a more perceptible distortion of 
the market than insider dealing in the shares of a well-known company 
on a recognised stock exchange. 87 Member States would be, therefore, well 
advised not to make use of the authorisation given to them by Article 2(3). 
4. Prohibitions 
According to Article 2(1) of the Directive a primary or secondary 
insider possessing inside information may not take 
"advantage of that information with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or 
disposing of for his 07M account orfor the account of a third party, either directly of 
indirectly, transferable securities of the issiter or issuers to WhiCh that information 
relates. " 
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The scienter requirement is interesting. The insider must act with 
fidl knowledge of the facts, in other words he must know what he does. 
Accordingly, it must be shown that the insider acted wilfully. 88 Mere 
negligence, even gross negligence, as Hopt points out, is not enough. 89 0 
This restriction was not included in the draft Directives90, but was added 
in the last in the final version as a clarification. It may be important as a 
matter of principle but has, nevertheless, little practical consequence. It is 
clear that making use of a privileged information in the stock market 
could not result from an inattention. In most cases the insider will be 
making use of the information with full knowledge of the facts. 91 The 
penal prosecution of a person who violates the prohibition could be 
successful in the jurisdictions of practically all Member States if the 
violation was wilfulN Member State legislators can, of course, adopt a 
stricter solution, following the example of France, and impose sanctions 
on the insider even if 'it cannot be proved that he acted sciejiter. '93 It is 
not. necessary for the insider to attend to achieve gain or the avoidance of a 
loss of himself or a third party. In addition, it is not required that the 
transaction actually yielded a profit94 since this may depend on 'fortititotts 
circtinistances'. 9-5 The existence of gain will probably be taken into account 
for the determination of the penalty. 96 
Whereas inside information can only be possessed by natural 
persons, transactions can be effected for the account of legal entities. As has 
already been remarked in the beginning of this chapter97, Article 2(2) of 
the Directive states that, where the insider is a company or other type of 
legal person, the prohibition shall apply to the natural persons who take 
part in the decision to carry out the transaction for the account of the legal 
person concerned. This rule should be read in the light of the laws of most 
Member States under which it is inconceivable to have legal persons 
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prosecuted penalty. Wherever this is possible, as in the case of Germany 
where legal persons can commit quasi-criminal irregularities (Ordnwigs- 
zuidrigkeiten), 98 Member States are able to apply the same rules for insider 
dealing to legal persons, provided the natural persons themselves are also 
subject to the prohibition. The Council Protocol, the Council and the 
Commission declare that, in conformity with Article 6, every Member 
State may apply the prohibition of Article 2(1) and the resulting penalties 
also to legal persons directly. 99 
This prohibition applies to any acquisition or disposal of transferable 
securities on an official market as defined in Article 1(1&2) and to any 
such act effected through a professional intermediary (Art 2(3)], even 
outside such an official market. As has already been mentionedlOO, 
Member States may exempt transactions effectpd without the 
involvement of a professional intermediary outside an official market 
[Art 2(3)]. In that case the probable sanctions should be based on traditional 
civil or penal law concepts. 101 The tivo conditions of the exemption clause 
i. e. lack of involvement of a professional intermediary and execution of a 
transaction outside an official market, have to be met cumulatively. 102 
The word "involvement" is so broad that even help and advice from 
intermediaries is covered. The intermediary need not act as a go-between. 
In countries103 following the universal or all-purpose banking system 
banks (apart from official or unofficial stock brokers) act as professional 
intermediaries. 104 According to Professor Hopt the two conditions set in 
the exemption clause will also affect block trading ( Paketizandel ) which 
in Germany belongs to the domain of banks. The latter help private buyers 
and sellers as well as enterprises to find out and bring about such deals. As 
a result of the terms of the exemption, block trading could not be 
exempted 'unless it is done by the buyer and the seller alone'. 105 
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The Directive does not prohibit jailtire to transact by reason of inside 
information. Despite the fact that gains can also be realised by avoiding the 
I xvrong' transaction, the same solution has been adopted by most insider 
regulations. As a matter of practice it can be enormously troublesome to 
prove the connection between the insider information and the 
omission. 106 
The decision of the insider to trade must be connected causally with 
the possession of information. At least the wording of the Directive which 
requires the insider to be 'taking advantage of Mat inforination witiz fidl 
knowledge of the facts' leads to that conclusion. The latter is confirmed by 
the exclusion in the Preamble of three cases of professionals who often 
possess inside information and who normally do not trade on the basis of 
an independent decisicýn. According to the Preamble: 
"the mere fact that market-makers, bodies authorised to act as contrepartie, or 
stockbrokers with inside information confine themselves, ill the first two cases, to 
pursuing their nortual business of buying or selling securities or, ill tire last, to carnjing 
out air order should not ill itself be deemed to constitute rise of such inside information; 
[ ... 
I likewise tire fact of carnjing out tranSaftiOJIS With tile aim of stabilising the price 
of new issues of secondary offers of transferable securities should not ill itself be 
deemed to constitute rise of inside information". 
As to market-makers or bodies authorised to act as "contrepartie", the 
fact, according to Hopt, that they "make the market" is price sensitive by 
definition. 107 It is, nevertheless, necessary for the fulfilment of their duties 
that their intervention be not deemed to violate the insider dealing 
prohibition. Stockbrokers who execute an order should not be hindered in 
their professional activities because of the fact that they possess inside 
information. Similarly, as Gaillard and Pingel remark, it would be 
inopportune to impede the normal activities of financial intermediaries 
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by imposing on them a duty to verify the circumstances that lead their 
clients to a transaction every time there can be doubts as to their 
motives. 108 
A different problem arises when the intermediary makes use for 
himself or for another client of the information he acquired in the exercise 
of his functions, especially, when an order of significant volume 
constitutes in itself privileged information. This case falls outside the 
scope of the Preamble of the Directive and should be dealt with in the 
legislations of Member States. The latter do not seem to have found an 
answer to that question yet. 109 
The practice of stabilisitig the price of new issues or secondary offers 
of transferable securities is also exempted from the insider dealing 
prohibition. It is left. to, the national legislator to decide under what 
circumstances stabilisation is allowed. Considering the wide disparity in 
the solutions that have been adopted so farI10, the regulation of the 
stabilisation practices in the EC will almost certainly lack homogeneity. 
Finally, the Directive restricts its scope in Article 2(4) stipulating that 
it shall not apply to: 
"transactions carried out in pursitit of itionetary, exchange-rate or public debt- 
managenzent policies Inj a sovereign State, Inj its central batik or ally other body 
designated to that effect by the State, or ally other person acting oil their behalf. 
Member States may extend this exemption to their federated States or similar local 
authorities itz respect of the inattagentent of their public debt. " 
This is part of the general policy in EC legislation and aims at 
safeguarding the economic sovereignty of Member States. 111 It can not be 
overemphasised that this exemption from the general rule should be 
construed narrowly. 112 
The prohibition of tipping has already been examined in relation to 
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secondary insiders. 113 
5. Sanctions 
The Directive does not specify what type of penalties the 'Member 
States should introduce for the violation of insider dealing regulations. 
According to Article 13: 
"Each Member State shall determine the penalties to be applied for infringement of 
the measures taken pursuant to this Directive. The penalties shall be sufficient to 
promote compliance with those measures. " 
The Commission, lacking the power to enact criminal sanctions itself 
because of the EC-Treaty, has left the penalties (civil or criminal) to the 
discretion of Member States. The Committee for Law and Civil Rights of 
the European Parliament, judging the Commission proposal to be 
insufficient, required that sanctions for insider dealing should also be 
harmonised. 114 The Commission was unwilling to follow this solution 
for fear of political disagreements and simply added a second sentence 
according to which the sanctions must be so deterrent that observation of 
the provision is warranted. 115 The Council reached the final wording in 
the common position of 20 July 1989. In an attempt to justify the terms 
finally adopted, the Council underlined that not even the strictest 
sanctions could guarantee the observation of a rule one hundred per 
cent. 116 The Directive provides, in general terms, that the sanctions 
(penalties in the English text, sanctions in the French and Sanktionen in 
the German) must be sufficient 'to promote compliance with those 
measures'. 
Although the Directive is an improvement over the first proposal, 
harmonisation of the penalties and the civil remedies would be a more 
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efficient approach. The primary goal of fostering confidence in the EC 
securities market, as set out in the Preamble, will not otherwise be met. 117 
The Directive by using the term 'penalties' does not confine the 
possible sanctions to those of criminal law. Civil sanctions are not 
excluded and it is not clear whether Member States are obliged to use 
criminal penalties. This is an important issue in countries which opposed 
the imposition of criminal sanctions. ' 18 Especially in Germany there have 
been lengthy discussions about the adequacy of such sanctions for insider 
dealing. There were the usual119 arguments in favour of voluntary 
restraints and a limited applicability of the insider dealing prohibition. It 
has, also been argued that weak civil penalties may have no preventive 
effect and, therefore, stricter civil sanctions or specific criminal provisions 
should be created. The existence of a criminal sanction is not determining 
as the international experience of very few convictions shows. 120 This, of 
course, is closely connected with the difficulties in detecting the offence 
and with problems related to the efficiency of enforcement. 
Professor Hopt has made in relation to insider dealing sanctions a 
well-aimed observation: 
"The international experience shows that it is itimpise to rely exclusively on criminal 
sanctions. Sometimes civil law, administrative law or disciplinary and self- 
regulatory sanctions are inore effective. It is hoped that Member States will not settle 
for a quick and easy trait sfornia tion by just having it penal provision which ntay or not 
be effective, but that thought will be given to embedding such a penal provision ill its 
company and stock exchange setting. "121 
In other words Hopt supports that the existing codes of conduct, 
stock-exchange and other disciplinary or self-regulatory sanctions should 
not be done away with. The harmonisation of civil law liability rules poses 
undeniably more problems than the simple creation of a new criminal 
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offence. On the other hand, particular investors or companies should not 
be left without remedies in most cases. An important and necessary 
measure would be the disgorgement of profits. The intensity of the 
penalties should be strong enough to have a deterrent effect and should 
vary according to the particular behaviour or the particular aim to be 
achieved. 122 
In recent years, it has become apparent that British regulators tend to 
be less effective at tackling the problem of enforcement than some of their 
foreign counterparts. In 1993, for example, France's regulatory authority, 
the Coininission des Op6rations de Mirse (COB), fined ten people for 
insider- trading; America's Sectirities and Exchange Coininission (SEC) 
fined 34, whereas in Britain, since 1980,23 people have been convicted of 
insider dealing; more than 300 have been investigated by the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) and 50 prosecuted. 123 
There are various reasons for this 'superior hit rate': 124 "Neither the 
COB nor the SEC has to resort to criminal law; both rely first on civil law, 
though the guilty may be charged with criminal offences as well. The 
burden of proof in civil disputes is less than in criminal ones. And the 
fines levied can be hefty. Besides forcing wrongdoers to give back their ill- 
gotten gains, both the COB can fine convicted insiders a multiple of those 
profits - up to three times the gains from transactions in America (though 
the SEC normally settles for less), and up to ten times in France. "125 
The lack of definite, harmonised penalties is among the main 
weaknesses of the Directive and it may obstr-uct EC legislation in achieving 
a common insider regulation within the EU, as well as, in providing 
Member States with the proper means of enforcing their insider dealing 
statutes. 126 
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6. Enforcement and Co-operation between Member States 
According to Article 8 (1) of the Directive each Member State shall 
designate the administrative authority or authorities competent, if 
necessary in collaboration with other authorities to ensure that the 
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive are applied and shall so 
inform the Commission which in turn informs the other Member States. 
It would be impossible, in the absence of monitoring authorities, to 
discover the dealings of insiders and the perpetrators. The competent 
authorities must be given all stipervisory and investigatory powers that 
are necessary for the exercise of their functions, where appropriate in 
collaboration with other authorities [Art 8 (2)]. In the statement of its 
motives the CommisEiion underlines that the authorities should have 
sufficient powers of investigation to find out from financial 
intermediaries the real givers of orders. 127 This ambitious objective 
presupposes that national authorities are vested with sufficient powers of 
investigation and of sanction towards persons who would refuse to co- 
operate with them. 128 
The competent authorities shall co-operate with each other 
whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out their duties, making 
use of the powers given to them. To this end, they shall exchange any 
information required for that purpose, including information related to 
actions prohibited according to the options of a more stringent prohibition 
under Articles 5 and 6 only by the Member State requesting the 
information [Article 10 (1)]. This means that a State cannot refuse to give 
information on the basis of the fact that the suspected behaviour is not 
considered insider dealing under its law. 129 
The competent authorities may refuse to act on a request of 
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information where the communication of the information might 
adversely affect the sovereignty, security or public policy of the State 
addressed, and where with respect to the same actions and the same 
persons, judicial proceedings have been initiated or final judgements have 
been passed [Article 10 (2)]. 
Article 10 (3) restricts the possible use of information given only to 
the exercise of the function of insider law enforcement and to the context 
of administrative or judicial proceedings specifically relating to the 
exercise of those functions. This is obviously an attempt to entrench the 
information given by tax authorities. Judicial proceedings under criminal 
law are treated differently. In addition the authority receiving the 
information may use it for other purposes if the competent authority 
communicating the information consents thereto. A duty of professiotial 
secrecy is imposed [Article 91 on all persons employed or formerly 
employed by the competent authority. Information covered by 
professional secrecy may not be divulged to any person or authority except 
by virtue of provisions laid down by law. This is another attempt to keep 
the information with the insider law enforcement authority. According to 
Hopt, neither mere administrative practice of information exchange nor 
the general laws about mutual assistance by the various public authorities 
should be considered to meet the requirement of Article 9 (2). 130 
The Community may, in conformity with the treaty conclude 
agreements with non-member countries on the matters governed by the 
Directive [Article 11]. Until it will have concluded such agreements, the 
Member States will be competent, according to the Council protoCOI131, to 
do so, provided the Directive is not affected and the agreement is not 
hindering the development of the Community law. 
In the absence of a Community rule governing a particular subject 
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concerned, Member States will apply (after its entry into force) the 
Convention on Insider Trading of the Council of Europe (Article 16bis, 
inserted in the Convention by its Protocol of 11 September 1989), which 
will also be the essential source for international enforcement activities 
,. vith respect to non-EC Member States. 
According to Article 2 of the Convention, the Parties undertake to 
provide each other with the greatest possible measure of mutual assistance 
in the exchange of information relating to matters establishing or giving 
rise to the belief that irregular operations of insider trading have been 
carried out, in accordance with the specific rules laid down in the 
Convention. Each Party may, by a declaration to the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe, undertake to provide other Parties, subject to 
reciprocity, with the greatest possible measure of mutual assistance in the 
exchange of information necessary for the surveillance of operations 
carried out in the organised stock markets which could adversely affect 
equal access to information for all users of the stock market or the quality 
of the information applied to investors in order to ensure honest dealing 
[Article 3 of the Convention]. The Parties also undertake to afford each 
other the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters relating 
to offences involving insider trading [Article 12 (1) of the Convention]. 
7. Conflids of Laws issues 
Recent experience has shown that insider dealing is becoming more 
and more an international problem. 132 The phenomenon of insider 
operations occurs more frequently in more than one countries. ff the order 
for the purchase or the sale passes through a place other that the one 
where the securities are negotiated, if the person involved in the 
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transaction has his domicile in a different country, or if the securities in 
question have been admitted in more that one sto ck- exchanges, the 
authorities of more than one states have the jurisdiction to control the 
illicit transaction. 133 
The Commission has made an effort to tackle problems of 
international private law, apart from international procedural law 
questions as mentioned above. According to Article 5 (1) each Member 
State shall apply the prohibitions provided for in Articles 2,3 and 4, at 
least to actions undertaken witizin its territory to the extent that the 
transferable securities concerned are admitted to trading on a market of a 
Member State. The Community approach is based on a territoriality 
principle. This leads to the protection not only of the Member State's own 
markets, but also of all stock-exchanges and capital markets within the 
Community. This solution legitimises a plurality of competences (c it in it I 
de coinpitences) and gives to Member States the possibility of maintaining 
the already existing rules. 134 
Sentence 2 of Article 5 clarifies the content of the rule in sentence 1 by 
stating that each Member State shall regard a transaction as carried out 
within its territory if it is carried out on a market, as defined in Article 1 (2) 
in fine, situated or operating within that territory. The location of the 
place of operation and functioning may not be so self evident any more. 
The advent of modem computer-aided or even computer-driven markets 
creates the possibility that the latter may have 'more than one place of 
operation and functioning with the consequence that also more than one 
jurisdiction will be competent'. 135 In the draft directive there was the 
provision for transactions outside a stock exchange market. In that case the 
domicile of the counterparty of the professional insiders should be 
decisive. 136 This provision was modelled on consumer protection rules 
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and was dropped in the final version. The problems that may occur Nvill 
have to be answered by the general conflict of law provisions of Member 
States. 137 
8. Appraisal 
The Directive is an attempt to provide minimum standards for 
insider dealing laws throughout the Community. Its efficiency will 
depend, to a great extent, upon the legislative measures that Member 
States will take in order to adopt the Directive's rules into their national 
laws. But under one provision: It has become a well-accepted principle 
determined by the European Court of Justice, that national courts of the 
Member States should comply with that Directive to the extent that it is 
clear and does not. give discretion to Member States about its 
implementation even where the national legislation is either non-existent 
or defective. 138 In the extreme case of Marleasing SA v La Coinercial 
Internacional de Affinentacioti SA139 national courts were required to 
ignore altogether national legislation which is in conflict with the terms of 
the Directive. 140 
Among the major strengths of the Directive are the definitions of the 
terms. The definition of insider, for example, provides an excellent basis 
because it is broad and may include persons other than those directly 
connected with the company, such as lawyers, auditors, and financial 
journalists. Other Directive terms, such as employment, duties, and 
profession, are defined precisely and, therefore should escape judicial 
manipulation. 141 The definition of inside information is broad yet clearly 
defined. The Directive would be stronger if all restrictions applied to 
primary insiders were also applied to tippees. On the other hand, in those 
countries where secondary insiders will not be submitted to the tipping 
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prohibition, their distinction from the third category of primary insiders 
will be important, but create problems of delineation. Certain professional 
groups (such as investment analysts), if they are treated like primary 
insiders, Nvill be restricted in the free exercise of their profession. It would 
have been advisable to clearly state explicit exceptions from the general 
rule, as was done for certain categories in the preamble. 142 
Another strength of the Directive is its scope. The Directive applies 
not only to transactions undertaken on a stock exchange, but also to any 
transaction involving a professional intermediary. It can reach 
transactions with securities registered on a stock exchange which are not 
traded on the exchange, as well as transactions that do not involve a 
professional intermediary. 143 
The Directive proyides an express legal basis to justify actions against 
inside traders. Resort to general principles and unrelated provisions of 
securities fraud is no longer necessary, contrary to the situation in the 
U. S. A. 
The stage of prosecution of violations poses special problems since 
the prohibition includes a large number of persons traditionally 
considered as outsiders and requires that these persons act scienter and 
that there be a causal connection between their "full knowledge of the 
facts" and their act. As has been shown, in most cases the Directive 
imposes a rebuttable presumption of knowledge on primary insiders. The 
latter bear, consequently, the burden of proof of their ignorance or the lack 
of connection between their decision to transact and their specific 
knowledge. In 10 out of 12 Member States with Civil Law systems no 
presumptions or presumed truths can exist in Criminal and Criminal 
Procedural Law. In other words, the creation of a level playing field in 
relation to the burden of proof seems impossible. Apart from the problems 
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of proof that the Directive creates, even more difficulties will arise when it 
comes to defining the exact content of the "fidl knozvledge of the facts". 
The Directive tries to integrate the preventive aspect of mandatory 
disclosure of information. Article 7 extends the thnely disclostire 
provision of the first Stock Exchange Admission Directive of 1979144 to 
companies and undertakings the transferable securities of which, 
whatever their nature, are admitted to trading on an official market. This 
provision states the obligation for companies-issuers of securities to 
immediately inform the public about circumstances likely to affect 
significantly the price of their transferable securities. The consequences of 
this apparently minor extension of the disclosure of information 
obligation may be considerable for the Member States. 145 
The measur_es of the Directive do not deal sufficiently with the 
problem of insider dealing in the context of take-overs and banking. The 
Commission is currently furthering its efforts to cover take-over bid 
regulation. 146 Hopt suggests that the Directive can be the point of 
departure for insider law harmonisation but there is room for 
improvement in the context of many financial operations, even outside 
the securities market, particularly in universal or all purpose banking 
systems, where dealings of insiders could also be regulated by a special 
bank contract law or a bank supervisory law. 147 
The Directive is also incomplete in enforcement and surveillance 
measures. The detection of violations presents one of the most important 
problems related to the regulation of insider trading. The addition of an 
institutional level surveillance requirement, so as to create in each 
Member State regulatory bodies similar to the American Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), would improve greatly the effectiveness of 
the Directive. 
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The original Commission proposal left the penalties for violation of 
insider trading to the discretion of each Member State. The adopted 
version provides that the penalties must be "sufficient to promote 
compliance with those measures". 148 Although the Directive is an 
improvement over the first proposal and can be characterised as a realistic 
political compromise, harmonisation of sanctions provides a better 
approach and, more importantly, one in conformity to the regulatory 
purpose pursued. 149 The primary goal of the Directive, which is fostering 
investor confidence in the EC securities market, will not be met. Penalties 
that are not harmonised, instead of safeguarding the successful and fair 
operation of the market, have an erosive influence on investor 
confidence. The discretion of Member States to determine the penalties for 
infringement of the prohibitions gives rise to the question whether the 
mere adoption of criminal penalties is an effective implementation of the 
Directive or civil remedies could provide a necessary and probably more 
efficient alternative. The Directive, in other words, does not furnish any 
guidelines as to the form sanctions should take, apparently ignoring the 
criticism on the deterrence potential of criminal law and the possibility of 
substituting civil remedies or combining civil and criminal sanctions. 150 
In contrast with the discretion afforded by the Directive as far as 
national enforcement and sanctions are concerned, mutual co-operation 
and information exchange between Member States' authorities is expressly 
required. This solution seems convincing both in pragmatic terms and on 
an international law level. 151 
Bergmans has expressed concern that the regulation of insider 
dealing was not seen in the general context of the harmonisation of 
company law and securities regulation, as an aspect of a 'wider policy goal 
linked to the Single Market of 1992, and in particular a Common Capital 
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Market in the context of a continuing globalisation of this area'. 152 The 
above commentator is in favour of a more balanced approach which 
would take under consideration, apart from the proper functioning of the 
market as the only policy argument, the interests of certain categories of 
participants of the securities markets. 153 
On the other hand Bergmans' suggestion that reference should be 
made by the Directive to problems of breach of duty and misappropriation 
of information is not in conformity with the spirit of the Directive and the 
shift of emphasis from the traditional company law - fiduciary approach to 
that of securities market regulation it attemptS. 154 Information, however, 
should be recognised as the central element to be regulated. It has been 
correctly argued that insider dealing is also a problem of asymmetries of 
information. 155 It would be advisable, therefore, that national legislators 
use the law of information as a general legal framework for the Directive's 
rules. 
9. Conclusion 
The EC Directive on Insider Dealing, being a compromise text, has 
not always adopted desirable solutions. It reflects, however, the 
widespread understanding among Member States that rigorous action 
must be taken to combat the expansion of insider dealing practices. 1-56 By 
adopting the present Directive, the EC takes a positive step towards 
harmonising the insider dealing laws of EC States. 
The efficiency of the Directive depends greatly on the severity of 
sanctions that will be enacted in the Member States. In order to achieve 
harmonisation and to encourage the co-operation between the authorities 
of different Member States the Directive has extended the competence of 
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the Contact Committee, which was instituted by Article 20 of the Directive 
79/279/EEC co-ordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to 
official stock exchange listing, to the cases of insider dealing. The Contact 
Committee 'shall also have as its function: (a) to permit regular 
consultation on any practical problems which arise from the application of 
this Directive and on which exchanges of view are deemed useful; (b) to 
advise the Commission, if necessary, on any additions or amendments to 
be made to this Directive. '157 Beyond these procedures, it can be reasonably 
assumed that the concern of financial centres to reassure investors will 
exercise enough pressure on Member States towards vigorous sanctioning 
of insider dealing. 
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D. 1. Insider Dealing Regulation in the United Kingdom 
Recent Developments 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom first introduced prohibitions against insider 
trading in the Companies Act of 1980.1 The philosophy behind the 
legislation was to 'develop the confidence of sinall investors by providing 
thein zvith a feeling of protection froin the tinscrtiptilotts'. 2 This 
legislation was re-enacted with modifications in 1985 in the Company 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. The 1985 Act increased criminal 
sanctions and included provisions relating to insider trading in the 
context of take-overs and mergers. The rapid development of the 
securities markets throughout the 1980s necessitated further legislative 
reform in order to promote the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
financial services industry. In 1986 the insider trading law was amended by 
the Financial Services Act 1986 which was primarily concerned with the 
general regulation of the financial services industry but, nevertheless, had 
implications for the control of insider trading. In addition to these 
provisions, it was thought 'desirable to maintain the flexibility which 
exists in a self-regulatory framework'3. Accordingly, there existed a 
number of self-regulatory organisations ('SROs') established under the 
Financial Services Act 1986 that drew up their own Codes of Conduct. The 
Securities and Investments Board ('SIB') and the various SROs were 
responsible for the promulgation of the Conduct of Business Rules and 
Core Rules. The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers was responsible for the 
promulgation and supervision of the City Code on Take-overs and 
Mergers ('City Code') and, finally, the Model Code for Securities 
Transactions by Directors of Listed Companies ('Model Code') which was 
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drawn up by the Council of the Stock Exchange, set out guidelines for 
dealings by directors in the shares of their own company where that 
company is a listed company. The Model Code was annexed to the 
Admission of Securities to Listing ('Yellow Book'). 
On May 6,1997, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that 
responsibility for monetary policy was being transferred to the Bank of 
England. This would necessitate legislation, and on May 20,1997 he 
announced that he was taking the opportunity to tackle the question of 
regulatory reform. 4 In a passage that contains the heart of the matter he 
said: 
'So there is strong case in principle for bringing the regulation of banking, securities 
and insurance together under one roof. Firms organise and manage their businesses on a 
group-wide basis. Regulators need to look at thein in a consistent way. This ulould 
bring the regulatory structure closer into line With the day's increasingly integrated 
financial markets. It would deliver more effective and more efficient supervision, 
giving both firms and customers better value for nioney. ' 
As a key feature of the reforms, the principle of self regulation was in 
effect abandoned, being replaced by an independent agency based on the 
existing SIB, and operating under statutory authority with an 
indeterminate degree of practitioner involvement. In all, nine regulatory 
bodies were to be subsumed, namely the Building Societies Commission, 
the Friendly Societies Commission, the Insurance Directorate of the DTI, 
the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), the 
Personal Investment Authority (PIA), the Registry of Friendly Societies, 
the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), the Securities and 
Investments Board (SIB), and the Supervision and Surveillance Division 
of the Bank of England. - 
The new regulator was launched by its incoming Chairman, Howard 
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Davies, on October 28,1997. Legally, it was the SIB, re-named the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA). FSA will become fully operational by the end of 
1999. Its remit covers banking, securities and insurance supervision. 5 
Standards of supervision will certainly be more consistent. One central 
location and organisation will encourage prompt and frequent exchange of 
information amongst the individual units or departments, but there must 
be some doubt, until otherwise proven, of the appropriateness of the 
supervision to all types of financial services businesses. Enforcement will 
be consistent and probably more rigorous, creating a wider gulf between 
the regulator and the regulated. More personal accountability of the most 
senior executive in a financial institution will highlight this notion and 
lead to a more litigious approach by the regulated. 6 
Critics such as lvlichael Taylor, a former Bank of England official, 
claim that the FSA's remit is too wide to be effective7, suffering from 
I inanageinent overstrech, an iinpossibly broad range of responsibilities .... 
conf7icting ctiltitres ... a lack of accotintability and oversight. ' The Director 
of the Serious Fraud Office highlighted the fact that the legal framework of 
the FSA will need radical amendment because at present the SIB, unlike 
the other SROs, does not have the power to fine traders or financial 
advisers who break the rules. 8 Howard Davies himself has called on the 
governernet to grant the FSA the power to impose civil penalties on 
insider dealers, claiming that the power to name and shame individual 
offenders is insufficient. 9 
The FSA's investigation, enforcement and disciplinary work will be 
carried out by a dedicated unit. The present situation whereby firms are 
subject to different disciplinary powers depending upon their choice of 
regulator will cease. 10 
At present, the biggest failing in the British system is the 'sorry record 
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of enforceinent'. 11 According to the same commentator the stock exchange 
has a better record of spotting possible insider dealing than in America or 
France; but the prosecution authorities find it harder to achieve successful 
prosecutions than their American or French counterparts. 12 Some 
I grumblers' have even argued that the notion of self-regulation within a 
statutory framework which underpinned the 1986 Financial Services Act 
has failed and that 'full-blown statutory regulation, anathema in 1986, 
would be preferable'. 13 Regulatory reform is all very well, but is pointless 
if the rules are not enforced. British fraud investigators have a miserable 
recent conviction rate - notably in such high-profile cases as Blue Arrow 
and Guinness. As regards insider dealing, it is quite remarkable that, since 
1980,23 people have been convicted of insider dealing, more than 300 
have been investigated, by the DTI and 50 prosecuted. Qnly in 1993, of the 
seven people prosecuted none was convicted. In other words, the most 
urgent reform must be to improve the detection and prosecution of rule- 
breakers. 14 
From the prosecution point of view the Company Securities (Insider 
Dealing) Act 1985 created an offence that contained many separate 
elements, all of which had to be proved15, increasing, thus, the 
opportunities 'for the prosecution case to come to grief for technical 
evidential reasons'. 16 This view is apparently shared by Professor Gower17 
who claimed that the old legislation, by its proliferation of matters that 
had to be proved and of defences that n-dght be raised, seemed calculated to 
make it as difficult as possible for the criminal law sanctions against 
insider dealing to be effective, and expressed the hope that the situation 
would be improved if legislation in compliance with the EC Dir ective 
were adopted. 
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The New Law 
The EC Council Directive of 13th November 1989 co-ordinating 
regulations on insider dealing (89/592/EEC OJ L 334/30) required the 
adoption by Member States of insider dealing legislation in compliance 
with its terms before 1st June 1992. The United Kingdom exceeded the EC 
deadline by a little over a year. The Criminal justice Act 1993 in 
implementing the EC Insider Dealing Directive brought about significant 
changes of the law mainly by extending potential criminal liability. 
The fact that the EC Directive is the source of the British legislation 
has a two-fold importance which should be noted at this point: (a) It has 
become an accepted principle by the European Court of Justice and, with 
understandable reluctance, by national courts that Member States should 
comply with EC Direcqves to the extent that they are clear and they do not 
give discretion to Member States about their implementation 'even where 
the national legislation is either non-existent or defective'. 18 In the 
extreme cases Marleasing SA v La Coinercial Internacional de 
Alitnentacion SA [1990 1 ECR 41351 or M. Karella and N. Karellas v 
Minister of Inditstry, Energy and Technology [1993 BCC 6771 national 
courts were required to ignore national legislation which was in conflict 
with a Directive. 19 (b) The legislative steps taken in compliance with an EC 
Directive should be also construed in the light and the context of the 
Directive so as to serve the same purpose. 20 
The new statutory provisions contained in the Criminal justice Act 
1993 are differently worded from their predecessors but are nevertheless 
just as complex. A careful examination of a number of definitions is 
required for the better understanding of the provisions. 
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1. Insiders 
The Criminal justice Act 1993 does not use the terms "pritnary" 
insider and "secondary" insider (or "tippee"21), but they are widely used in 
practice, they have been endorsed by the House of LordS22 and they 
correspond to the approach of the Act which uses the concept of having 
information "froin an inside sotirce"23 defining exhaustively24 "inside 
sotirce" as having the information either by virtue of status (i. e. being a 
primary insider) or from a primary insider (i. e. being a secondary insider 
or tippee). 25 
a) Primary insiders 
Under Article 2 of the Directive, three categories of persons who 
possess inside information are to be prohibited by Member States from 
dealing in the securities to which that information relates. They are 
persons who possess inside information: 
(i) by virtue of their membership of the administrative management or supervisory 
body of the issiter of transferable securities; 
(ii) by virtne of their holding in the capital of the issuer of such securities; or 
(iii) because they have access to such information by virtite of the exercise of their 
employment, profession or ditties. 
The third category is the broadest. It encompasses as primary insiders 
all those who have access to inside information of a company by virtue of 
their status. The test has been characterised by Rider and Ashe as 'wholly 
subjective and depending on whether a person has access to inside 
information and if he does whether it is by virtue of his position'26, which 
may be because of the absence of any well-defined criterion. 27 The circle of 
potential insiders embraces, thus, not only the employees of the company 
itself but also persons such as bankers, auditors, lawyers and others who, 
'though not a part of the company, are close to it'. 28 
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Part V of the Criminal justice Act 1993 (hereinafter the 'Act') 
provides that an insider is a person who has information from an inside 
source either: 29 
through: 
(i) being a director, employee or shareholder of an issiter" of securities; or 
(ii) having access to the information by virtue of his employment, office or profession. 
This definition replaces the notion of a person 'knowingly connected 
with a company' under s. 9 of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) 
Act 1985 and those abusing information obtained in an official capacity (s. 
2 of the Act). 31 What seems to be important now is not the conneCtion32 
with the company but the access to inside information and the quality of 
the information as inside information which originates from an inside 
source. This solution is probably related to the shift of emphasis in the 
philosophy underlying European Insider Trading Laws as explained by 
Davies. 33 In other words, the regulation of relationships in the securities 
markets seems to be the objective of the Act and not, as previously, the 
regulation of relationships characterized by common law as having a 
fiduciary character. 34 The approach of the Act and, specifically, the 
'loosening' of the connection with the company has been criticized as 
making the offence 'too wide'. 35 Moreover, if the breach of trust by 
individuals 'connected' with the company was formerly accepted as the 
philosophical basis for making this behaviour a criminal offence the new 
law reduces the credibility of this argument. According to Janet Dine36 the 
formulation of the Act 'may catch the waiter who gleans the information 
from overheard conversation as he serves a meal to insiders since he 
gains the information by virtue of his employment'. 
It could be argued, however, that the wording of the Act establishes a 
catisal link between the employment or status and the acquisition of 
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information by requiring that a person has information from an inside 
source 'if and only if' he has it 'throtigh having access by virtite of' the 
employment etc. The wording of the Act is stronger than that of the 
Directive which simply uses the term 'by virtite of'. 37 On the other hand, 
according to the Act it is no longer necessary to show that the employee 
occupied a position which could reasonably be expected to give him access 
to inside information. According to Davies 'if the broader "Ind for" test is 
adopted, then employees of these organisations, not employed on the tasks 
mentioned, but who sere ndipitotisly [emphasis added] come across the 
information in the workplace, would be covered too. '38 The wording of 
both texts is still ambiguous and whether it expresses the necessity for a 
casual link may fall to be determined by a preliminary ruling of the 
European Court of Justice at some future date. 39 
The Act does not make specific provisions for "public servants"40 or 
individuals contemplating take-over bids. The former case is certainly 
covered by the general terms of the new provision whereas the latter is 
rather redundant and has been omitted from the Act since it is normally 
corporations that make take-over bids. 41 
'Atitoinatic insider stattis'42 is also now conferred for the first time 
on shareholders. There is no theoretically lower threshold for the 
shareholding to be relevant to a prosecution, in the absence of any 
guidelines from the Directive. It is likely, as the Government recognised, 43 
that this category of insider will be more appropriate to the larger or 
institutional shareholder who holds a significant block in the company. A 
typical example of such a case would be a shareholder who declines a 
secret approach to sell his stake to a potential bidder but nevertheless 
trades on the basis that a forthcoming bid for the company is likely to be 
made. 44 
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According to the Act only individuals (or persons) can be insiders 
(ss. 57(l) and 52). The idea of extending the scope of insider dealing law to 
cover legal entities as well as individuals had been considered but it was 
concluded that since companies act through individuals it would be 'an 
unnecessary complication to cover the actions of companies in general'. 45 
It should be noted at this point that the Directive clearly contemplates that 
companies can be insiders but also expressly provides in Article 2(2) that 
when the status of insider is attributable to a legal person, the prohibition 
applies to the natural persons who decided to carry out the transaction for 
the account of the legal person concerned. 
In the new law there is no specific provision for "shadow directors". 46 
Such persons, however are likely to be "secondary" insiders. 
b) Secondary insiders 
A secondary insider or tippee is a person whose "direct or itidirect 
sotirce of ... hiforination" is a primary insider. 47 Thus, anyone who has 
information emanating from a primary insider, no matter how long the 
chain of information iS, 48 may be a secondary insider. Problems of proof, 
however, may arise the longer the chain becomes. The scope of the tippee 
liability is now broader. Under the old law, in the case of-R v. Keaii alld 
Floyd49 'part of the successful defence case was that two market-makers in 
a dealing house which was corporate broker to a public company could not 
be tippees if they had received inside information about that company 
from their colleague, an in-house analyst, who knew from her boss about 
a pending announcement from the company but who had no relationship 
with that company personally'. The Crown had not proved that they 
received information from a person knowingly connected with that public 
company and the analyst was not 'shown to have been connected with the 
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public company at all'. 50 Such an argument will not stand under the 1993 
Act because as Rider points out the 'sotircing' of the information is much 
wider than under the 1985 Act. 51 
The new wording which avoids the use of the phrase "obtains 
[information]" lays to rest the controversy which has been settled in the 
prosecution's favour by Attorney General's reference (No. 1 of 1988)52 of 
whether 'obtain' connoted actively seeking out the information or, more 
broadly, just "coming into possession ... without effort on one's own 
part". 53 The new wording makes it clear that a tippee may be such no 
matter how he acquired the information, as long as the original source 
was a primary insider. 54 The defendant must know that he 'has' the 
information from a direct or indirect source who was an insider. It is now 
clear that unsolicited information is also covered. 55 In an obiter, rather 
over-restrictive comment in the same Reference, Lord Lowry indicated 
that a tippee could only be made liable under the 1985 Act if he knew the 
identity of his informant. The ambiguity on the exact knowledge which 
the tippee must possess continues both in the Directive and in the 1993 
Act. In the wording of Article 4 of the Directive the tippee 'with flill 
knowledge of the facts possesses inside information, the direct or indirect 
source of which could not be other' than a primary insider. 56 According to 
s. 57 of the 1993 Act the tippee must know that he has inside information 
and, at the same time, that he has the information from an inside source. 
Section 57 also provides that the tippee has information from an inside 
source 'if and only if the direct or indirect sotirce of his inforination is' a 
primary insider. In both provisions it remains unclear whether the 
identity of the primary insider, who communicated the inside 
information, must be known. The Government's Consultation paper was 
rather clearer on the identity issue: 'It is not proposed that the secondary 
-143- 
insider [or tippee] need know exactly which pritnary insider was the 
source, but instead that he should know only that it came from a primary 
insider. '57 If the courts decide, however, to follow Lord Lowry's obiter 
dictitin, they will unduly confine the scope of legislation which explicitly 
seeks to catch tippees whose indirect source is an insider. The knowledge 
of the specific and price-sensitive nature of the information should be the 
only paraineter for tippee liability rather than the additional one set out by 
the legislation, i. e. the awareness of the identity or position of the 
immediate or ultimate informants of tippees. 58 Proving, however, 'that a 
11 sitb-tippee" or even a "stib-stib-tippee" knew that the ultimate source of 
the information was a primary insider could be fraught with problems. '59 
11. Inside Information 
The definition of what amounts to inside information is probably the 
most significant innovation of the new Act. The general principle of the 
underlying philosophy is stated in the preamble to the EC Directive: 
investor confidence depends inter alia on the assurance afforded to 
investors that they are placed on an eqtial footing and that they will be 
protected against the improper use of inside information. The Criminal 
Justice Act 1993 states that (ss 56 & 60(4)) "inside information" means 
information which: 
'(a) relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities or to 
particular issiters of securities and not to securities generally or to issuers of securities 
generally; 
(b) is specific or precise; 
(c) has not been made public; and 
(d) if it Were made public 7170uld be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
any securities. ' 
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The possession of "inside information" is an essential requirement of 
liability under the statute. The definition of the term is inevitably complex 
and breaks down into four cumulative components. All four must be 
present for the information to be "inside information". 60 
First, 61 "inside information" means information which relates either 
to particular securitieS62 (whereas the old law only talked about 
information relating to the "company"63) or to a particular issuer of 
securitieS64 or to particular issuers of securities. The definition expressly 
provides that the information must not relate to securities "generally" or 
to issuers of securities "generally". Thus, it has to refer to a specific 
category of securities or issuers. Examples of such "inside information" 
would be information that a take-over bid for a company was imminent65 
or that the company's profits were out of line with expectation. Moreover 
it is expressly provided66 that information is to be treated as relating to an 
issuer which is a company not only where it is about the company but also 
where it may affect the company's business prospects. This provision was 
inserted to make clear that information about the context in which a 
company operates is to be regarded as information about the company. 
Thus, for example, information about changes in the market sector a 
company belongs to, or about its main supplier will be comprised within 
the clause. 
Secondly, 67 "inside information" must be "specific or precise". The 
use of "or" means that is is enough if the information is specific (even if it 
is imprecise) or if it is precise (even if it is unspecific). The old law used the 
word "specific" whilst the EC Directive68 uses the word "precise". In the 
new provision a combination of the two alternatives is attempted. The 
connotation of "precise" is something exact and definite whereas the term 
11 specific" seems to broaden the meaning 'to soinething pertainitig to 
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soinething identified'. 69 Thus, information that a company's profits were 
in excess of expectation would be "specific" (about the company) but nor 
11 precise" (in that the amount of the excess was not stated). In the Standing 
Committee, attention was drawn to the fact that the information can be 
either specific or precise. 70 Mr Nelson, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, 
gave as a typical example of specific information a bid that is going to be 
made. 71 He pointed out that 'precise' information would be the price at 
which that bid was going to be made. Precise information is "narrow, exact 
and definitive"72 and, if it were used as the only prerequisite by the statute 
it would limit the scope of application of the new law. The addition of 
I specific' information is in fuller conformity with the spirit of the 
Directive. 
Alistair Alcock quotes one more interesting example given by the 
Minister: 73 
'I hesitate to itse examples, but, if it helps the Committee, I suggest that if somebody 
were to say during ... a lunch [befttyeetz a company chairman and an analysti, "Our 
results will be nutch better than the inarket expects or knows, " that would not be 
precise. The person would not have disclosed What the results of the company were to 
be. However, it would certainly be specific, because lie would be saying something 
about the company's results and making it pretty obvious that the information had 
not been nuide public. In such circumstances it should not have been disclosed. It would 
be insider information because it would be specific. ' 
While the intention of the United Kingdom draftsmen was to ensure 
that the information categorised as inside information was 'accurately 
expressed and distinctly formulated, the qualification that it should be 
It specific or precise" may provide more difficulty than assistance' according 
to one commentator. 74 The additional wording. however, will most 
probably assist juries in recognising that knowledge of a particular 
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forthcoming event is itself sufficient to constitute inside information 
without the need for the prosecution to establish that an individual knew 
some or all of the salient details connected with that event. 75 The criterion 
stipulated by the Directive [Art. 1(1)1 seems to be the only point of practical 
importance: The probable reaction of market traders on the release of the 
information is of importance and not the existence of the fact. 76 
The third77 characteristic of the definition of inside information is 
that it must not have been made public. Section 58 is devoted to outlining 
the meaning of the phrase. The Act does not require that the information 
should be confidential to the company and this complements the 
extension of liability to individuals beyond those who hold information 
'by virtue of being connected with the company' as in the previous IaW. 78 
From the very beginning it is made clear that its "provisions are not 
exhaustive as to the meaning of that expression". 79 The courts are, 
therefore, given the power to extend the lin-dts of what can be considered 
as made public, at the expense, perhaps, of certainty. Alcock has pointed 
out that the new guidance on the meaning of "made public", although 
well-received by the City, 'does not entirely compensate for the extra 
hazards created by the new Act no longer requiring inside information to 
be confidential'. 80 Accordingly the Stock Exchange requires all significant 
'price-sensitive matters' to be confidential until properly announced 
through the Company Announcements Office ('Yellow Book' Section 5)81 
and the listing obligation to announce as soon as possible new 
developments that might be price sensitive will be extended to USM 
companies by statutory instrument. 82 
The Government was initially inclined to adopt the Directive's 
approach and leave the courts to interpret the phrase 'made public'. This 
met with vigorous opposition from several peers who felt that 'the 
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absence of a definition left an unwelcome degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the content of offences carrying up to seven years' 
imprisonment. '83 The inclusion of a non-exhaustive definition of the 
meaning of "made public" in the statute 'is to be welcomed' and is 
undeniably better than the guideline approach which would create 
additional difficulties in a criminal statute failing to state with precision 
the content of an element of the offence. 84 This solution was dictated by 
the 'concern about the vulnerable position of analysts, particularly since 
the Mackie 85 case in Scotland'. 86 
The statute87 deems information to have been made public if it is: 
(a) I published in accordance With tile rules of a regulated market 88for tile 
purpose of informing investors and their professional advisers; 
(b) [ ... I contained in records which by virtue of any enactment are open to inspection by 
the public; 
W if it can be readily acilitired by those likely to deal in any securities; or 
(d) it is derived from information which has been made public. 
If one of these situations is present the information cannot be 
characterized as "insider information". If the information is published in 
accordance with the rules of a "regulated market"89 for the purpose of 
informing investors and their professional advisers, irrespective of 
whether the market has already responded or not to the information9O, it 
is considered as "made public". The same applies if the information is 
contained in public records, with no express limitation to public records of 
the UK, which by virtue of any enactment are open to inspection by the 
public. The provision states iWer alia that information has been made 
public if it has been derived from information which has already been 
made public. Thus, for instance, the 'underlying logic' behind the 
published investment recommendation of a highly-respected financial 
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analyst would be considered as information within the public domain. 91 
The wording, however, of section 58(3)(e) indicates that, in general, 
publication has to be in the UK since it makes clear that information inay 
be treated as "made public" even though it is published only outside the 
UK. 92 The interaction between s. 58(2)(c) and s. 58(3)(e) was discussed at 
length in the Committee Stage and it was debated whether information 
published only in the 'Tonga Evening NewS'93 could be treated as having 
been made public or the opposite conclusion would be justified for more 
parochial overseas publications. The Economic Secretary claimed that such 
issues are left to the courts but, nonetheless, admitted that a person 
divulging information could then deal immediately, 'even if the market 
had not had the time to adjust to the new information'94 as under the 
legislation previously in force. It would appear, thus, that the employee 
who has had several hours' prior knowledge of the contents of an 
important company press release is legitimately able to 'beat the news'95 by 
trading before the market has had a chance to assimilate the full 
implications of the announcement. Finally, if the information can be 
readily acquired by those likely to deal in any securitieS96" it qualifies as 
made public". The last case should be interpreted narrowly. As Alcock 
remarks: 'a director is unlikely to be able to defend himself and any analyst 
he speaks to merely by saying that he would have been prepared to give 
the same information to any other analyst who rang him Up'. 97 Likewise, 
it would be absurd to claim that the information was "readily available" to 
private shareholders or anyone who might deal. 
In certain circumstances information in ay be treated as made public 
even though: 98 
(a) it can be acquired only by persons exercising diligence or expertise; 
(b) it is communicated to a section of the public and not to the public at large; 
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(c) it can be acquired only Inj observation; 
(d) it is communicated only on payment of a fee; or 
(e) it is published only outside the United Kingdoin. 
The special provision on "expert assessments" under (a) consolidates 
the view that deductions made from public information are not "inside 
information". Indeed, if investment analysts, for instance, draw 
conclusions from information which is accessible to all who seek it in the 
right way, they will not be caught by the Act. 99 Thus, the assiduous 
investment analyst who systematically reads through recent issues of a 
relevant but obscure technical journal seeking information about a 
particular company may safely issue recommendations to his fund 
manager. The provision is intended to give analysts and fund managers a 
measure of assurance irý circumstances where uncertainty as to the means 
of dissemination might discourage them from recommending 
transactions or dealing altogether. It is not, of course for the individual to 
show that the information he had fell within one of the recognised 
categories; the ontis is always on the prosecution to prove that the 
information was not made public at the time. 100 
On the other hand, a person not certain if the information he has is 
public, under the new law had better assume that it is not. 101 Especially, if 
the information is available to a limited class of people, those who receive 
it must be on their guard. 102 Directors and many employees of quoted 
companies who are bound to have better specific knowledge of their 
company and of the relevant sector it operates in than 'can ever be 
obtained from public sources'103 should exercise extreme caution about 
dealing not only in the securities of their own company, but also in the 
securities of other companies in the same sector. 104 In fact, as Norman 
Barry comments, researching out information, e. g. about rumours, and 
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passing that on to clients is now presumably illegal. 105 A guidance 
produced by the Stock Exchange' 06 stresses that non-public price-sensitive 
information must always be given to the market as a whole, through the 
announcement mechanisms provided by the Exchange, and that such 
information must not be allowed "to seep into the pitblic doinain. ' 
Directors and employees should also avoid discussing matters of the 
companies in the sector with analysts since this behaviour might amount 
to the crime of 'encouraging others to deal'. 107 
Information may be treated as made public if it has been 
communicated to a section of the public and not to the public at large. The 
absence of an adjective qualifying 'section' allows the court a considerable 
degree of latitude in cases where there has been only partial public 
disclosure of significant information. 108 
Equality of information in the stock markets could be paraphrased as 
Tie art of tize possible', and it is perhaps the latter that the law has made 
an attempt to master. 
Fourthly, information must be "likely to have a significant effect on 
the price of any securities" if it were made public. 109 According to one 
interpretation the adjective "significant" means that the information 
must 'potentially have a major impact on the price'. 110 Movements in 
price of no importance are not sufficient for the purpose of the statute. The 
Take-over Panel for the purposes of requiring statements uses a 10 per cent 
untoward' movement on one day as a benchmark. 111 
The impact of eventual disclosure of inside information on the 
market price will depend in most cases on such variables as the liquidity of 
the company's shares and the prevailing market conditions. 112 Thus, the 
relatively vague test of "price-sensitivity" of information could not be 
substituted by a more specific universal standard for reasons of practicality 
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and it is left to courts to decide on individual cases. 113 The 1985 Act 
described price-sensitivity in relation to the probability that general 
disclosure of the information would have a 'material' effect on the market 
price of the affected securities. 1 14 The Directive refers to the probability of a 
f significant' impact on price, and the same wording has been followed in 
section 56(2) of the 1993 Act. 
The same section [s. 56(1)&(2)] comprises the definitions of two other 
related terms: "price-affected securities" and "price-sensitive information". 
For the purposes of this Part of the statute: 115 
I securities are "price-affected securities" in relation to inside information, and inside 
information is "price-sensitive information" in relation to securities, if and only if 
the informatiOll Would, if made public, be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of securities. ' - 
Alastair Brown has rightly characterized this definition as 
"wonderfully tautologous" . 116 Securities are price affected securities, and 
information is price sensitive information, if the information would, if 
made public, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the 
securities. The 'materiality' will inevitably continue to be determined in 
most cases on the simple post Itoc observation of the actual price shift 
recorded following proper disclosure of the information. Price-sensitivity, 
however, remains to be resolved under the 1993 Act according to the 
market conditions prevailing at the time of the alleged offence. 117 One 
more time the courts will have to decide what is a criininal passing on of 
price-sensitive information and what information could be freely 
communicated because it could not affect the price of securities. 118 
The individual who commits the offence must have information "as 
an insider"119 and "from an inside source". 120 Thus, both an objective and 
a subjective element must be present. 121 An individual "has information 
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as an insider if and only if (making it, thus, perfectly clear that the 
definition is exhaustive122): (a) the information is, and the individual 
knows that it is, "inside information" and (b) he has it, and knows that he 
has it, from "an inside source". 123 Section 57(2) states that: 
11 a person has information ftom all inside source if and only if. 
Whe has it through: (i) being a director, employee or shareholder of all issuer of 
securities; or (ii) having access to the information by virtile of his employment, office 
or profession; or 
(b) the direct or indirect source of his information is a person within paragraph (a)" 
The definition of having information as an insider clearly requires 
the individual to know that he is an insider in the sense of realizing that 
he has the information by virtue of the relevant status, if he is a primary 
insider, or that the source of information is a primary insider (in the case 
of secondary insider). In the latter case he need not actually know the 
identity of that primary insider if he is aware of his status. In other words a 
person has information as an insider if he is an insider (i. e. has access to 
inside information either as a primary or as a secondary insider) and 
knows both that it is inside information and that he has it from an inside 
source. 
The aim of the legislation, therefore, should not be to eliminate 
informational advantages, but to 'proscribe those advantages whose use 
would be improper, often because their acquisition was not the result of 
skill or effort but of the mere fact of holding a particular position. '124 On 
the other hand the definition of information is largely a cotnprotnise 
between the need to protect investors and the need to avoid 'asphyxiating' 
the market. If the concern for investor protection pushes insider dealing 
legislation too far, only dealing in the dark would be permitted. This 
would make it impossible for people to use the Stock Exchange. 
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111. Securities 
The prohibition will only apply in relation to certain investments 
which the statute terms "securities". The relevant securities are defined 
as: 125 
'any security which (a) falls Within any paragraph of Schedule 2; and (b) satisfies 
any condition applying to it under an order inade by the Treasury for the purposes of 
this subsection. " 
The list of Schedule 2 comprises shareS126, debt securitieS127 
warrantS128, depositary receipts in relation to shareS129, optionS130, 
futures131 and contracts for differences132 in relation to any security falling 
within any category of "relevant securities" of Schedule 2. The latter can be 
amended by the Treasury by secondary legislation133 giving, thus, the 
possibility to the legislator to extend the liability to new 'investment 
media and new abuses' as soon as they emerge. 134 A really important 
innovation of the new list is that it extends the liability of the old law by 
also covering Government or local authority stock. This extension of the 
definition of securities (along with the abolition of the connection 
requirement of primary insiders with the company135) has brought about a 
considerable increase in the scope of liability. The definition now includes 
giltS136 and local authority stock, as well as futures and options. 137 
Alcock observes that although the definition of a company in the 
new Act (s. 60(3)(a)) is wide enough to cover unit trusts as well, the list of 
securities in Sched. 1 does not cover units in such trusts, apparently 
leaving unit trusts managers free to trade in the units of their trusts, but 
not managers companies operating investment trusts in their shares. 138 
This solution is rather controversial because unit trusts are also related to 
securities traded on formal markets and raises questions as to the 
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protection of "small investors" who normally prefer them. The same 
commentator adds that at the request of LIFFE139 the Schedule was 
specifically amended to cover derivative contracts in short term interest 
rates, even though they have no underlying security. 140 
According to section 54(l)(b) of the Act the Treasury will issue an 
Order stipulating conditions to be fulfilled by the investment which will 
qualify as a "security". The Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated 
Markets) Order stipulates that in the United Kingdom these are any 
markets established under the rules of the London Stock Exchange, the 
London International Financial and Futures Exchange, the London 
Securities and Derivatives Exchange and Tradepoint. 141 
The main limitation imposed by the Treasury is that it restricts the 
legislation to market based securities: 
'The purpose of the legislation is to enstire confidence in the market in its broadest 
sense. So only transactions in securities that are inarket-related are to be caught. But 
because the terins oil which securities are admitted to formal markets differ Widely, 
and because the need to ensure that it is possible to apply the legislation to situations 
Where there is a ready trade in securities related to those traded oil forlizal lizarkets, 
the section provides a power to describe the securities by order., 142 
According to Article 4 of the relevant statutory instrument 'The 
Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order 1994 (SI No187) 
which came into force on 1 March 1994, the condition which applies to any 
security falling within any paragraph of Schedule 2 to the CJA above is 
that: 
(a) it is officially listed in a State within the European Economic 
Area143; or 
(b) it is admitted to dealing on, or has its price quoted on or under the 
rules of, a regulated market. 144 
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In the Committee Stage debates, Anthony Nelson confirmed that the 
placing of new securities by stockbrokers as vendor consideration 'subject 
to listing' will not be caught by the new Act because, although the placees 
may agree to take the securities relying on a professional intermediary 
with information not yet made public, the securities are not yet listed. 
Alcock draws the conclusion that, if the previous argument is correct, the 
same must apply to underwritings and placings of all new issues, a point 
confirmed by the Earl of Caithness when the House of Lords considered 
the Commons Amendments. 145 This solution on the one hand restricts 
the problems that corporate finance activities have with the new Act to 
those involving securities that have already been issued, but, on the other, 
it means that all 'grey inarket dealings in ne-, v issites fall outside the ainbit 
of the legislation'. 146 . 
IV. The Insider Dealing Offence 
The activities covered by the Criminal justice Act are basically the 
same as those covered by the Directive and the Insider Dealing Act 1985. 
The basic policy objectives of the new Act find expression in the new 
formulation of the offence which, in section 52(l), is as follows: 
"An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider dealing if, in 
the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in securities that are price 
affected securities in relation to the information. " 
The Act prol-tibits: 
(a) dealing as principal or as agent; [s. 52(1)&(3), s. 55] 
(b) procuring another to deal as principal or as agent; [s. 55(l)(b)&(4)] 
(c) encouraging another person to deal who might reasonably be 
expected to do so [s. 52(2)(a)]; and 
(d) disclosing inside information other than in the proper 
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performance of one's duties [s. 52(2)(b)] 
The secondary insider dealing is prohibited, but the exposition of the 
primary insider dealing offence will cover all that is necessary to explain 
the secondary offences. 147 
i. Dealing or procuring dealing 
The main innovation is that for procuring or disclosing, the 
prosecution no longer needs to show that the insider knew or ought to 
have realised that someone would deal. 148 
The definition of dealing, as in the Insider Dealing Act 1985, includes 
merely agreeing to acquire or dispose of a security 'even if property never 
eventually passes'. 149 Dealing is further defined by s. 55 and includes 
acquisition and disposal as principal or agent or the direct or indirect 
procurement of an acquisition or disposal by any other person. In 
Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1975), 150 'proctire' was held to 
mean 'prodtice by etideavotir'. The defendant must therefore have caused 
the prohibited result by his actions. In that case the defendant charged with 
the procurement had added alcohol to the drink of another without his 
knowledge. It was held that if the defendant knew that the other man 
intended to drive and that the ordinary and natural result of the added 
alcohol was to cause him to have an alcohol concentration above the limit 
for drivers, the defendant had procured him to commit the drink/driving 
offence. 151 
The 'open-ended' definition of procuring in the Act caused some 
anxiety in the Committee stage152. As Dine remarks: 153 
'The ineatzing of an 'indirect procurement' must therefore remain rather obscure, 
particularly so far as the mens rea to be proved. Must it be proved that the defendant 
foresaw or that 
it Was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's actiO11S 7170tild 
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lead to another acquiring or disposing of securities? The relationship between this 
section and s. 52(2)(a) WhiCh prohibits the encouragement of another to deal is also 
somewhat obscure. Could there be an indirect procurement WhiCh Was not an indirect 
encouragement to deal or vice versa? ' 
Section 55(3) provides a non-exhaustive definition (subs (5)) of the 
circumstances in which an insider may be regarded as procuring an 
acquisition or disposal of securities by another. A person procures an 
acquisition or disposal of a security if the security is acquired or disposed of 
by a person who is: 
(a) his agent, 
(b) his nominee, or 
Wa Pei-SOIZ Who is acting at his direction, 
in relation to the acqr1isition or disposal. 
This provision covers a number of permutations. 154 If a principal, for 
example, in possession of inside information gets an innocent agent, a 
professional dealer or simply a friend, to deal for him, the innocent agent 
(not having any inside information) is not liable being neither an insider 
nor a tippee. The principal, on the contrary, remains liable because he has 
procured the acquisition or disposal, despite not having dealt himself. 15-9 
In Rv GoodinanI56 where the insider (a company chairman) gave his 
entire holding in the company to his girlfriend ahead of the news of 
significant losses and she disposed of the shares, he was treated as having 
procured their disposal. The same interpretation would apply in the case 
where the insider deals through a company which he controls. In this 
particular case the insider procures the dealing by another person acting at 
his direction. Consequently, the insider will be caught by this procuring 
element even if he chose not to deal in the price affected securities. 157 
To meet the very meaning of procuring the prosecution will have to 
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prove that the insider knew the other party would deal. Alcock adds 
convincingly that, in most cases, it is more than enough to prove the 
crime of encouraging, and that 'this tinkering with the onus of proof will 
not make a practical difference to many, if any, cases'. 158 
Dealing will only amount to an offence if it takes place in the 
circumstances set out in s. 52(3). They are: 
. 
(a) that the acquisition or disposal in question occurs on a regulated 
market; or 
(b) that the person dealing relies on a professional intermediary or is 
himself acting as a professional intermediary. 
This wording follows Art 2(3) of the EC Directive which permits 
Member States to exempt deals not involving a professional intermediary. 
Previously, the off-market prohibition had only covered transactions in 
advertised securities which had been carried out by or through a party who 
had been authorised under the Financial Services Act 1986.159 
According to the Act [s. 59(4)] reliance on a professional intermediary 
occurs if and only if: 
"a person who is acting as a professional intermediary carries out an 
activity mentioned in subsection (2, mainly acquiring or disposing) in 
relation to that dealing. " 
'Professional interinediary' is defined in s. 59. Essentially, it is a 
person who holds himself out to a section of the public as being someone 
willing to engage in the acquisition or disposal of securities. 
The transactions that fall within the scope of the Act are those 
effected on a 'regulated market' or when the person dealing relies on a 
professional intermediary or is himself acting as a professional 
intermediary [ss. 52(3), 59, and 60(1)]. Consequently, all European securities 
and derivatives markets are covered160 as well as all other dealings by or 
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arranged through UK and overseas market-makers and securities brokers 
(e. g. Eurobond dealers). 161 Many corporate finance transactions of 
merchant banks and stockbrokers (but not, as Alcock observes, generally 
accountants or solicitors162), like underwritings, firm placings, rescue 
packages and the obtaining of irrevocable undertakings to accept take-over 
bids (s. 59), which are invariably based on material and unpublished 
information, have been covered by the 'closed circles' defence in an effort 
to remove the prospect of prosecution from the conduct of legitimate 
corporate finance deals. 163 The definition given to 'professional 
intermediaries' alone is probably wide enough to catch lawyers and 
accountants instructing securities transactions on behalf of their clients but 
section 59(3) removes the application of the dealing offence from those 
who 'incidentally' or 'occasionally' actas professional intermediaries. The 
EC Directive [Art. 2(3)] permits Member States to cover all off-market 
transactions including private face to face deals. The UK government, 
unlike some of its continental counterparts chose not to do SO. 164 Thus, 
cases where company's securities are not traded on the market do not fall 
within the scope of the legislation. If among the objectives of the insider 
dealing legislation ranks the prevention of the improper use of 
information possessed by insiders, it is easy to see that cases of abuse of 
inside information are equally likely to arise in shares of non-quoted 
companies. 165 Professor Murray remarks that a case where directors 
bought in knowledge of an impending take-over (Percival v. Wright [19021 
2 Ch 421)166, often invoked as the classic case of what constitutes insider 
dealing, occurred in an unquoted English company. 167 The partiality of 
law, which criminalizes the reprehensible behaviour in one case and not 
in the other, can hardly be justified. 168 
The inens rea of the dealing offence requires the prosecution to prove 
-160- 
that the individual knew both that his information was inside 
information and that he has it from an inside source. 169 It must be shown, 
therefore, that the defendant understood the specificity and materiality of 
the information at the time he chose to deal and the same 'subjective 
appreciation'170 has to be shown in relation to the source of the 
information: either that the defendant knew he had the information on 
account of his inside position or, in the case of a tippee, that he had the 
information directly or indirectly from the one who was in that position. 
The fact that the individual did not at the time of the transaction expect 
the dealing to result in a profit attributable to the price-sensitive nature of 
information or that he would have acted the same way if he had not had 
the information may constitute a defence. 171 
The Act (s. 62) follows Art. 5 of the Directive in defining the 
territorial scope of the crime of insider dealing. Crimes of dealing or 
procuring are committed if either the perpetrator, the market or the 
professional intermediary used is in the UK. For this purpose, there are 
three UK markets, the Stock Exchange, LIFFE and OM172 London (Art. 9 
Draft Order). 173 The 1993 Act has apparently adopted the lex loci delicti 
approach dictated by the Directive. It also follows the Directive regarding a 
transaction as carried out within its territory if it is carried out on a market 
which 'by an order made by the Treasury, is identified (whether by 
reference or by criteria prescribed by the order) as being .... regulated in the 
United Kingdom' s. 62(l)(b). 
The Directive requires that the Member States prohibit insider 
dealing insider dealing in transferable securities "admitted to a market of a 
Member State"174 and not just those admitted to its own markets. In line 
with this requirement, the 1994 Order extends the application of the Act to 
securities which are officially listed in or are admitted to dealing under the 
- 161 - 
rules of any investment exchange established within any of the states of 
the European Economic Area. This solution of 'applying domestic 
sanctions irrespective of a foreign element' has been rather wrongly 
criticised as creating criminal law with an unacceptable territorial reach. 175 
ii. Disclosing 
Section 52(2)(b) provides that an individual who has information as 
an insider is guilty of insider dealing if: 'he discloses the information, 
otherwise than in the proper performance of the functions of his 
employment, office or profession, to another person. ' Consequently, 
individuals passing on inside information in proper discharge of their 
duties are not within the scope of the provision. The simple disclosure of 
information is the most likely offence to be limited by the concept of 
'taking advantage' discussed below. 176 
In all three types of insider dealing the requisite ineits rea of the 
offence is knowledge both that the information is "inside information" 
and that the defendant is an "insider" in the sense of either knowing that 
he has the information by reason of the relevant status (primary insider) 
or knowing that the source of the information is a primary insider. 177 The 
prosecution has to establish, in other words that the individual knowingly 
understood the quality and source of the information at the time of the 
disclosure. It is no longer necessary to show that the individual must have 
intended to bring about a particular result as a consequence of his 
disclosure. It does not have to be proved, for instance, that the defendant 
intended or ought to have realised that the recipient would use the 
information to advise others to deal in the affected securities. 178 On the 
other hand, the defendant now has a defence that he did not expect 
anyone to deal because of the disclosure. The onus of proof, however, is 
on him (s. 53(3)). 179 
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The crime of disclosing information is committed if either the tipper 
or tippee is in the UK at the time of the disclosure (s. 62(2)). The lex loci 
delicti approach of the Directive has been implemented in a narrower 
fashion to the disclosing offence. 
iii. Encouraging others to deal 
The third way of committing the offence is by encouraging others to 
deal [s. 52(2)(a)]. It must be shown that the deal occurs in a regulated 
market or is effected through a professional intermediary. It would seem 
that this must be the case as the offence is complete on proof of 
encouragement. It has been correctly remarked that the essential achis relts 
of the offence under section 52(2)(a) is the imparting of advice to deal in 
the specified securities as opposed to substantive disclosure of the 
information which le4 the individual to give that advice. 180 The actual 
deal need not have taken place. A specific encouragement to deal on the 
market or through professionals must therefore be shown. It is irrelevant 
whether the advice was offered gratuitously or for personal gain. 181 
Palmer observes that any dealing which ensues need not be on a 
11 regulated market" or be by or in reliance on a "professional 
intermediary", although, the defendant must "know or have reasonable 
cause to believe" that the dealing will take place. 182 It does not matter, 
therefore, if it later transpires that it occurs in some other way. If the 
person encouraged does receive the "inside information" the disclosing 
offence has also been committed. 183 
The iiieiis rea of this type of the offence has some additional 
elements. The offender must know or at least have reasonable cause to 
believe that the dealing will take place either on a "regulated market" or 
by or in reliance on a "professional intermediary". The minimum set by 
the provision is that the defendant must have "reasonable cause" to 
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believe that the dealing will take place in the relevant circumstances, has 
been characterized as an 'objective element' introduced into the inens rea. 
The defendant can be convicted without the recipient of the advice having 
known that the former had the benefit of price-sensitive information 
when he was encouraged to deal. It is not even necessary to prove that the 
recipient actually heeded the advice given by buying or selling the 
relevant securities. 184 
The crime of encouraging others to deal is committed if either the 
person who encouraged or the recipient of the encouragement is in the 
UK at the time of the encouragement of the dealing (s. 62(2)). 
Taking Advantage 
According to the Directive [Article 2(1)] the person in possession of 
inside information is Ao be prohibited from "taking advantage of that 
information with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of, 
for his own account or for the account of a third party, either directly or 
indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that 
information relates". The prohibition of "taking advantage" is extended by 
Art. 4 to secondary insiders who with full knowledge of the facts possess 
inside information. It must be shown that the defendant was "taking 
advantage" of inside information. 185 If the factors discussed so far can be 
proved, the defendant is presumed to have "taken advantage" of the 
information in dealing, disclosing or encouraging others to deal but the 
presumption of taking advantage can be displaced by proof by the 
defendant (presumably on balance of probabilities) of a number of 
available defences. 186 
One interesting aspect of the insider dealing prohibition is the 
scien ter requirement which reflects the wording of the Directive. Insiders 
must take advantage of the information "with ftill knowledge of the facts" 
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according to the Directive and the Act provides [s. 57(1&-2)] that a person 
has information as an insider if and only if: (a) it is, and he knows that it 
is, inside information, and (b) he has it, and knows that he has it, from an 
inside source. The inference is necessarily drawn that the insider must 
have acted wilfully. As Rider points out "mere carelessness while in 
possession of inside information will not be enough". 187 
V. Defences 
The wider scope of the basic crimes in the new Act, has enhanced the 
importance of defences. The Act comprises various defences to insider 
dealing. Two groups of defences can be distinguished: Defences of a 
general nature [s. 53] and defences of a specific nature or special defences 
contained in Schedule 1. It should be noted, at this point, that the Treasury 
is empowered by the Act [s. 53(5)] to amend Schedule 1 by order. The 
general defences of s. 53 are not amendable whereas the specific defences of 
Schedule 1 could be improved, extended or abolished. 
a) general 
In section 53 there is special provision for each of the three types of 
insider dealing. According to the Act an individual is not guilty of insider 
dealing "if he shows" that certain conditions are fulfilled. Thus, the 
defendant has to prove that the circumstances stipulated by s. 53 exist. The 
defences applicable to "dealing" and "encouraging" are almost identical: 00 
(a) If the defendant shows that he did not expect the dealing to result 
in a profit attributable to the fact that the information was "price-sensitive 
information in relation to the securities", he is not guilty of insider 
dealing. It is made clear by the provision that "the avoidance of a loss" is 
included in the meaning of "profit" [s. 53(6)]. The defendant is afforded a 
defence if it is proved that he did not anticipate, based on his subjective 
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judgement, that the transaction would result in a profit (or in the 
avoidance of a loss). A similar defence existed under the previous 
legislation. 188 The new Act189 does not extend this defence to trustees or 
personal representatives who have information but act on the advise of a 
professional manager of the assets. 190 These cases could now rely on the 
third general defence that the accused 'would have done what he did even 
if he had not had the information' [s. 53(1)(c), 2(c)]. 
(b) The second general defence to dealing and encouraging (but not to 
disclosing) can be invoked when the defendant 'believed on reasonable 
grounds that the information had been or would be disclosed widely 
enough to ensure that none of those taking part in the dealing would be 
prejudiced by not having the information'. 191 In this particular case the 
criterion is an objectively reasonable belief that the information is 
sufficiently widely known. 192 If this defence were available when the 
Mackie193 case was tried it might have led to the adoption of a different 
line of argumentation. It could be invoked by an 'honest investment 
analyst'194, even if the information on which he relied had not been 
"made public", provided he can 'point to the basis on which he believed 
there had been wide disclosure'. 19-5 Corporate finance transactions like 
underwriting secondary issues or obtaining irrevocable acceptances for 
bids depend on this defence. 196 An employee of an institution, for 
example, might commit his employer to underwrite an offer subject to 
approval by the employer's board and 'the board might approve the deal 
on the basis of the employee's recommendation without knowing much 
of the contents of the offer document'. 197 
(c) The defendant has a defence if he shows that he would have dealt 
or encouraged another to deal "even if he had not had the information" 
fs. 53(1)(c), (2)(c) and (6)]. In other words, the defendant must prove that the 
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event of being in possession of the information was fortuitotis in the 
sense of not causing him to deal (or encouraging another to deal)'. 198 It 
has already been noted that this defence -would give protection to a trustee 
or personal representative who has inside information, but is acting on 
the advice of a professional manager of the assets, or it would protect an 
analyst who has been given inside information but tries to continue to 
advise his clients on the basis of the information he had before. 199 
According to Alcock this defence should also cover bona fide activities of 
liquidators, receivers and trustees-in-bankruptcy who no longer have a 
specific defence. 200 On the other hand, the same commentator sounds a 
cautionary note: "this defence does highlight to the unscrupulous, the 
potential for 'inantijachiritig' evidence after the event to show that the 
accused always intended to act in the way he did before he obtained the 
inside information. "201 The insider dealing enforcement recordS202 rather 
lend probability to this theory. 
Individuals prosecuted for the "disclosing" offence are afforded two 
different defences: 
(a) Firstly, if the defendant can show that he did not expect at that 
time (i. e. at the time of the disclosure) that any person would deal, because 
of the disclosure, either on a "regulated market"203 or as or in reliance on 
a "professional intermediary"204. Here the test is again subjective. If the 
defendant can prove that he did not anticipate that anyone would deal on 
the basis of the disclosure, as it has been succintly put, 'no matter how 
naive the expectation that the recipient would not deal on the basis of the 
disclosure was'. 205 The defence could still arise if the defendant did not 
expect the recipient of the information to deal on a regulated market, or 
that the person dealing would rely on a professional intermediary or 
would himself act as a professional intermediary. 206 
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(b) In addition, if the defendant can show that "although he had such 
an expectation at that time"207, he did not expect the dealing to result in a 
profit attributable to the fact that the information was price-sensitive 
information in relation to the securities. 208 This defence is quite similar to 
the first defence considered above in relation to the "dealing" and 
11 encouraging" offences, and its test is similarly subjective. It should be 
stressed that in all cases the o it us of proof is upon the accused and that 'the 
standard or proof would be a balance of probabilities, as usual where there 
is an evidential burden on the accused. 209 The jury will, eventually, take 
a view on the motive behind the dealing. 
b) special 
Schedule 1 provides for three specific defences. 210 They are applicable 
to the cases of "dealing" and "encouraging". As presently worded, 
Schedule 1 is irrelevant if the offence amounts to mere disclosure of 
information. The Schedule, as has already been noted, may be amended by 
Order. The defendant must prove that the terms of the defence are 
fulfilled. 
The first special defence applies to "market makers". According to the 
definition of Schedule 1211, a market maker is a person who: 
(a) holds himself out at all norinal times in compliance with the rules of a regulated 
nzarket212 or an approved organisatio, 1213 as willing to acquire or dispose of 
securities; and 
(b) is recognised as doing so under those rules. 
Market makers who can show that they acted in good faith in the 
course of their business as market makers or their employment in the 
business of a market maker, are not guilty of insider dealing by virtue of 
dealing in securities or encouraging another person to deal. This is 
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probably derived from the preamble to the Directive where it is noted that 
the mere fact that market makers who have inside information confine 
themselves to pursuing their normal business of buying or selling 
securities, should not in itself be deemed to constitute use of such inside 
information. The aim of the defence is to facilitate the conduct of ordinary 
business of market makers who have a particular stock in their book and 
who acquire information which they did not seek. 214 The meaning of 
tv good faith" is not specified by the provision but it could reasonably be 
interpreted as comprising actions within the scope of market making 
business and in accordance to normal market practices. 215 An individual 
market maker is clearly not acting bona fide as a market maker if he takes 
a personal profit from inside information but it is uncertain whether a 
market maker, who hýaving learned of an unannounced take-over bid, 
aggressively purchases the target's shares for the firm's own 'back book' 
and in the process improves his personal bonuS, 216 is acting in bad faith. 
This defence is similar to the "jobber"217 and "market makerS"'218 
exemption of the Insider Dealing Act 1985 and remains as controversial as 
its predecessors. 
The second "special defence" relates to market information. Market 
information is defined as information consisting of one or more of the 
following facts: 219 
(a) that securities of a particular kind have been or are to be acquired or disposed of, 
or that their acquisition or disposal is under consideration or the subject of 
negotiation; 
(b) that securities of a particular kind have not been or are not to be acquired or 
disposed of; 
(c) the number of securities acquired or disposed of or to be acquired or disposed of or 
Whose acquisition or disposal is under consideration or the subject of negotiation; 
-169- 
(d) the price (or range of prices) at which securities have been or are to be acquired or 
disposed of or the price (or range of prices) at which securities Whose acquisition or 
disposal is under consideration or the subject of negotiation may be acquired or 
disposed of, 
(e) the ideiztihj of the persons involved or likely to be involved in any capacity in an 
acquisition or disposal. 
In essence, it is information which market participants may acquire 
in the course of that participation. Apart from the acquisition or disposal 
of securities that have taken place or will do so, market information 
includes the possibility that the transactions are under consideration or 
that someone is not dealing in securities of a particular kind. It also 
comprises the possibility that someone might know the range of prices at 
which dealing is contqmplated as welt as the price at. which particular 
transactions are to take place. 220 The "market information" defences break 
down into two categories. The first applies when the defendant can show 
both that the information was "market information" and that it was 
11 reasonable" for an individual in his position to have acted as he did 
despite having that information as an insider at that time. 221 The test of 
what is reasonable will be connected with the content of the information, 
the circumstances and the capacity in which he first had the information, 
and the capacity in which he now acts. This would probably cover the case 
of a person who acquired market information when he was not "an 
insider" but later became an insider. 
The second market information defence222 can be invoked by persons 
who deal or encourage others to deal in the context of facilitating dealing 
which was already under consideration (as for example when building up 
a stake in a company prior to a take-over). Accordingly the directors of a 
t predator company having the inside information that their company was 
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about to take over another, may themselves buy shares in the taro'et 
company or encourage others to do so in order to facilitate the take- 
over'223 and the same applies to banks if they underwrite or place 
securities without giving progress reports. In the previous Jaw224 this 
defence was extended to the "disclosing" offence but its scope has now 
been considerably curtailed by the new Act. The case of "front rtinning" or 
in other words, dealing for a private gain ahead of the publication of an 
highly regarded analyst's report in which the analyst is dramatically 
changing his views on the company and which will inevitably affect the 
price of the securities will not be covered by the defence. 225 
The new Act retainS226 the defence for stabilising new issues, 
providing such stabilisation complies with the SIB rules on the subject 
(Sched. 1, par. 5). The SIB is empowered to make rules as to stabilisation of 
certain securities. The issuer may be permitted to deal in the securities in 
order to maintain the market price as long as he complies with the rules, 
during the period specified by the SIB. Otherwise the issuer could be found 
guilty of "insider dealing" for having the "inside information" that the 
stabilising process was in progress. According to one commentator 
activities in furtherance of legal stabilisation will also fall within the scope 
of the defence. 227 
Both the general and the special defences set (jut in the Act Place the 
onus on the accused to bring himself within them. The prosecutor does 
not have to displace them, at first instance, though, in appropriate cases he 
will 'wish to have and lead evidence designed to counter any attempt to 
invoke them'. 228 
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VI. Sanctions 
a) Criminal Liability 
The Directive in Article 13 leaves to Member States the penalties for 
Insider Dealing and merely provides that the penalties "shall be sufficient" 
to promote compliance with the measures taken pursuant to it. A Member 
State is, accordingly, free to impose criminal or civil sanctions for insider 
dealing or a combination of both. 
According to the provisions of the Act: 229 
An individual guilty of insider dealing shall be liable: 
(a) on stuninary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maxinuun or 
imprisonment for a terin not exceeding six months or to both; or 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or imprisonment for a terut not exceeding 
seven years or to both. 
The Act, in other words, has carried on the tradition of criminal 
sanctions, first introduced in 1980, by placing exclusive reliance upon 
criminal sanctions. The solution of exclusively criminal law sanctions for 
the offence of Insider Dealing has been questioned both for its deterrent 
effect and its enforcement potential. Before the promulgation of the Act, 
one commentator stated that 'the most urgent reform must be to improve 
the detection and prosecution of rule-breakers'. 230 The 'sorry record of 
enforce? nent' which has been characterised as the biggest failing of the 
British system, is, to a considerable extent, due rather to the procedural 
system than to drafting errors of the legislation. The 'inherent vice' of the 
enforcement procedure of the legislation could be put down to three 
different elements. 
Firstly, the offence displays such a complexity that the prosecution 
case is likely to come to grief for technical evidential reasons. 231 Moreover, 
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the likelihood of successful prosecutions is jeopardised by the fact that the 
provisions are construed according to rules of evidence and, principally, 
the presumption of innocence, that were developed originally, as Brown 
points out, 'for the protection of persons accused of offences which at one 
time carried the death penalty'. 232 Secondly, an additional obstacle is posed 
by the lack of efficiency of the jury system. The complexity of the issue and 
its context which has little to do with the daily experience of the jury create 
some doubts as to whether juries are 'a fit means of trying cases of this 
sort'. 233 Proper research on the competence of the juries can not be carried 
out without the repeal of section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, 
which was proposed by the Runciman Commission (1993). Finally, Brown 
points to the nature of the offence, which in his view is clandestine, and 
'it is usually carried out by someone who is blessed with greater than 
average intelligence and has applied that intelligence to concealing his 
actions'. 234 This remark should not lead to the inference either that this 
characteristic pertains only to the offence of insider dealing or that 
prosecution is rendered impossible because of the capabilities of the 
potential offenders. Above all, it has no significance regarding the 
criminal character of the act. 
Critics examining the primary reason for poor enforcement of British 
Insider Trading statutes, point to the fact that only criminal sanctions are 
available. 235 The prosecutor has to prove the allegations beyond 
reasonable doitbt, in order to achieve a criminal conviction, and many 
times it can be extraordinarily difficult because of the nature of the crime 
to demonstrate the link between the trader and the information to that 
degree. The view has been expressed by many that civil actions can 
increase the deterrent effect of the law and, at the same time, provide 
comýensation for victims of the activity, especially in circumstances 
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where the criminal penalties do not have a sufficient deterrent. Such 
circumstances can occur where the detection is difficult and where an 
economic calculation is conducive to wrong-doing. 236 Civil sanctions, on 
the other hand, require a far less burdensome standard of proof based on a 
balance of probabilities in comparison with Criminal provisions that 
require proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
A critique237 of the new British Insider Dealing Legislation attributes 
the superior rate of convictions of the French Coininission des Opgrations 
de Mirse (COB) and the American Sectirities and Excliange Coininission 
(SEC) to the fact that neither the COB nor the SEC has to resort to criminal 
law. They both rely first on civil law, though the guilty may be charged 
with criminal offences as well. The commentator remarks that: 238 
"Besides forcing wrongdoers to give back their ill-gotten gains, both the COB and the 
SEC can fine convicted insiders a multiple of those profits - up to three times the 
gains fi-onz transactions in America (though the SEC normally settles for less), and up 
to ten times in France. 
Easier convictions inake fines more of a deterrent. fit Britain, insiders face unlimited 
fine s and rip to seven years in jail. But that is not initch of a deterrent when so jew are 
convicted. fit the unlikely event that any one in Japan is convicted of insider-trading, 
he will face a maxinittin fine of Y500,000 ($5,100) and six inonths ill jail. " 
For criminal cases, trials should be shortened and simplified. It has 
been suggested that the Serious Fraud Office should 'trim'239 the number 
of charges it brings and assemble its cases more quickly. In addition, 
increasing the number of high-court judges would help. One more 
proposal supports a fuller use of preparatory hearings, for which the 
defence should be required to disclose its case in advance. Perhaps any 
changes that increase the chances of punishment for wrongdoing would 
contribtAe more to the improvement of the regulation of Insider Dealing 
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than 'any amount of tinkering -with regulatory structures'. 240 
It should be noted at this point that both the SEC and the COB have 
specialist departments with lawyers who handle most investigations and 
civil suits themselves. The COB has 50 people in its enforcement division, 
all of whom can investigate insider- trading; the SEC has over 800. Britain 
has no special insider-trading unit, apart from a team of about 20 at the 
London Stock Exchange. 241 The findings of the Exchange are passed to the 
DTI, which, if it considers there is a strong enough case, appoints a 'couple 
of ad lioc in-spectors to look into it. '242 The problem of "staffing" of 
specialist departments with insider-trading investigators is even worse in 
other EC Member States and may hinder the enforcement of the Insider 
Dealing Directive. 243 
Another difficulty in prosecuting i nsiders has arisen from Saunders 
v. United Kingdoin,. 244 The European Court of Justice upheld a 
Commission's Report which adopted the view that Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights had been violated by the 
conviction of Saunders, Guinness chairman during the notorious 
Distillers' takeover bid who complained that the use of his criminal trial 
of transcripts of interviews with the DTI inspectors violated Article 6. 
Saunders relied upon the fact that he was under a duty to answer the 
inspector's questions, enforceable by proceedings for contempt. The 
Commission concluded that: 
"the use at the applicant's trial of incriminating evidence obtained from hiln under 
compulsonj powers Was oppressive and substantially impaired his ability to defend 
himself against the criminal charges facing him. He was therefore deprived of a fair 
hearing Withill the ineaning of Article 6. " 
In the Commission's opinion, the privilege against self- 
incrimindtioift is an important element in safeguarding an accused from 
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oppression and coercion during criminal proceedings. The Government's 
argument that protection against self incrimination is not justified for 
people enjoying a fiduciary position towards the public did not convince 
the Court. 
The impact of the Saunders case on insider dealing proceedings 
remains to be seen. It can be reasonably inferred that it will not make 
tl-dngs easier for the supervisory or enforcement authorities. 
In addition to the traditional criminal penalties which may be visited 
upon insiders, it seems that the disqualification sanction is available 
against some insiders. The effect of disqualification is to disable the person 
disqualified from being involved in the running of companies in the 
future. 245 In R. v. Goodinan246 the Court of Appeal took a liberal view of 
what could be said to be "in connection with the management of the 
company", so as to bring within the phrase the managing director's 
disposal of his shares in the company, advance of publication of bad news 
about its prospects and upheld the Crown Court's decision to disqualify, 
for a period of 10 years, a managing director convicted of insider dealing. 
The Crown Court had invoked section 2 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 which enables a court to disqualify a person who 
has been convicted of an indictable offence in connection with the 
management of a company. 
b) Civil Consequences 
It has already been suggested that treating insider dealing as a matter 
of civil liability could be dealt with in a lower standard of proof than the 
standard required in a criminal case. UK courts have not offered any 
realistic civil sanctions against insider dealing and the relevant case law 
indicates that courts are reluctant to imply that directors and other agents 
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of a company owe 'anything other than duties created by contract to 
shareholders'. 247 Insiders owe no duty to reveal the basis upon which they 
are dealing, whether it is direct with an investor or through a market- 
maker, since normal contractual terms are caveat einptor. 
Insider dealing has been often, wrongly characterised as a "victimless 
crime". 248 The main counter-arguments against this theory are on the one 
hand the fact that the illegal use of inside information presupposes that 
some improper advantage will have been taken over some other party, 
and, on the other, that the company where the insiders practice insider 
dealing may be a ViCtiM. 249 Indeed, the company may suffer financial loss 
and, more importantly, its reputation may be irreparably damaged by the 
acts of insiders. What seems to be the real hindrance for civil actions is the 
lack of adequate title to pursue a claim. 250 
It should not be inferred from the previous paragraph that insiders 
are free from any liability for dealing on inside information. Directors, 
employees, agents in general, auditors or financial advisers of the 
company, who have used information confidential to the company can, in 
theory, be asked to account for any profit made thereby even if the 
company itself has suffered no loss, but, in practice this rarely happens. 251 
Insiders could even be liable for profits made by others to whom the 
confidential information was divulged and those could also be liable if 
they knew or should have known that the information they were using 
, vas obtained through a breach of fiduciary duty by an insider. 252 
Actions based on breach of fiduciary duties to the company can be 
brought even if no offence was committed under the Act or if the 
company did not suffer any loss. Individuals bound by such duties will be 
liable to the company to make over any profits arising out of the use of 
such information. The practical difficulty entailed is that only the board of 
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directors of the company can authorise the company to institute 
proceedings against a fellow director who owes such duties to the 
company and who has acted in breach of his duties. As Professor Murray 
has observed: 'It is much more likely that a director will be found to have 
retired or resigned for "personal reasons" or to devote his attention to his 
other interests or whatever, leaving the matter in limbo, than that public 
proceedings will be taken against him. '253 
Another difficulty is related to circumstances when a minority 
shareholder might be able to claim that with an effective theft from the 
company of its property, there has been a fraud on the minority, such 
shareholder actions are "highly unlikely after the Prtidential v 
Newinan254 fiasco". 255 
Insider dealing may lack credible plaintfffS256 in most cases but when 
the board of a company changes, as could happen after a take-over, the 
new board, as phrased by Professor Murray257, 'may be quite ruthless about 
recovering as much as possible from the former directors in matters of this 
sort'. In the Diainond v. 0 rea in it n 0258 (1969, New York Court of Appeals) 
case directors of a company, in breach of their fiduciary duties, sold their 
shares on the market at a favourable price, knowing that because of an 
increase in expenses profits had fallen drastically, before that information 
was made public. Subsequently, when the shares dropped, they were held 
liable to the company for the difference, although the company was not 
the party who had suffered that particular loss. In the opinion of Fuld Cj: 
"It is true that the complaint before us does not contain any allegation of 
damages to the corporation but this has never been considered to be an 
essential for a cattse of action fotinded on a breach offiduciary ditty. This is 
because the function of such an action, unlike an ordinary tort or contract 
case, is not merely to compensate the plaintiff for wrongs committed by 
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the defendant but, as this court declared many years ago 'to prevent them, 
by removing from agents and trustees all inducement to attempt dealing 
for their ov., n benefit in matters which they have undertaken for others, or 
to which their agency or trust relates. " 
In relation to the potential harm to the company the same judge 
conceded: "In addition, it is pertinent to observe that, despite the lack of 
any specific allegation of damage, it may well be inferred that the 
defendant's actions might have caused some harm to the enterprise. 
Although the corporation may have little concern with the day-to-day 
transactions in shares, it has a great interest in maintaining a reptitation of 
integrity, an itnage of probity, for its management and in ensuring the 
continued ptiblic acceptance and inarketability of its stock. When officers 
and directors abuse their position in order to gain personal profits, the 
effect may be to cast a cloud on the corporation's name, injure stockholder 
relations and undermine public regard for the corporation's securities 
[emphasis added]. " Consequently, it could be safely inferred the actions of 
directors in igh t cause damage to the enterprise but the breach of fiduciary 
duty is the basis for awarding damages, regardless of the proof of actual 
loss. 
In exceptional circumstances civil remedies may be provided by 
sections 61 or 62 of the Financial Services Act 1986 where clients of a 
person authorised according to the Act suffer loss by reason of the breach 
of the rules by the authorised person. These can only apply in very limited 
circumstances, namely, only if the party to the transaction who committed 
the insider dealing offence is an authorised party, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Act. In addition, such persons will have to prove actual 
loss. The scope of these remedies is therefore limited, and, moreover, they 
are 'witried' in the context of insider dealing. 259 
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The reluctance of British law to afford civil remedies, in the absence 
of breach of fiduciary duties, to individuals who have suffered loss 
resulting from insider dealing is reflected by the case of Percival v 
Wright260, 'often referred to as the classic case of what constitutes insider 
dealing'. 261 The plaintiff, a shareholder who sold his shares to the 
chairman and two other directors of a company, sought to have the sale 
transaction set aside on the ground that the directors were in possession of 
information (on an impending take-over) which they ought to have 
disclosed when negotiating for the purchase of the shares. The court ruled 
that a director purchasing shares need not disclose a large casual profit, the 
prospect of a good dividend or the discovery of a new mine, and, likewise 
a director selling shares need not disclose losses incidental to the ordinary 
course of management. The argument of the plaintiff was based on a 
fiduciary duty that directors owed to all other shareholders at the point of 
an impending take-over which would oblige them to make such 
information available. The court found that no such duty was owed to the 
members of the company and the action of the plaintiff failed on that 
ground nor does English law afford any remedy for persons like the 
plaintiff. 
The practical effect of this decision, so far as shareholders or third 
parties (injured and without a breach of fiduciary duty owed to them) are 
concerned, is that directors have no duty to reveal inside information or 
to abstain from using it, the breach of which could give rise to civil claims 
against them. 
Making people civilly liable for insider dealing would form a manner 
of giving redress for insider dealing without the costly and burdensome 
procedures of criminal trials. The prospect of being found liable to parties 
who have lost because of the transactions should have a deterrent effect to 
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persons who would otherwise indulge in insider dealing. The argument 
that might be advanced that the objective of insider dealing regulation is 
to maintain the integrity of the market, and, therefore, civil sanctions 
would be inappropriate, does not seem convincing. 262 
An example of a civil penalty is provided by the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act 1984 of the United States. It authorises a court in an action 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission to impose a civil penalty of 
up to three times the insider's profits. In addition, the party adversely 
affected may rescind the contract. Civil remedies are also provided for by 
the Irish legislation (Companies Act 1990, s. 109) which implemented the 
Insider Dealing Directive of the EC. 263 
The measure of profit (or loss avoided) could be, according to one 
approach, the difference between the price at which the insider or tippee 
traded and the market price of the security a reasonable time after the 
material information becomes available publicly. 264 It could be at the 
discretion of the regulatory agency to distribute the amount so recovered 
to those who traded contemporaneously with the insider or tippee. Civil 
remedies which concentrate on compensation have to confront the 
problem of 'demonstrating harm to any individual trading on an 
exchange'. 265 Professor Cranston adds in relation to civil remedies and the 
measure of damages: 266 
"It can be argued that if the individual trades on the basis of his own evaluation, he 
is not induced to do so by the insider's trading, and any loss suffered is not caused by 
the latter. But against this can be said that if an insider or tippee had a dilty of 
disclosure at the time of his trading, the failure to do SO WOuld cause loss, because if 
there had been disclosure at the time of his trading, the individual would not have 
traded. As the Anisman report (Insider Trading Legislation for Australia) argues, 
there is no rational basis for distinguishing between an individual Who just happens 
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to trade with an insider and one who does not, although there will be a need to 
provide a limit oil what could be substantial potential damages. Consequently, it 
would not be right to confine the cause of action to investors who are direct parties to 
a transaction with an insider. (Those dealing directly with all insider, however, 
should be able to obtain full compensation, without being subject to the limit 
mentioned. ) A tipper should also be liable, for his and his tippee's activities. Again 
there is a need to provide a limit oil potential damages. 
As regards the measure of damages, the courts should have a discretion. However, 
the Anisman Report suggests a prima facie rule for transactions oil a stock exchange, 
Whereby damages would be measured in terms of the difference betWeen the price 
paid or obtained and the market of the security a reasonable time after the inaterial 
information became generally available. There WOuld need to be defences if, for 
example, a major econginic event caused the prices of the secilrity to l1love. " 
The previous legislation267 provided that no transaction was "void or 
voidable" by reason only of contravention of the insider dealing 
prohibition. The new Act has changed the word "voidable" to 
"unenforceable "26 8, thus, ruling out the possibility that arose in the 
decision of Cliase Manhattan Eqtdties Ltd v Goodinan269. In the latter case 
a sale agreement in contravention to s. 1 of the Company Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985 was found "tainted by illegality" and therefore 
"unenforceable". The solution of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 is dictated 
by the need to avoid upsetting the market and to maintain a level of 
certainty in transactions. It seems justified on the basis of financial market 
policy considerations but could possibly have some unfair results on 
victims of insider dealing. The possibility of prejudicing the rights of 
persons who have suffered loss as a result of the acts of insiders could be 
eliminated by affording civil remedies to these individuals. 
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VII. Territorial Scope and Co-operation between Member States 
By Art. 5 of the Directive, the Member states are to apply the 
prohibitions 'at least' to actions undertaken within its territory 'to the 
extent that the transferable securities concerned are admitted to trading on 
a market of a Member State'. This provision appears to be of impenetrable 
obscurity but an attempt has been made to reflect the Directive in s. 62 
, %, hich restricts jurisdiction to acts done within the United Kingdom or 
markets declared by Treasury order to be a market regulated in the United 
Kingdom. It is not necessary that the dealing should have occurred within 
the United Kingdom: 'any act forming part of the alleged dealing' will be 
sufficient to found jurisdiction. According to the Act: 270 
"An individual is not guilty of an offence fallillg Within subsection (1) of section 52 
tinless: 
(a) lie was within the United Kingdom at the time when lie is alleged to have dolle 
any act constituting or forming part of the alleged dealing; 
(b) the regulated market Oil UlliCh the dealing is alleged to have occurred is olle 
which, by an order made by the Treasury, is identified (whether name or by reference 
to criteria prescribed by the order) as being, for the purposes of this Part, regulated in 
the United Kingdom; or 
(c) the professional intermediary was within the United Kingdom at the time when 
he is alleged to have done anything by means of which the offence is alleged to have 
been committed. " 
For the case of disclosing the Act specifieS271 that either the person 
, vho discloses or encourages must have been in the United Kingdom at 
the time when he alleged to have disclosed the information or encouraged 
the dealing or the alleged recipient of the information or encouragement 
was within the United Kingdom at the time when he is alleged to have 
received the information or encouragement. 
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Financial crime in general is largely a cross-border phenomenon. 
Increasing internationalisation of securities markets has made more 
difficult the task of investigating securities law abuses. In the past, 
governments were rather reluctant to co-operate in law enforcement 
matters. That reluctance which created serious problems of enforcement, 
has, in recent years given way to an 'eagerness for improved arrangements 
and that eagerness has spawned several important treaties and informal 
arrangements between regulators'. 272 A harmonised insider dealing 
regulation amongst Member States facilitates co-operation between 
national jurisdictions. Under Article 8, each State is obliged to designate 
the administrative authority competent to apply the provisions adopted in 
conformity with the Directive. Members states are made responsible for 
giving the authority the necessary supervisory and investigatory powers. 
Article 10 is designed to promote co-operation between the administrative 
authorities in each State. Cross-border insider dealing can be investigated 
in State A on behalf of State B. 273 Article 10 also envisages exchange of 
information for the purposes of the State's insider dealing law and in 
Article 11 there is a special provision for agreements between the 
Community and non-member countries on the matters governed by the 
Directive. 
It should be noted that a Member State may refuse to act on a request 
for information on two circumstances: 274 
(a) Where communication of the information might adversely affect the sovereignty, 
security or public policy of the State addressed, 
(b) Where judicial proceedings have already been initiated in respect of tile same 
actions and against the same persons before the authorities of the State addressed or 
Where final judgement has already been passed on such persons for the same actions 
by the competent authorities of the state addressed. 
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Similar provisions exist in the Companies Act 1989, ss. 82-91. On 1 
October 1991 the Insider Trading Convention of the Council of Europe275 
came into force having been ratified by the necessary 3 Member States 
(Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The Convention276 
represents an important attempt to facilitate multilateral co-operation for 
the enforcement of laws prohibiting insider dealing. 277 Its aim was to 
create mutual assistance by exchanges of information, to enable 
supervision of securities markets and to establish whether persons 
carrying out financial transactions are or are not insiders. According to the 
Protocol to the Insider Trading Convention, the State Parties which are 
members of the EC are to give precedence to the Directive over that 
Convention. 278 The Directive and the Convention are entirely compatible, 
reflecting according to. Brown279, the involvement with observer status 
which the Commission of the European Communities had in the 
elaboration of the Insider Trading Convention. The definitions of terms 
used in the Convention, and especially the definition of inside 
information are broader in scope than the definitions of the EC 
Directive. 280 
Under article 2 of the Convention, the main undertaking of the 
Contracting States is "to provide each other with the greatest possible 
measure of mutual assistance in the exchange of information relating to 
matters establishing or giving rise to the belief that irregular operations of 
insider trading have been carried out. " Assistance should be taken to 
include providing access to information in the files of the requested 
authority, taking evidence of persons and obtaining documents. Each State 
must designate, according to article 4, authorities responsible for 
submitting and for receiving requests for assistance. In addition, it is 
provided that the execution of the requests is carried out in accordance 
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with the law of the Contracting Party where the requested authority 
operates and, in the absence of specific provisions, the latter may apply the 
rules laid down by national law for obtaining evidence [art. 6(1)&(2)]. 
These provisions may not prejudice the rights accorded to the defendant 
by national law [art. 6(3)]. In this context, sanctions laid down for breaches 
of professional secrecy shall not apply in regard to the information 
provided compulsorily by witnesses in the course of an enquiry [art. 6(2)]. 
The undertaking of the requested authority to supply information is 
conditional upon the facts on which the request is based constituting 
insider dealing as defined by the Convention and, in addition, constituting 
"in each State an irregularity as regards the rules of both States. "281 This 
requirement of "dual irregularity "28 2 means that the facts must constitute 
according to the laws -of both the requested and the requesting States a 
criminal offence or an infraction subject to administrative, disciplinary or 
civil sanctions, but not an infraction for which damages is the only civil 
sanction. 283 Reference to "disciplinary sanctions" suggests that the 
communication network could be used for the enforcement of self- 
regulatory rules. According to Tridimas, a case may be envisaged where a 
Contracting Party requests from another information which the latter can 
obtain from the regulatory authorities of a third State pursuant to an 
existing agreement between the third State and the requested State and, on 
the condition that the requirement of dual irregularity is fulfilled, such a 
request is not beyond the scope of the Convention as the latter does not 
presuppose that the information requested is already in the hands of the 
requested authority or within the territory of the State. 284 
The scope of application of the Convention is limited in two ways: 
Firstly, by the requirement of "dual irregularity". It should be noted that 
Article 10 of the EC Directive specifically requires the exchange of 
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information upon the request of a Member State even where the relevant 
action is not prohibited by the law of the requested State. Secondly, it has 
been observed285 that the Convention "solely incorporates an undertaking 
of 'passive assistance"', by merely imposing upon a State the obligation to 
provide information in connection with the suspected violation of the 
insider trading laws of another State if the latter so requests. The 
authorities of a Contracting State are not required to inform the 
authorities of another State that a breach of the insider trading law of the 
latter is suspected. This type of undertaking is often referred to as "active 
assistance". 286 
The Convention has had a rather poor take-up which may reflect the 
existence of efficient informal means of exchanging business regulatory 
information, the recerlt expansion of arrangements for the exchange of 
information about insider dealing, and the presence in Article 10 of the 
Directive of provisions requiring the exchange of information between 
business regulators. 287 
As regards prosecution, the Convention seeks to ensure that the 
proper procedures have been followed before the information transmitted 
to the requesting authority is used in criminal proceedings. The reason is 
that under the Insider Trading Convention, the information is obtained by 
administrative means whereas "actes interizationatix d'instrtiction" are 
normally subject to the procedures of the European Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. 288 It should be stressed at this 
point that the Convention on Mutual Assistance contains no requirement 
that the action which is the subject of the prosecution should be criminal 
in both the requesting and the requested State before assistance can be 
given. 289 Article 12 of the Insider Trading Convention requires State 
Parties to afford each other the widest possible measure of assistance in 
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criminal matters relating to offences involving insider trading, but this 
obligation operates without prejudice to the application of the European 
Convention on Criminal Assistance in Criminal Matters. Given that the 
latter Convention has had a much higher take-up (22 parties)290 the 
investigative trail will be capable of being followed in some of the EU 
Member States that have not yet ratified the Insider Trading Convention. 
A further optional undertaking is provided by Article 3 of the Insider 
Trading Convention: 
"Each Party, may, by a declaration to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 
undertake to p rovide other Parties, subject to reciprocity, With the greatest possible 
measure of inutual assistance in tile exchange of information necessary for 
surveillance of operations carried out in the organised stock markets which could 
adversely affect equal -access to information for all users of tile stock illarket or tile 
qualihj of the information supplied to investors in order to ensure honest dealing. " 
This is an attempt to extend the scope of the application of the 
Convention to other fraudulent operations such as investment fraud and 
market manipulation which is severely obstructed by the requirement of 
"dual irregularity". 
The United Kingdom has also become a party to the Council of 
Europe Convention on Extradition291 which requires [article 2(l)] that, 
before extradition is granted, the offence be one which is punishable under 
the laws of both the requesting and the requested party by deprivation of 
liberty for at least one year. If this condition is satisfied, subject to the rest 
of that Convention, State Parties are obliged to extradite. This measure 
will undoubtedly increase the efficiency of prosecution of insider trading 
in EU Member States. The problems of interstate co-operation and 
enforcement both at an EU and an International level will be further 
examined in the final chapter. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
One of the main shortcomings of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 seems 
to be that it did not alter any of the sanctions or enforcement procedures, 
although the courts, in interpreting the previous legislation, had been 
prepared to find non-executed contracts based on inside information 
unenforceable (Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd v Goodinan, Ch D, BCC [22- 
7-91]). The need to avoid upsetting the market and to protect the certainty 
of transactions has prevailed. The financial market Policy considerations 
that dictated the adopted solution are undeniably important but could 
possibly have some unfair results on victims of insider dealing. The 
possibility of prejudici-pg the rights of persons who have suffered loss as a 
result of the acts of insiders could be significantly reduced by affording 
civil remedies to these individuals. As Dine has pointed out both the 
criticism of the use of the criminal law and the possibility of substituting 
civil remedies have apparently been ignored. 292 It could be doubted, 
therefore, whether the use of criminal law is sufficient to promote 
compliance as expressly required by the Directive [Article 13]. 
According to one commentator the new Act has emasculated the 
concept of insider as liability focuses not on the relationship with the 
issuer but on the nature of the information held, thus, extending liability 
beyond the range of individuals potentially liable to a company under the 
civil law for breach of confidence. 293 This criticism does not seem justified. 
The broader definition of the insider adopted by the Act reflects the 
international tendency of insider legislation to shift from the company 
law - fiduciary approach, which perceives as insiders persons with 
fiduciary duties, to the financial market approach which sets the 
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protection of the integrity of the market294 as the main priority of the 
insider dealing legislation. Liability will also arise in respect of a broader 
range of information, given that there is no requirement that the 
information should be confidential to the company. The adoption of a 
simple criminal offence of acting in "breach of fiduciary duty" even if it 
were supported by detection mechanisms set up by companieS295 would 
unduly restrict the scope of the legislation. 
The wide definition of insider dealing has forced the government to 
adopt ever more complicated defences resulting in "so many get-outs and 
defences that it is likely that even fewer people will be referred for 
prosecution and that there will be more acquittals than previouSly. "296 
The Act has taken positive steps to follow its statement in the 
Consultative Document of 1990 according to which the drift net of liability 
should catch anyone with an informational advantage, 297 focusing on the 
possession of information as is dictated by the current insider trading 
regulation theories. 298 
Finally, it should be recognised that the implementation provisions 
of the Crin-dnal justice Act 1993, in general terms, reflect the Directive well 
and, at the same time, do away with some of the deficiencies of the 
previous legislation. The efficiency of the provisions remains to be seen in 
practice especially in the light of the recent reform of the financial 
regulation. The Criminal justice Act 1993, as has already been remarked, 
must be confronted as a coinproinise statute. Perceiving the task of 
regulating insider dealing as 'the art of the possible' would weaken the 
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D. 2. Insider Dealing Regulation in Greece 
I. Overview 
The first reported cases from criminal suits against sellers of securities 
for cheating the buyer through withholding or not disclosing information 
as to the company's financial situation were confined to securities 
transfers outside the stock exchange. 1 The law invoked in such cases is the 
law, civil or criminal, governing sales. This law has not been affected by 
the insider law promulgated in 1988 as amended by the Presidential 
Decree 53 / 1992. 
The issue of insider trading was specifically addressed for the first 
time in Greece in 1988, when Article 30 of Law 1806/1988 (hereinafter the 
'Law') amending the existing legislation governing stock exchanges and 
introducing both insider criminal liability and an indirect take-over 
publicity was adopted. 
Although the law became effective on September 20,1988, prior to the 
final adoption of the EC Directive 89/592 of November 13,1989, co- 
ordinating regulations on insider dealing, the provisions of the Law 
relevant to insider trading are similar to the basic principles of the 
Directive. Furthermore the Ministry of National Economy has already 
adapted the provisions of the Greek legislation to the Directive in 
accordance with Article 14, pursuant to which each Member State should 
take the necessary measures to comply with the Directive before June 1, 
1992. The necessary amendment took the form of a Presidential Decree 
(53/ 92), it repeats in essence the provisions of the above Directive with few 
changes and was enacted in February 1992.2 
Presidential Decree 53/1992 (hereinafter PD 53/92) enacted into 
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national law the Insider Dealing Directive without reiterating the 
rationales for prohibiting Insider Dealing stated in the preamble of the 
Directive, namely the preservation of an orderly and fair market free of 
abuse that does not confer on a privileged part of market players and 
unfair advantage over the others. 
The relevant provisions of the PD 53/92 are almost a copy of the 
Directive, following the same line as to the definition of inside 
information, namely that this information must be precise, non-public, 
pertaining either to the issuer or the security, and if made public must 
have a significant effect on the price. Nonetheless, the PD does not define 
what is meant by the words significant effect over the price of the security. 
The inference can be readily drawn that Greek courts, when a relevant case 
is brought before them, are going to accept the definition that significant 
information is the 'information that would drive the market price of the 
security concerned towards a new price equilibrium. '3 
Article 30 of Law 1806/1988, which is somewhat narrower in scope 
compared with PD 53/92, remains in force creating a duality in the Greek 
insider dealing legislation with both advantages and disadvantages. 
11. Definition of Insider Trading 
1. Categories of Insiders 
A. Pritnary Insiders 
According to paragraph 1 of Article 30 of the Law 1806/1988, pritnary 
or direct insider is "anyone who uses confidential information which has 
come to his knowledge by virtue of his temporary or permanent rendering 
of services in any capacity to an 'enterprise', to purchase or sell either 
himself or through another person, stock-exchange values of such 
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I enterprise' with the object of obtaining a significant financial benefit for 
himself or a third party or to cause a significant loss to a third party". 
It should be noted that the PD 53/92 follows the Directive in avoiding 
the pitfall of 'benefit' in the objectives of insiders. 
The Law uses broad wording in defining the persons that are 
potentially criminally liable, and covers any person who uses confidential 
information about an enterprise by virtue of his permanent or temporary 
rendering of services' to such enterprise or for such enterprise. The Law 
does not specify which 'services' give rise to punishment of potential 
offenders and, thus, covers all personnel of an enterprise - irrespective of 
an individual's duties - including insiders within the 'inanagerial 
nitcletts'4 of the enterprise as well as those exterior to it. It also includes 
persons who are not employees e. g. lawyers, financial advisers etc. 
Although this definition of insiders is broader in this respect than the 
definition of Article 2 of the EC Directive and PD 53/92, article 30 does not 
appear to cover shareholders of the issuing company, since shareholders 
do not 'render services' to an enterprise. 5 At this point Georgakopoulos 
remarks that "if the insider alone or with others makes a decision then he 
is not informed but he is acting as a decision-maker, e. g. for the issue of 
new shares". 6 The result is that a 'specific' information as required cannot 
be the decision expected to be taken by someone who acts not as a service 
contracting party but as a shareholder. In the interpretation of 
Georgakopoulos the text of the provision is confined to 'service insiders' 
and does not include 'participatory insiders'. 7 According to the same 
commentator 'a share-holder having his own decision possibilities and 
perspectives does not benefit from information but from his own 
decision'. 8 Even in the case where the shareholder is an officer, employee 
or other 'service insider' and he has access to information about future 
-207- 
decisions of shareholders, it is a question of causality, argues 
Georgakopoulos, whether he benefits from the information or from his 
own decision. Furthermore, 'the other parties to a transaction cannot 
require him to abstain from benefiting from his own decisions as a 
shareholder'. 9 The main argument for the exclusion of the participatory 
insider from the Greek insider regulation along these lines of 
construction, before the adoption of PD 53/92, seemed to be that the 
perspective of the insider himself, i. e. his decision, is not known to the 
other contracting party in the transaction unless the insider undertakes to 
decide as expected. Only if such an obligation is not undertaken, does the 
benefit accrue from an uncertain perspective and not from inside 
information. Still, under that theory shareholders cannot use information 
referring to facts or d. ecisions; already existing, e. g. a resolution already 
taken concerning issue of new shares. 
Livos10 and Michalopoulos1l consider shareholders of a significant 
percentage as potential insiders under paragraph 1 of Article 30 of Law 
1806/1988 and their view is more convincing because of the terms used in 
the statute and the clear intention of the legislator to cover all persons 
participating in the management of the company or rendering any kind of 
services to the company, complying, thus, with the Directive. At this 
point, it should be noted that the EC Directive [Article 2(l)], as 
implemented by article 3(1) of PD 53/92, imposes on primary insiders 
(among them persons who possess inside information by virtite of their 
holding in the capital of the issiter) a rebuttable presumption of 
knowledge of the privileged information. Professor Hopt has suggested 
that Member States should introduce a less bureaucratic registration 
system for company insiders confined to major shareholders for example 
from 10 per cent Up. 12 
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The choice of the Greek law is that spouses or children of the above- 
described persons would not be covered except possibly as 'secondary 
insiders', since they do not 'render services' to the enterprise. The 
inclusion of spouses and children in the first category would prevent the 
infringement of the provision by these persons, combining a more 
immediate deterrent effect with easier proof of the act of trading. 
De facto or de jiLre executives of a legal entity rendering services to 
the enterprise could be offenders within the meaning of the Law, although 
the Law does not include a specific provision similar to Article 2, 
paragraph 2 of the Directive, which specifies that when the insider is a 
legal person, the prohibition applies to natural persons who take part in 
the decision to carry out the transaction. Article 3(2) of the PD 53/92 does 
include a specific provision making it perfectly clear that in the case of 
legal persons the provision shall apply to the natural persons who take 
part in the decision to carry out the transaction for the account of the legal 
person concerned. In this respect it should be stressed that under the Greek 
criminal law, a legal entity may not be prosecuted criminally; only its 
managers may be held criminally liable. 
It has already been remarked that the requirement of 'obtaining a 
significant financial benefit' in the insiders objectives was done away with 
by PD 53/92. Under article 30 of the Law'benefit ' can be a benefit for the 
insider himself or for a third party. Given that inside information is only 
that which can have a substantial influence on the price, the benefit must 
also be significant and almost invariably translated into a price difference. 
According to the Law the responsibility of insiders is a double one: 13 
(a) Illegal benefits. Direct insiders are responsible if they benefit 
themselves from their own information. 
(b) Illegal breach of confidence. Direct insiders are also responsible 
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when they let third parties benefit from their information. This is a 
responsibility for breach of confidence enabling someone else to benefit, 
and does not require benefit for the insider. The responsibility is 
independent from the reason of breach, economic or social. It may 
coincide, however, with the responsibility of the indirect insiders. 
B. Secondary Insiders 
Secondary or indirect insiders are those who obtain information from 
a direct insider and use it in the knowledge of the nature of the 
information as 'confidential information' (art 30 para 2 of the Law). The 
provision of the Law is similar to Article 4 of the Directive and does not 
create a presumption of knowledge regarding the source from which such 
secondary insiders gain knowledge of inside information. 14 The method 
of obtaining the information is irrelevant and the knowledge of its 
confidentiality is necessary. Such persons who make use of inside 
infon-nation acquired in this manner are punishable by the same penalties 
as 'primary insiders'. 
One important question is whether both the primary and secondary 
insiders are responsible for the use of the same information in the same 
transaction. The answer seems to be that there can be no double use of 
information in the same transaction. It is indeed provided that the use of 
the information by the primary or secondary insider can be made either by 
himself or through a third party (art 30 paras 1 and 2 of the Law). If the 
insiders use it through a third party, then this party is acting for them and 
there is no second use. If direct or indirect insiders obtain information but 
do not use it in buying or selling securities, then they do not commit 
insider trading, although they might have sold their information to 
indirect insiders, possibly constituting, thus, another sort of offence. 15 
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It is rather difficult to ascertain the persons who belong to the 
category of secondary insiders: the spouse or the children of primary 
insiders, brokers or members of brokers companies (soci6t6s anonymes), 
banks holding shares in brokers S. As., journalists of financial press, 
investment analysts having the initiative to approach companies and to 
negotiate the possibilities of co-operation, public authorities exercising 
supervision on public companies (S. As), even maintenance contractors in 
the premises of the company or the driver of a member of the board of 
directors, can be secondary insiders. The unlimited possibilities of 
expansion of the provision (especially in the last two cases) should be faced 
with scepticism. As the distance between potential secondary insiders and 
the centre of decisions grows, the more impractical the implementation of 
the provision becomes. In addition, the difficulties of proof of the 
knowledge of the confidential nature of the information are aggravated. 16 
Finally, it should also be noted that both primary and secondary 
insiders can utilise the inside information either themselves or through 
other persons. 17 
The PD 53/92 uses the definition of the Directive on primary and 
secondary insiders. Primary insiders are 'holders of the office of director, 
shadow directors, shareholders or other persons who have privileged 
access to inforination becatise of their profession, einploy? nent or dtities. ' 
Consequently, as the Greek legislation follows the Directive, it covers only 
indirectly the further transfer of inside information from a tippee to 
another third party. Article 5 of the PD 53/92 fashioned on Article 4 of the 
Directive prohibits trading by anyone on the basis of inside information 
when he knows that he is in possession of confidential information the 
direct or indirect source of which cannot be other than a primary insider. 
Unlike s 60(l) of the UK CJA 1993, under the Greek Law secondary 
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insider's inens rea is established only when he has actual knowledge that 
he is in possession of confidential information. However, reasonable 
cause that the source of information is a primary insider suffices to fulfil 
the second of the Article 5 requirements. 18 
2. Inside Information 
Article 30 of the Law imposed sanctions against insiders who used 
'confidential information' to purchase or sell securities listed on the stock 
exchange. The purpose of the relevant provision, as stated in the 
introductory report, was to ensure, to the extent possible, equality among 
investors. Paragraph 4 of Article 30 of the Law, obviously influenced by 
Community Law, was superseded by Article 2 (1st case) of the Presidential 
Decree 53/92 which sets out the cumulative combination of conditions 
determining the confidential nature of information: 19 
a) Confidential information is the information which is not made 
known to the public in any way. That is to say, it must not have been 
made known outside the company. Temporal precedence is attached to the 
privileged character of information. The concept of 'published 
information' of Article 30 created problems of interpretation. Was legal 
publication, as prescribed by the company statutes, required or should 
publication in the financial press be considered sufficient? The reference of 
Article 30 to 'any other zvays' of publication was broad enough to embrace 
any other way not specifically stipulated by statutes provided that the 
average investor had the possibility for timely assessment of the 
information. 20 
b) The information must be specific. It must not be mere assumption 
but must concern certain facts, positive or negative, apparently related to 
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the financial status of the company. Information, for example, on a 
forthcoming merger, bankruptcy, increase of the share capital, increase of 
dividends because of higher profits, the discovery of oil deposits etc. fall 
clearly within the scope of the definition of specific information. 
c) The information must concern one or several issuers of 
transferable securities or one or several transferable securities admitted to 
trading on a market. A question could be posed in this case as to whether 
the information can concern a non-listed subsidiary company the 
performance of which has important consequences for the parent 
company. 
d) The information could affect perceptibly the price of such securities 
if made known to the public. This last element of confidential 
information is the most substantial and is apparerdly related to the 
financial importance of the privileged information. The test for the price- 
sensitive nature of the information is neither the expert assessment that 
could be carried out by experienced (professional) institutional investors 
nor the simplistic estimate and the haphazard choice that could be made 
by a chance investor under the strain of speculation. The measure for 
assessing the significance of. the effect on the price that the confidential 
information could have, should be sought in the ordinary course of stock- 
exchange transactionS21, or to the perception of the average investor 
which must be "the point of reference and the centre of gravity of the 
sought protection". 22 
The cumulative combination of the above four conditions is. required 
for characterising the information as confidential and for constituting the 
criminal act. One more element is self-evident: the test of the confidential 
character of the information must take temporal precedence over the time 
of confirmation of the information, i. e. the test must be made when the 
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order for purchase or sale was placed. 23 Considering the varying length of 
time between the characterisation of some information as confidential and 
its de-characterisation through publication, the importance of its timely 
testing cannot be overemphasised. 
3. Presumption of Knowledge 
The EC Directive imposes on primary insiders a rebtittable24 
prestanption of knowledge of the privileged information. Michalopoulos 
has expressed the opinion that, according to Article 30 of Law 1806/1988, a 
presumption of knowledge of the confidential character of the 
information must exist for the persons having an organic or operational 
relation with the company, as long as the relevant decision, in its 
substance, belongs to the sphere of their duties. This view runs counter to 
a basic principle of Greek Criminal Law. As a general rule in the penal 
code the notion of 'prestiniption' is never applicable to an offence 
committed intentionally or negligently. Moreover, in criminal 
proceedings no presumed or 'formal' truth exists and the search for the 
truth is made ex officio, it being the task of the public prosecutor to 
ascertain the true state of affairs. Consequently, the Law has not created a 
presumption of knowledge of inside information for any potential 
offender. 25 
4. Transferable Securities 
The PD follows the Directive in the definition of the kinds of 
transferable securities covered and the markets the securities concerned 
must be negotiable in. Thus, the PD covers index contracts but remains 
silent as regards OTC contracts for differences, a source of major 
controversy in the UK following the Trafalgar House Affair. However, 
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given that derivatives contracts are not yet negotiable on the Athens Stock 
Exchange, this omission is not Yet of material importance. The same 
applies for a recent amendment of the PD by article 51 of law 2533/1997 
which extended the scope of transferable securities including 11nits of 
investinent flinds admitted to trading on a market. No such units have 
been listed yet on a Greek market. Consequently, the provision is only 
applicable for units traded on overseas markets qualifying under the 
provisions. The Greek adaptation of the Directive's "inarket which is 
regulated and stipervised by atithorities recognised by pliblic bodies, 
operates regidarly and is accessible directly or indirectly to the ptiblic", 
gives the wrong impression that a cumulative combination of conditions 
is required by article 2 of the PD: (a) the securities must be admitted to 
trading on a market operating under certain rules, (b) the market must 
operate within the E. U., (c) the market must be supervised by a publicly 
recognised body, and (c) must be directly or indirectly open to the public. 
Fortunately, in case of doubt the original text of the Directive prevails. 
Moreover, the direct effect of EU Directives is increasingly recognised by 
recent cases and jurisprudence as it has already been stressed in previous 
chapters. 
The Pl) does not apply to transactions effected by a public authority in 
pursuit of monetary or public debt management policies. Also, Article 6 
follows Article 2(3) of the Directive, providing by implication that 
transactions in transferable securities effected through a professional 
intermediary outside a regulated market are not caught. 
5. The Insider Trading Offence 
The prohibited activity of Article 30 of the Law consists of the use of 
confidential information by an insider, to purchase or sell, himself or 
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through a third person, securities listed on a stock exchange of a given 
enterprise, with the purpose of 'obtaining significant benefits for himself 
or a third party or causing significant loss to a third party. '26 
The PD, following the Directive, did not adopt the betiefit 
requirement, and extended the scope of the offence to participatory 
insiders. 
Under article 30 of the Law the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
A. Personal Conditions 
The liability depends on the quality of the person as a direct or 
indirect insider. The quality of the insider has been examined above. This 
personal quality consists of the existence of confidential knowledge 
acquired either personally (by the direct insider) or from a direct insider (by 
the indirect insider).. Nobody is responsible for obtaining or having 
information per se, even if this information is confidential. The nature of 
(confidential) information has already been considered. Referring to the 
sense of information, there is no difference between direct and indirect 
insiders. 27 
B. Objective Conditions 
Objective conditions consist of the act, which if executed by a person 
presenting the personal conditions, is the ground for his punishment. 
This act is the use of the information in buying or selling securities by the 
insider. According to the apposite interpretation of Professor 
Georgakopoulos 'using information in buying or selling means a causality 
between the information and the transactions decision (buying or 
selling). '28 Consequently, if a person has knowledge of the information, 
but acts independently, which is not impossible, a causality does not exist. 
Moreover, causality does not exist if the decision was taken before the 
knowledge, e. g. by fixing an investment and portfolio management plan, 
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or if the decision was taken in knowledge of the information but not as a 
result thereof, e. g. by taking into consideration other aspects of the 
security. By a bigger transaction there can be a use of information 
concerning the part of the transaction, which would not take place if the 
information was available, but not the rest. 29 
C. Finality Conditions 
The intent 'to obtain a significant financial benefit for himself or a 
third party or to cause a significant loss to a tl-drd party'30, is also required 
by the provision in order to constitute the offence which is different from 
the mere intention to use the information. The user may have any of the 
following three objectives: (i)Significant benefit for himself, or 
(ii)Significant benefit for a third party, or (iii)Significant damage to a third 
party, and perhaps eventually to the company itself. 
The determination of the significance of the gain or loss is left in 
specific instance to the courts. 31 The adoption of the term 'significant' 
gave rise to strictures by many members of the Parliament. It has been 
criticised as being vague and legally unjustified. The size of the profit 
expected, in this view, does not create the punishable character of the 
action. In other words, the raison d7tre of the provision is to 'sanction the 
intentional exploitation of confidential information possessed by an 
insider', 32 regardless of the final outcome of the insider's act. 
The finality condition, according to the theory of Greek Criminal Law 
is part of the 'stibjective foitndatiotz' of the offence. 33 That is, the offender 
does not have to achieve his purpose. In this particular case, it does not 
appear material whether significant benefit or loss has been actually 
realised, i. e. the user can fail in his objective. It is however sufficient as far 
as his responsibility goes that he had the intention to benefit himself or 
damage others when using the information. 
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It has been correctly remarked that the attainment of financial gain 
can be indicative for the in concreto calculation of the fine. It has also been 
supported that the achievement of financial profit (or damage to a third 
person), after the investigation of the crime, can influence starting or 
continuing criminal proceedings. 34 
D. Aggravating Circionstances 
The third paragraph of Article 30 of Law 1806/1988 defines as an 
aggravating factor of the offence the commission of the act 'by persons 
working for limited stock exchange corporations in the equity of which 
participate banks, or for a bank that is a shareholder in such Corporation'. 
In this paragraph no stricter sanctions are provided for, neither have the 
conditions that constitute the basic act changed and, therefore, no special 
form of the basic offence is created. Consequently, the role of the 
aggravating factor is confined to the judicial determination of the sentence 
(or fine) according to the general principles of Criminal Law (Article 79 of 
the Penal Code). 35 
This provision was seemingly added at the request of certain 
Ministers who expressed the fear that such participation of banks in the 
equity of stock exchange companies could become a special source of 
confidential information. 36 During the parliamentary debate it was made 
clear that the provision should cover persons rendering services to or for a 
bank. The problem is that the wording of the statute, as Lambadarios 
correctly points out, fails to convey this idea. 37 If the person concerned 
does not render services simultaneously to or for the enterprise or issuer 
of the stock exchange securities, the prerequisite of paragraphs 1 and 2 is 
not met. In that case the offender is a person who renders services to the 
stock exchange corporation or the bank and not to the enterprise the 
securities of which are the object of the purchase as provided in Article 30. 
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The prerequisite of shareholding of banks has been criticised as 
unjustified on the grounds that it covers only stock exchange companies 
in which banks are shareholders, and banks, shareholders of such 
companies, whereas it should be sufficient that the offender is an 
employee of the stock exchange company or the bank with which the 
enterprise collaborates, whether or not the bank is a shareholder. 
E. Defences (tinder article 3 of the PD 53192) 
According to Article 3 of the PD a valid defence is established if it is 
proved that the transaction was done otherwise than with a view to 
making a profit or avoiding a loss by the use of inside information. A 
defence is also established when an insider can prove that he had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the information had been disclosed 
widely enough to be perceived as public, ensuring that others dealing in 
the same security would not be prejudiced by not having privileged access 
to that information. 
This is a somewhat tentative interpretation of the PD wording, since 
no guidance is given by it as to when inside information becomes public - 
in contrast with s 58 of the CJA 1993. In addition, it remains unclear 
whether other reasonable defences like those included in s 53(l)(c) and 
s 53 (2)(c) of the UK CJA 1993 (that the defendant has a defence if he can 
prove that he would have dealt in the security or encouraged the deal in 
any case) would constitute a valid defence under Greek law. There is no 
exemption in Greek law in the Directive for professional dealers and the 
same applies to equity issues stabilisation exempted under Sch 1 para 2 of 
the UK CJA 1993. 
-219- 
III. Control of Insider Trading - Supervision of Transactions 
The Greek Insider Trading Law should be examined in the context of 
the 1988 reform in Stock Exchange Law. As Georgakopoulos has stressed, 
the undisclosed but clear point of departure of the 1988 reform is state 
interference in the administration of the Athens Stock Exchange. 38 It is 
indicative that three members of the board of the Stock Exchange are not 
appointed by brokers but are proposed by them and appointed by the 
minister. Brokerage companies are given three seats on the board 
independently from their number, since these companies are expected to 
be subsidiaries of the banks. Three other members are proposed by 
employees, investment companies and companies having securities listed 
on the stock exchange. The minister is given the right to appoint the 
seventh director. The post of the president of the stock exchange is 
unlikely to be held by a broker because the latter would have to suspend 
his brokerage activities. 39 For reasons of transparency Articles 27 and 28 
have introduced the rule of written evidence of all orders. This step 
facilitates inspection by officers of the Ministry of National Economy and 
emphasises the responsibilities of insiders. 
The designated authority that deals with the implementation of the 
prol-tibitions of the PD 53/92 (as required by Art 8 of the Directive) is the 
Capital Market Commission under Art 8 of the PD, which must be assisted 
in the discharge of its duties by the Ministry of National Economy 
Division for the supervision of the Athens Stock Exchange. 
1. Civil Law Consequences 
The Law does not make the relevant transaction either void or 
voidable. No other civil consequences are prescribed for insider trading. 40 
The person who suffered damages from the illegal action of the offender 
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has, nevertheless, the possibility to claim compensation under the general 
clause of the Civil Code. Under Article 914 of the Civil Code 'a person who 
through his fault4l has caused, in a manner contrary to the law, prejudice 
to another shall be liable for compensation'. 42 It should be stressed that 
under Greek Law, as under the majority of Civil Law systems, treating 
insider dealing as a matter of civil liability is not mutually exclusive with 
the initiation of criminal proceedings as well as with treating the act as a 
criminal offence. The person or legal entity that have suffered loss because 
of the act of the insider can be compensated therefor under the general 
clauses of the Civil Code, participating in the criminal trial as plaintiffs for 
the civil claim. 43 On the other hand the conviction of the offender is not a 
necessary precondition for the awarding of damages. A civil action 
without any criminal proceedings taking place can be raised by the person 
who suffered damages. 
This solution is undeniably more realistic that the solution adopted 
by the current British legislation44 and is more likely to provide adequate 
deterrent to potential insiders. The pecuniary penalties imposed by the 
Greek Criminal Law (No 1806/1988) are, nevertheless, too low. 
Article 11 of the PD 53/92 provides that apart from the criminal 
sanctions provided for in Art 30 para, 1 and 3 of Law 1806/1988, the Capital 
Market Commission can impose on violators of the relevant prohibitions 
fines ranging from 10.000.000 drs to 1.000.000.000 drs, or fines to five times 
the insider's profits. 
2. Prosecution 
In the absence of specific rules regarding the commencement of 
criminal prosecution against insiders, the general principles of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure will be applied. Articles 36 and 52 of the latter state 
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that criminal prosecution commences, as a general rule, ex officio 
following a report, a charge, or other information that a punishable act has 
taken place, except in specific cases where a formal complaint of the person 
against whom the offence has been perpetrated is required by law. 
Prosecution of insider dealing may start ex officio, at the request of the 
Board of Directors of the Stock Exchange or the competent authorities of 
the Ministry of National Economy. The Department of Stock Exchanges 
and the Department of Capital Market that have been created by Article 24 
of Law 1806/1988 and operate under the aegis of the Ministry of National 
Economy can also start prosecution. Finally, prosecution can start 
'pursuant to a denunciation by any citizen'45 but, in an cases, it is carried 
out exclusively by the public prosecutor. 
3. Sanctions 
The Greek legislator has chosen criminal sanctions and 
administrative penalties for the insider trading offence. The offenders are 
threatened by, at least, three months imprisonment and pecuniary 
penalty. For the determination of sentences or fines the Law refers to the 
general principles of Crin-dnal Law. The issue of the appropriate penalties 
caused controversy in the Parliament where the opinion has been 
expressed that the penalties provided are too lenient. 46 According to the 
general provisions of the Penal Code (Articles 51 and 53) imprisonment 
can be up to five years, while the pecuniary penalties range from Drch. 
2,000 to Drch. 1,000,000. The possible imprisonment sentence can be 
considered as sufficient deterrent to potential offenders, whereas the 
maximum amount of the fine is definitely too low and, thus, fails in its 
deterrent objective. If the measure of the fine were linked to the amount 
of the illegal profit that was made or the loss that was avoided or the 
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damage that was caused, as an equal or a multiple of this amount, the 
objective of the provision would be better served. 
The Presidential Decree 53/92 (Article 11) increased the pecuniary 
penalties that the Department of Capital Market can impose on insiders. 
The penalties range from 10,000,000 drachmas minimum to 1,000,000,000 
drachmas maximum or to the illegal profits multiplied by five. It can 
hardly be denied that the amendment has given additional deterrent effect 
to the insider legislation. 
IV. Major Acquisitions Disclosure (Insider's Disclosure, art 29 of Law 
No 1806/1988 and Presidential Decree 51/1992) 
The disclosure of major acquisitions results ity the disclosure of 
insiders and belongs, therefore, to the insider dealing regulations. Major 
acquisitions have to be brought to the attention of the Stock Exchange 
Board of Directors prior to registration. Anyone interested in the 
registration and specifically the transferee can notify the board. The 
company has to proceed to registration upon evidence of such notification. 
The stock exchange does not have the authority to stop the registration or 
to make it subject to any conditions. If the acquisition was concluded as a 
compensatory transaction, notification of the stock exchange is not 
necessary because such transactions can only be effected by permission of 
the Board of Directors of the stock exchange and, therefore, are known to 
it. The absence of notification does not render void the registration of the 
transfer by the company, since no such sanction is provided by the Law. 
The interpretation that the registration is not void is supported by the fact 
that the acquisition is mentioned in the provision as effected before 
registration. 47 The company has no right to deny registration if the latter is 
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requested by a shareholder who is a company, possibly controlled by 
another shareholder. Any objections of the company effecting the 
registration have to be proved. 
The stock exchange has to inform the public about acquisitions. The 
way of publication will be determined by a decision of the supervising 
minister. 
Major acqidsitions are defined by the Law as acquisitions of 
nominative shares listed on the stock exchange that exceed or bring an 
existing participation over 10,25,33.3,50 and 66.617o of the voting or non- 
voting share capital of the company. Noininative shares are mainly the 
shares of banks, or insurance companies, or the shares of any company if 
they are not fully paid up. The legal reason for the acquisition is 
irrelevant. 48 It can be purchase, barter, subscription, inheritance or merger 
of parent companies. Transfers of major participations to new share- 
holders fall in the scope of major acquisition. The notion of major 
acquisition is restricted to nominative shares because it -Vvould be 
enormously difficult to detect such matters involving bearer shares. 
The concept of acquisition of shares comprises both ownership and 
control of shares. 'Control' is interpreted as the majority percentage in a 
company. 49 Consequently, the term major acquisitions affects both shares 
owned by a shareholder and shares owned by companies in which there is 
a majority shareholder. Georgakopoulos remarks with felicity that 'the 
most customary majority shareholder in the Athens Stock Exchange is the 
Greek State and the state companies, mainly state banks and the holding 
company for companies under reorganisation'. 50 As a result, the afore- 
mentioned state companies are the main insiders affected by this 
provision. 
According to Article 29 paragraph 2 which deals with existing 
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participatiotts, any shareholder of nominative shares listed on the stock 
exchange, holding or controlling 107o of the share capital of a company, at 
the time of enforcement of the Law, has to inform the stock exchange 
about any acquisition, even of one share. 
When transfers of nominative shares listed on the Stock Exchange 
are effected they are registered through a broker's deed on the reverse of 
the share plus an inscription in the roll of the Stock Exchange. 
Registration in the company books is effected after and according to the 
notary's or broker's deed. The broker's deed is the content and the 
condition of the notification to the Stock Exchange Board of Directors. 
In the recent amendments to Law 1969/1991 on the Stock Exchange 
and the competence of the Capital Market Committee special provisions 
on market manipulation and 'inarket inaking' that constitutes 
dissemination of false information likely to influence the price of 
securities, were included. 51 
V. Criminal Law Provisions outside the scope of Law 1806/1988 and 
PD 53/1992 
Before the enactment of the Greek Insider Trading Law some 
provisions of the criminal legislation could be applied to certain insiders. 
Some of these provisions could play at present an ancillary role. 
a) Provisions of the Penal Code 
Article 191 of the Penal Code (on the disturbance of state investment 
policy) provides that 'whoever spreads false news or rumours with a view 
to disturbing the policy of financial development followed by the state for 
the encouragement of domestic private investments or the attraction of 
foreign capital, is punished'. This is a crime against public order and, 
specifically, the state regulation of investment policy. 
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The provisions aiming to secure confidentiality (252 Penal Code) or, 
especially, professional confidentiality (371 Penal Code) are conceptually 
related to Law 1806/1988. On the one hand they cover a wider scope of 
cases of breach of confidentiality, on the other they are narrower regarding 
the potential perpetrators (e. g. only auditors of companies, barristers, 
notaries or legal advisors who have access to secret records because of their 
profession or position in the company could be caught by the provision). 52 
According to Article 406 of the Penal Code on profiteering, 'whoever 
exploits, out of greed, the inexperience or mental weakness of another 
person, misleading him in stock exchange speculative transactions, 
outside of his area of business activities, which are grossly 
disproportionate to his fortune and which, because of this fact, may bring 
or accelerate his financial ruin, is punishable by imprisonment of up to 
two years'. 
Articles 386 and 389 of the same Code provide that: 
(i) Whoever, With the intent of deriving for himself or for another person an illegal 
fitiancial benefit, damages property belonging to another, persuading such person to 
act, omit or tolerate (an act or oinission), by an intentional statentent of false acts as 
trite or hj the illicit concealment or passing over in silence o trite facts, is punished by 
imprisonment for at least three nionths and if the dantage caused is considerable, by 
imprisonment for at least two years. Imprisonment for tip to ten years is ordered if (a) 
the guilty person commits fraudulent acts by profession or habit, or (b) the 
circumstances under which the act was committed evidence the dangerous personality 
of the guilty person. 
(ii) Whoever intentionally illegally damages property belonging to another, 
persuading such person to act, omit or tolerate (an act or omission) by intentional 
representation of false acts as trite or Inj illicit concealment or passing over in silence 
of trite facts, is punishable by imprisonment for tip to two years or by pecuniary 
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penalty. 
Lastly, the crime of breach of confidence (390 Penal Code) could be 
applicable if confidential information is perceived as an element of 
financial value which is meant to be used for the achievement of the 
objectives of the company, yet it is being exploited by, and for the benefit 
of, directors. 53 
b) Provisions in Company and Stock Market Law statutes 
According to Article 56 of the law on public limited companies 
(sociftis anonyines) 2190/1920, any founder, director or manager of a 
company who, in order to induce subscriptions to shares, founder's shares 
or bonds of such company, or to influence the Stock Exchange quotations 
thereof, knowingly makes false declarations to the public through 
publications or writte4 statements concerning: (i) the subscription to, and 
payment of, the share capital, the issue price of shares, founder's shares or 
bonds, the balance sheet or the distribution of dividends, (ii) the names of 
shareholders participating or about to participate in the company under 
any title whatsoever, (iii) any other event which bears influence on the 
affairs of the company and which is intended to entrap the public, is 
punished by imprisonment and a fine not exceeding Drch. 80,000 or to 
either of these penalties. 54 
Under Article 34 of Law 3632/1928 on securities markets, (a) anyone 
who, with the purpose of obtaining an illegaI55 benefit uses, with full 
knowledge that he is doing so, means that may mislead the public in order 
to influence the stock exchange prices or (b) makes inaccurate statements 
through the newspapers or publications, with the aim of obtaining public 
subscription, purchase or sale of securities listed on the stock exchange, 
commits a punishable offence. The same rule is applicable to anyone who 
publishes stock exchange bulletins contrary to the provisions of the law 
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and stock exchange regulations or who puts into circulation copies of such 
bulletin, with the purpose of obtaining illegal benefits. 
The more recent Law 1969/1991 published in October 1991, 
concerning the Stock Exchange, grants to the Capital Nfarket Committee 
the responsibility of supervising the smooth operation of the Stock 
Exchanae and of safeguarding compliance with securities legislation. It is 
also provided that both the Board of Directors of the Stock Exchange and 
the Capital Market Committee may impose the following penalties upon 
brokers whose behaviour is contrary to the boizos inores and commercial 
usages: (a) reprimand; (b) prohibition of effecting stock exchange 
transactions for up to 15 business days; (c) publication of the offender's 
name on the board of the Stock Exchange; or (d) financial penalties of up 
to Drch. 100,000,000 (as amended by article 96 of law 2533/1997). 
Imprisonment and fine up to Drch. 100,000,000 are provided against 
members of the Stock Exchange who, during a session of the Stock 
Exchange, use inisleading or deceptive ? nethods and means with the 
intent to generate, frustrate or otherwise influence a transaction 
concerning a specific security in order to obtain an illegal profit for 
themselves or a third party. A penalty up to Drch. 500,000,000 (as amended 
by article 96 of law 2533/1997) is threatened by Article 72 of the law 1969/91 
against any person who disseminates false information likely to influence 
the price of securities listed on the Stock Exchange. These penalties may 
also be imposed on members of the Board of listed companies and their 
financial advisers as well as on sponsors of issuers of securities. 56 
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VI. Conflicts of Laws issues 
1. jurisdiction 
Article 5 of the Greek Penal Code adopts the lex loci delicti, i. e. for 
illegal acts committed in Greece, Greek law is applicable regardless of the 
nationality of the perpetrator. In addition, according to Article 6, Greek 
criminal laws are applicable to Greek nationals for felonies or 
misdemeanours committed abroad, if they are also punishable under the 
laws of the country where the act has been committed. 57 Under Article 7 of 
the same Code, Greek law applies to aliens for offences against Greek 
nationals committed abroad. 
As Lambadarios remarked, Article 30 of Law 1806/1988 does not state 
specifically that it applies only to transactions on the Greek Stock Exchange 
and it would be, therefore, theoretically possible to consider the provisions 
of Article 30 applicable whenever an offence has been committed abroad 
by a Greek citizen, as well as if the offence were committed by a foreigner 
against a Greek citizen. The same commentator claims, however, 'that the 
legislature had in mind Greek stock exchange transactions, since the 
provisions of Article 30 have been included in the legislation reorganising 
the Greek Stock Exchange, and that acts committed abroad will, in 
principle, be governed by the legislation of the country in which insider 
trading took place'. 58 Nevertheless, the Community legislation seems to 
legitimise the plurality (or, perhaps hierarchy) of competences (cilinal de 
coinpitences) giving to Member States the possibility to maintain the 
already existing rules. 59 
The PD 53/92 covers illegal actions undertaken within the Greek 
territory (article 6), apparently adopting the lex loci delicti . Along the lines 
of the Directive, a specific presumption is established that a transaction is 
carried out within the Greek territory if it is carried out on the Athens 
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Stock Exchange. Illegal transactions on securities traded on foreign 
markets (especially markets of EU Member States) are also caught, 
provided they are carried out in Greece, despite the problematic wording 
of article 2. Any person dealing in Greece, whether a Greek national or 
not, falls within the scope of the provision. The transactions must be in 
transferable securities admitted to trading on an organised market. A list 
of organised rnýrkets is compiled on a yearly basis by the Capital Market 
Commission, pursuant to the Investment Services Directive, in order to 
serve the needs of Investment Firms. If the transferable securities 
concerned are traded on an organ ised market of that list, the condition set 
by PD 53/92 will, in all probability, be fulfilled. 
2. Enforcement and judicial Assistance 
Financial crime is largely a cross-border phenomenon and the 
'traditional reluctance of governments to co-operate in law enforcement 
matters has in the past been a problem' which necessitated international 
treaties and informal arrangements between regulators. 60 Article 8 of 
Directive 89/592/EEC on insider dealing provides for the creation of the 
competent inonitoring atithotities with full stipervisory and investigatory 
powers that are necessary for the implementation of the Directive. The 
competent authorities of Member States shall co-operate with each other 
whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out their duties, making 
use of the powers given to them. The latter provision of the Directive is 
reiterated by article 10 of PD 53/92. 
At this stage there is no special legislation in Greece regulating issues 
of intereuropean and international co-operation on cases of insider 
dealing. The Capital Market Commission has taken some steps to the right 
direction by means of a number of Memoranda of Understanding signed 
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with competent authorities of other states. These MOUs outline the 
framework of mutual assistance, co-operation and exchange of 
information that may be related to insider dealing. 
At present the Greek Penal Code comprises stipulations on judicial 
assistance. There are special provisions (a) on requests of Greek judicial 
authorities to foreign authorities for the hearing of witnesses and persons 
accused of an offence and the carrying out of inspections and expert 
consultations as well as the attachment of exhibits, and (b) on requests of 
foreign judicial authorities for Greek investigating authorities to conduct 
investigative actions. The European convention for mutual assistance on 
criminal cases has been ratified by the law decree 4218/1961. The Penal 
Code also regulates in detail matters of extradition. It should be noted that 
Greece has signed several bilateral treaties on extradition and that the 
European Convention on Extradition of December 13,1957 has been 
ratified by the Law 4165/1961. 
3, Enforcement and the November 1996 crisis. 
At the heart of the November crisis, which took the financial world 
by surprise when regulators closed down the Athens Stock Exchange for 
three working days, was a Brokerage Firm member of the ASE, Delta 
Brokers and a 'long-standing backlog in the clearing of matched orders in 
the clearing house and the delivery of securities and payments to those 
entitled to them'. 61 Delta Brokers had effected enormous purchases of the 
shares of two listed companies, Magrizos and Parnassos, acting on the 
orders of clients or as principal with the clear view to manipulating the 
stocks'price. Short sales, 'wash sales' and matched orders were among the 
most frequent techniques used. Prearranged transactions at agreed prices, 
manipulation of supply and demand, 'atteinpting to recycle liqtddity froin 
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sales into ptirchases of the saine shares in an ever widening cycle of 
transaction growth and financial expostire', '62 all these manipulative 
practices are clearly prohibited. The Capital Market Commission held that 
the insider dealing legislation had been violated (both art. 30 of Laxv 
1806/88 and PD 53/92) because insiders acted on information they had 
produced themselves by creating a misleading impression on the price and 
the trading volume of the above security, and imposed pecuniary 
penalties on the violators on the basis of this construction. 63 At the same 
time the Commission passed on the relative file to the competent public 
prosecutor in Athens. 
Criminal courts have not yet decided on the issue. It remains unclear, 
therefore, whether they will follow the interpretation of the Commission 
in criminal proceedings. It should be stressed, however, that in their 
recent decisionS64 Administrative Courts of First Instance upheld the 
decision of the Capital Market Commission on the pecuniary penalties 
and adopted the somewhat extreme interpretation the latter gave to 
I participatory insiders' and confidential information. The decisions of the 
Administrative Courts have been criticised as wrongfully bringing market 
fratid under insider dealing. According to one commentator the 
fraudulent intervention in the price or the trade volume of securities may 
amount to fraud but it is rather unlikely that it amounts to abuse of 
confidential information (i. e. insider dealing). 65 These strictures seem to 
ignore the possibility afforded by EU Directives: According to article 6 of 
the Insider Dealing Directive 'each Member State inay adopt provisions 
more stringent than those laid down by this Directive or additional 
provisions, provided that such provisions are applied generally'. On the 
other hand, these criticisms constitute an apparent effort to interpret the 
Greek legislation "in the light" of its obviously narrower in scope German 
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counterpart whereby fraudulent transactions of price manipulation are 
not caught by the prohibition of insider deahng. 66 
VII. Appraisal 
The existing ditality of the Greek Insider Dealing legislation (art 30 
Law 1806/88 versits PD 53/92) can be both a blessing and a curse. A curse 
because of its complexity and the additional interpretation difficulties it 
entails. A blessing because of the additional flexibility, especially regarding 
service and participatory insiders, it affords to the supervisory authorities 
and courts in their effort to 'proiiiote coinpliance with those ineastireS'. 67 
The difficulties of assessment, assimilation and exploitation of special 
economic information-by the average investor is closely connected in the 
Greek Laxv, with the lack of regulation on investment consulting. The fact 
is that there are special provisions for the functioning of institutional 
investors (investment companies and mutual funds of law decree 608/70) 
but the regulation of mediatory, consulting, and managerial professions is 
ignored. The aforementioned activities are exercised incidentally and as a 
monopoly by banks, stock-brokers and brokerage companies. 68 The latter 
can only give advise to their clients based on quick evaluation of pliblic 
information and correct analysis. Their duty to offer titnely advice does 
not include the use of confidential information. 
The underlying philosophy of Article 30 (Law 1806/88) and the 
Presidential Decree 53/92 is the restoration of the principle of equality of 
opportunities among investors. The well-aimed exploitation of public 
information after expert assessment of all indications and investment 
advice is not the behaviour outlawed by the provision. The exploitation of 
the knowledge or possession of confidential, privileged information, not 
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made public, with full knowledge of the source and the nature of the 
information, constitutes the punishable act. The enactment of the Greek 
legislation, as well as the insider dealing legislation in the rest of the 
Member States, has been in temporal conjuncture with the increase in 
corporate concentrations e. g. take-overs, mergers. The latter being critical 
decisions for the future of enterprises and for the fluctuation of the price 
of the relative securities, offer an additional lure of profiteering. 69 
While it is self-evident that no absolute protection against the 
practice of insider dealing can be secured, the efficiency of the enacted 
statute remains to be tested through judicial implementation and 
jurisprudential elaboration. The basic questions that will undoubtedly be 
posed are: (a) when some confidential information which is known to a 
certain circle of initiated persons becomes the possession of investors as a 
whole. 70 Given that the illegal conduct must be judged at the time the 
order for the transaction was placed, in the case of multiple successive 
orders the problem is to discern which transactions resulted from the 
exploitation of inside information, which were dictated by an expert 
assessment of indications, and, finally, which were based on public 
information; (b) if 'the intent to obtain a significant financial benefit or to 
cause a significant loss to a third party' will be considered by jurisprudence 
as an aggravating circumstance after the enactment of PD 53/92 or a 
conditio sine qtta noý for the constitution of the art. 30 offence, thus, 
creating additional problems for the enforcement of the Law; (c) What 
means of proof of the knowledge of the confidential character of the 
information and its source will be approved; (d) How will the notions of 
'significant financial benefit' and 'significant loss' be interpreted since 
these terms constitute 'interlocittory' conditions for the commencement 
or continuation of prosecution. 
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The adoption of the provision is in conformity with the policy of the 
European Community for the creation of an internal market7l on which 
Directive 89/592 was founded. The Greek insider dealing legislation is 
destined to make all persons involved in stock-market transactions 
sensitive about an abusive practice. The Greek Stock Exchange has come to 
flourish rather recently and its overburdening with repressive measures 
has been criticised as premature and excessive in comparison with the 
I shallowness' of the market. On the other hand, in still unsophisticated 
markets the ways of violation of elementary principles can be even more 
primitive. 
From the point of view of civil law the contract of sale of securities 
where one of the contracting parts commits insider dealing is a valid and 
legal contract effected through the mechanism of the stock exchange. It has 
already been stressed72 that in the absence of any special provision the 
transaction is neither void nor voidable. The solution chosen by the Greek 
law is justified by the nature of the transaction. The contracts are 
concluded in an impersonal way according to the rules of the stock market 
in the sense they have been standardised and they concern standardised 
objects (securities). The prices are formed by market forces and mainly the 
law of supply and demand. It is the duty of the legal entity to disclose and 
publish information. The person who enters into a transaction does not 
have any such duty in that particular transaction. Along these lines no 
appeal can be made against the validity of the contract nor can contractual 
responsibility be sought. On the contrary, an action in tort based on the 
general clause of the Civil Code (Article 914) is possible, as has already 
been mentioned. What is most important is that the civil action can be 
tried in parallel with the criminal case and by the same (Penal) court. 
The solution of law regarding the validity of the contract of sale of 
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securities burdened with insider dealing has been related to the theory that 
insider dealing is an offence without an easily identifiable victim, 'when it 
does not damage specifically some participant to the stock market. 73 This 
theory has been questioned and it has been argued that insider dealing 
may damage investors in general. Moreover, the fact that insider dealing 
maybe a 'victhnless cri? ne' does not eliminate the punishable character of 
the aCt. 74 On the contrary, it is rather clear that the act of insider dealing 
shakes investor confidence in the stock exchange75 with all market- 
distortive repercussions. 
The above comments lead to the following conclusions: Firstly, the 
centre of gravity of insider dealing legislation should be shifted from the 
control of contractual equilibrium between the principal contractual 
elements (e. g. offer, acceptance, consideration) to the control of extra- 
contractual elements that dictate the exact contents of the contract. The 
control should aim at securing the trustworthiness of market participants 
and the timely utilisation of confidential information for investors as a 
whole. Secondly, the strengthening of the deterrent effect of the pecuniary 
penalties of Article 30 (Law 1806/88) and PD 53/92 partly achieved the 
connection of the fine with the amount of the profit that was attained or 
the loss that was caused but there is still room for improvement. Lastly, 
the collective representation of investors is imperative for both the 
safeguarding of their financial interests and the vindication of their right 
of commensurate participation to the market. Indeed, investors are the 
'direct receivers' of the virtziotts conduct of the initiated, exactly as is the 
company vis-h-vis company directors and an unsuspected contracting 
party vis-ý-vis the opposite contracting party. The upgrading of the role of 
investors organisations in the preparation and implementation of 
securities legislation is particularly important. In this view, what is sought 
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beyond mere deterrence is the co-operation and the allocation of 
responsibilities between 'victimisers' and 'victims' according to the 
international tendency in competition, consumer and labour law, which 
favours the conclusions of collective agreements or the working out of 
deoidology rules between the representatives of financial sectors with 
conflicting interestS. 76 
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E. Remedies and Enforcement. 
a. Enforcement process and Direct Effect of the Directive 
The fact that the source of the insider dealing legislation of EC 
Member States is the EC Insider Dealing Directive' has two practical 
consequences: 
Firstly, the national legislations inspired by an EC Directive should be 
considered in the context of the Directive, interpreted according to a 
ptirposive approach and construed so as to comply with its letter and its 
spirit. 2 
Secondly, and more importantly, the European Court of Justice has 
accepted and operated the principle that the national courts of the Member 
States should comply with a Directive to the extent thýt it does not give 
discretion to Member States about its implementation, not only in absence 
of national legislation but even where the national legislation has 
implemented the Directive in a defective way. 3 In the case of Marleasing 
4 SA v La Coinercial bitertiacional de Affinentacion SA , as will 
be shown 
later in this chapter, national courts were required to ignore altogether 
national legislation which was in conflict with the terms of a Directive. 
This solution is dictated by the necessity to ensure that the conditions 
permitting the implementation of community measures are created and, 
in particular, that the directives are treated as enforceable in national law. 5 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves as the final authority on 
the interpretation and application of EC law. The Court has achieved its 
supreme status regarding EC law through a partial surrender of legal 
sovereignty by EC Member States. 6 However, in order to retain legitimacy 
within its recognised sphere, the ECJ has had to maintain a delicate 
balancing act with the national judiciaries of the Member States. As a 
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result the Court is careful strictly to observe the boundaries of its 
jurisdiction. 
The Court is empowered to interpret the growing body of EC law, and 
Member States are bound by the Court's interpretations. In this sense, the 
Court is the pinnacle of a legal structure combining hundreds of national 
courts. 7 
The Court's jurisdiction can be divided into two broad categories: 
actions brought directly before the Court and requests for preliminary 
rulings on questions of EC law brought by national Courts. The second 
category, cases brought under Article 177 from a national court for 
preliminary ruling, comprises a significant portion of the Court's caseload 
and has proved to be the most important in terms of development of EC 
law. Before discussing. the Court's jurisdiction under Article 177, however, 
the direct bases of jurisdiction for the ECJ will be briefly examined. 
L Actions Brought Directly Before the ECI. 
L Actions by the EC Against a Member State (Article 169) 
The Court is empowered to adjudicate cases in which the 
Commission has decided that a Member State has failed to fulfil its 
obligations under the Treaty. Recourse to the Court is allowed only after a 
reasoned opinion from the Commission to the Member State fails to 
result in compliance with the Treaty. The Court, which may not annul 
any national legislation, then issues a declaration that the Member State is 
in violation of the Treaty. 
Member States are, however, obliged under Article 171 to comply 
with the Treaty once the Court declares that the Member State is in 
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violation. Thus, Article 169 actions often follow on the heels of a 
declaration by the Court that a Member State has failed to comply with its 
obligations under Article 171. Nevertheless, the prospect of repeated 
conflicts between the Court and a Member State under the aegis of Article 
169 has not been realised because only 20 percent of proceedings 
commenced under Article 169 end in litigation before the Court. In 
addition to ensuring compliance with Treaty obligations Article 169 
provides a procedure for dispute resolution and an opportunity for the 
Court to clarify EC law. 8 
The effectiveness of the Article 171 procedure is probably minimal 
given that a deliberately disobedient Member State can simply refuse, once 
again to implement a judgement given on the basis of Article 171. The 
situation is aggravated by the fact that the ECJ cannot impose a dissuasive 
penalty on such an errant State. 9 The only alternative measure which 
would not require a Treaty amendment would be to enable individuals 
indirectly to enforce Community Law and in particular the provisions of 
directives before the national courts. 10 
ii. Actions By a Member State Against Another Member State 
(Article 170) 
The Article 170 procedures, under which a Member State may 
institute proceedings against another Member State for a Treaty violation, 
are similar to the procedures under Article 169. Before proceeding to the 
Court, a Member State notifies the Commission of the violation. Each 
Member State must submit comments; and the Commission must issue a 
reasoned opinion. If the Commission does not issue an opinion in three 
months, the complaining Member State can require the ECJ to take the 
case. The necessity for the Commission to issue a reasoned opinion under 
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both Articles 169 and 170 demonstrates the importance of the Commission 
in ensuring that EC law is respected by Member States and facilitates 
Member State compliance with EC law. Article 170, however, remains an 
option rarely used. Member States have preferred to allow the 
Commission to enforce Treaty obligations, perhaps because they view the 
Commission as a more detached and impartial body. 11 
iii. Actions Brought by Member States, the Council, the Commission 
or Individuals for Annulment of Administrative Acts (Article 173) 
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty represents a direct control on activities 
of Community institutions. Under Article 173, the Court has extended 
judicial review over acts other than recommendations or opinions of the 
Council and the Commission. Complementing Article 189 of the EEC 
Treaty, which states that recommendations and opinions shall have no 
binding force, Article 173 is intended to be a mechanism for the 
annulment of any binding legislative act of the Council or Commission. 
iv. Plea of IRegali! y (Article 184) 
Article 184 acts as a supplement to Article 173. Because Article 173 
may only be invoked within two months of the publication of an act, 
Article 184 provides that acts will not become immune from challenge 
when the two-month period elapses. However, a successful Article 184 
action will only render the act inapplicable, not void. 
Article 184 has also been interpreted as allowing any party to invoke 
the plea of illegality, even those parties precluded by Article 173, paragraph 
2 from challenging general acts. Article 184 has also been termed an 
indirect challenge to an EC regulation because a party may claim a 
provision to be illegal in a proceeding brought for another purpose. 
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v. Action for Failure to Act (Article 175) 
Article 175 provides Member States, individuals, or EC institutions 
with a remedy if the Council or Commission fails to act in conjunction 
with the EEC Treaty. Article 175 is similar to Article 173 in that the Court 
applies the individual concern test but is very little used. 
II. Preliminary Rulings From National Courts (Article 177) 
Article 177 allows national courts to have legal questions concerning 
the interpretation of a treaty or Directive or the validity of an EC 
institution's action answered by the ECJ. It is not a mechanism for appeals 
to the Court from the national courts of Member States. The Court does 
not have jurisdiction under Article 177 to interpret or address questions of 
national law. It must confine itself to interpretation of EC law and may not 
apply the law to particular factual situations. The policy implicit in Article 
177 is to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of EC law by the courts of 
Members States. Preliminary references from national courts under 
Article 177 form the backbone of the ECJ's caseload. 
Article 177 provides for two types of preliminary rulings: 
discretionary and mandatory. Discretionary references can be brought by 
any level of a Member State's judiciary, and the referring court's decision 
need not be a final judgement. Under Article 177, paragraph 3, however, 
the national court of last resort "shall" refer questions of Treaty 
interpretation to the Court. Thus, the Court has declared that a national 
court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law must refer question of EC law to the Court unless the 
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national court decides that: 
(1) the issue is irrelevant; (2) the Court has already addressed the 
question; or (3) the correct application of EC law is obvious. 
Article 177 gives the ECJ authority to declare EC actions invalid. 
When the Court declares an act of the Council of the EC void under 
Article 177, that ruling is binding on the national court which referred the 
matter to the Court. Other national courts, moreover, should regard the 
Court's declaration of invalidity as applicable throughout the Community. 
In this fashion, the Court reinforces the primacy of EC law over national 
law. 
Article 177 has also encouraged European integration by developing 
the concept that certain Treaty provisions and EC acts may have "direct 
effects" that produce individual rights which internal courts should 
protect. The conditions for finding a Treaty provision to be directly 
effective were developed by the Court in response to Article 177 references 
for preliminary rulings. Direct effect will be found if the nature of the 
obligation is precise, if the Member State has no discretion in its 
application and if the obligation is unqualified, not only in the absence of 
legislation implementing the Directive in question but also in the case of 
defective implementation. Regarding the duty of Member States vis-h-vis 
directly applicable provisions, the Court has stated that "directly applicable 
provisions of the Treaty are binding on all the authorities of the Member 
States and they must therefore comply with them without its being 
12 necessary to adopt national implementing provisions. " Provisions 
having direct effect are enforceable by private individuals in their national 
courts. 13 
The Court has sought to maximise the effectiveness of Directives in 
Community law motivated by a strong desire to safeguard the interests of 
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potentially affected parties by affording them a genuine opportunity to 
seek redress in the national courts. 14 At this point it should be noted that 
the direct effect of a directive is applicable only if the provisions of the 
directive confer 'directly effective rights oiz individitals'. 15 In the context 
of the Inside Dealing Directive this is not the case. The provisions of the 
Directive impose a specific obligation on Member States to legislate against 
the offence of insider dealing and to adopt sanctions that are sufficient to 
promote compliance. It could hardly be argued that any individual rights 
are conferred to persons under the Directive. If the Directive did not give 
discretion re-arding sanctions and provided for a specific civil remedy that 
the victims of the offence should have against the offender, the principle 
of direct effect, as developed by the ECJ would be of substantial importance 
because individuals would be able to seek enforcement of the Directive 
before national courts in case of its non-implementation or, even, 
defective implementation. The fact, however, that a Community law 
provision can be considered as directly effective does not of itself 
determine whether the right created in the individual is to be categorised 
by national law as a private law right to be protected by such remedies as 
the national legal system provides for such a right, or as a right to have the 
public law enforced, to which are attached the remedies appropriate for 
such enforcement. 16 Curtin remarks that, in as much as it is for the 
national court to give effect to Community rights, the remedies offered 
must be effective. This analysis leads to the conclusion that Community 
law may require national courts to make available, pursuant to the failure 
by a Member State to implement a directive into national law, a remedy in 
damages vested in those individuals injured by national public 
authorities' violation of Community law. 17 
Two preliminary rulings of the ECJ, quite appropriately related to 
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Company-Securities law Directives, illustrate the current tendencies 
towards the acceptance of the "direct effect" of EC Directives. 
In M. Karella and N. Karellas v Minister of Inditstry, Energy and 
Technology (intervenor: Organismos Anasinkrotiseos Epikhiriseon AE or 
"Organisation for Economic Recovery of Business Enterprises")- 30 May 
1991 18 , the Council of State of the Hellenic Republic referred three 
questions on the interpretation of Articles 25,41 and 42 of the second 
Council Directive (77 / 91 / EEC) for a preliminary ruling. 
In 1983, by decision of the Secretary of State for the Economy, the 
provisions of Greek Law No. 1386/1983 were applied to the company 
Klostiria Velka AE, which was experiencing serious financial difficulties. 
Pursuant to Article 8 of that law, temporary management of the company 
was transferred to the OAE, a public body for the restructuring of 
undertakings. 
During that period of administration, the OAE decided to increase the 
Company's share capital by 400,000,000 drachmas. That decision was 
approved by the Secretary of State for Industry, Energy and Technology. 
The decision granting approval made provisions for an unfettered right of 
redemption for existing shareholders, which they had to exercise within 
one month. 
By its questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the national court 
asked whether, having regard to Article 41(l) of the second Directive, 
Article 25(l) of the same Directive can be relied upon against the State 
before a national court by an individual and whether it was applicable in 
respect of public rules, such as those laid down by Law No. 1386/1983, 
which deal with the entirely exceptional circumstances of companies of 
particular economic and social importance for society as a whole which are 
experiencing serious financial difficulties. 
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The Court ruled as follows: 
"I. Article 250) of tile Second Council Directive (771911EEC) of 13 December 
1976 oil co-ordination and safeguards which, for the protection of tile interests of 
members and others, are required Inj Member States of companies within the ineaning 
of the second paragraph of Article 58 of tile Treaty, in respect of tile formation of 
public limited liability companies and the maintenance or alteration of their 
capital, With a view to making such safeguards equivalent, may be relied upon by 
individuals against tile public authorities before national courts. 
2. Article 25 in conjunction with Article 410) of tile Second Directive must be 
interpreted as meaning that they preclude national rules which, in order to ensure 
the survival and continued operation of undertakings Which are of particular 
economic and social importance for society as a Whole and are in exceptional 
circumstances by reason of their excessive debt burden, provide for the adoption by 
administrative act of a decision to increase the company capital, without prejudice to 
the preferential right of existing shareholders When the new shares are issued. "
NIr Advocate General Giuseppe Tesauro delivered his opinion at the 
sitting of the Sixth Chamber on 30 January 1991. He concluded as follows: 
"In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the questions 
referred by the Greek Council of State should be alIS7vered as fOlIO71)S: 
I. The provisions of Article 25 in conjunction with Article 410) of Council 
Directive 771911EEC are unconditionaland sufficiently precise19 that they call be 
relied upon against the State before the national court by an individual claiming 
that they are incompatible With the rules contained in a legal provision. 
II. The provisions of Article 25 in conjunction with Article 410) of Council 
Directive 771911EEC must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the 
application of rules which, while seeking to govern the management of certain 
undertakings in a situation of crisis, Without prejudice to the preferential right of 
existing shareholders, permits a decision to be taken to increase the company capital 
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by an administrative act and without consideration Inj the ineeting of shareholders. " 
The ratio decidendi of the Karella case has been criticised 20 as failing 
on the one hand to reconcile the Directive with the national law and to 
safeguard the coherence of legal institutions, and, on the other, as not 
embracing in its reasoning the whole body of law even if, as Curtin points 
out, this body consists for a large or major part of national law rules. This 
was one of the issues dealt with by Advocate General Van Gerven in the 
Marleasitig case. 
In Allarleasing SA et La Coinercial Internacional de Alhnentaci6n 
SA, C-106/89, arrk de la cour (sixiýme chambre), 13 November 1990, a 
ruling along the same lines can be found. The Court of justice has 
developed a parallel obligation, imposed on national courts, to interpret 
their national laws in the light of the objective and the wording of any 
pertinent Community directives, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of 
the individual's rights even in a horizontal relationship (i. e. in a private 
law relationship between individuals and not only in claims which by 
their nature will always be enforced against the State). According to the 
Court when applying national law, no matter if it concerns provisions that 
were enacted before or after the Directive, the national jurisdiction when 
called to interpret must do so in the light of the text and the objective of 
the Directive in order to achieve the result envisaged by the latter and 
being, therefore, in conformity with Article 189 of the Treaty. This 
obligation of national courts emerges as rather extensive and far-reaching 
from the judgement of Marleasing. The case concerned the attempt by 
Marleasing S. A. to obtain a declaration of the nullity of La Comercial 
Internacional de Alimentaci6n S. A. from a Spanish tribunal on the 
ground that it was vitiated by the lack of (lawful) consideration in 
violation of Articles 1261 and 1275 of the Spanish Civil Code. In its defence 
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La Comercial relied on Article 11 of the first Company law Directive 21 
which lists exhaustively the cases in which the nullity of a company may 
be declared, not including the lack of (lawful) consideration, which had 
not been implemented at that point in time into Spanish law. The 
national tribunal considered that the case raised the problem of the direct 
effect of a directive which had not been transposed into national law and 
accordingly it asked the Court of Justice whether Article 11 of the Directive 
in question could be considered as directly effective in a horizontal 
context. The Court, as Curtin comments 22 1, neatly side-stepped this 
response by rewording the question asked in terms of the existence or 
otherwise of an obligation to interpret national law in conformity with the 
provisions of a directive'. The national court was informed by the ECJ that 
it was obliged to interpret its national law, irrespective pf whether it pre- 
dated or post-dated the pertinent directive, in the light of the terms of the 
directive. The end result was that the obligation contained in the directive 
is placed on private parties, albeit after having been transformed, via 
judicial interpretation, into one of national law. In this manner 
"horizontal" rights, which are enshrined in directives, can have the force 
of law as between individuals without a specific domestic legislative 
process and the primacy of Community law is assured. 
The availability of adequate judicial remedies for the protection of 
individuals in the national courts in relation to enforceable Community 
rights may be described as an essential requirement of Community law. 
This general principle of effectiveness of judicial protection has been 
encapsulated in legislative form in two notable areas: First, in the 
directives relating to equal treatment of male and female workers, 
Member States are required to adopt measures which are sufficiently 
effective to achieve the objective of the directive. Secotid, with regard to 
-251- 
public procurement, the recently published draft "Compliance Directive" 
relating to the application of Community rules on procedures for the 
award of contracts in the fields of water, energy, transport and 
telecommunications ("excluded sectors") makes reference to the obligation 
on TMember States to provide effective legal means of recourse with a view 
to setting aside decisions violating Community legislation and national 
implementing legislation as well as to provide for the compensation of 
injured tenderers. 23 
Community law may carry the enforcement measures one step 
further and require national courts to make available, pursuant to the 
failure by a Member State to implement a directive into national law, a 
remedy in damages against the national state (as opposed to a mere 
declaratory order) vested in those individuals injured by the national 
public authorities' violation of Community law. There is some authority 
in the case law of the ECJ for the proposition that the interest of having a 
judgement by the Court in the context of proceedings under Article 169 of 
the Treaty is that it may establish the basis of the liability the State may 
incur, in particular towards individuals as a result of the breach of its 
obligations. 24 This argument has been reiterated by the Court in the 
context of an action concerning a Member States' failure to transpose 
correctly a Directive into national law. 25 
In the absence of any Community harmonisation the arrangements 
for & compensation of individuals injured by an unlawful act of a public 
authority is still governed by the national legal systems with the corollary 
that the systems both of evidence and of estoppel prevailing in the 
separate Member States will apply, thereby jeopardising any hope of 
attaining a uniform system of rules. Nevertheless, the principle that the 
State is liable is acknowledged in all the Member States provided that the 
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damage was caused by the public authority in the exercise of their 
functions. 26 Whereas under no national legal system is liability arising 
from acts in the nature of secondary legislation automatically excluded, in 
a majority of Member States fault by a public authority has to be 
demonstrated and only in a minority of states, is an unlawful act by an 
authority equivalent to fault. 27 For the common law jurisdictions an 
analogy may be drawn between the tort a Member State commits in failing 
to implement the provisions of a directive into national law in time, if the 
directive provides for the protection of individual rights, and the cause of 
action arising out of a breach of a public duty under a statute. 28 
National courts are obliged on the basis of the general obligations 
imposed upon Member States in Article 5 of the Treaty, to draw the 
consequences flowing. from their State's membership of the Community 
and they must determine the extent of the protection national law offers 
individuals affected by any breach of provisions of Community law, which 
establish individual rights, in accordance with the Community law 
principle of effectiveness and appropriateness. This idea was expressed in 
Rtisso 29 by Advocate General Reischl who stressed that: 
"the liability of a Member State for the cotisequetices flowing from an infritigemetit of 
Community law also arises out of the obligation to provide effective protection of 
these rights provided that the other prerequisites under national la7t, are present-. 30 
It may be argued that where a Member State acts in breach of the 
directly effective provisions of Community law, any loss or damage 
suffered by an individual as a consequence sound in damages. The failure 
by a Member State to implement the directly effective provisions of, in the 
event, a directive into national law occasions the breach of individual 
rights which are deemed to be absolute and which lead to an action in 
damages. According to this analysis it would be incompatible with 
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Community law for a national court to subject an injured individual's 
right to obtain damages from the State for violation of a directly effective 
right to the further restrictive proof of an abuse of power by the Member 
State. 31 
In the context of the Insider Dealing Directive special problems are 
posed. It has already been mentioned that the Directive does not confer 
any individual rights on persons and that only if it provided for certain 
civil law remedies it could be argued that private persons would be in a 
position to benefit from the direct effect (vertical or horizontal) of the 
Directive. As regards damages, it should be remembered that insider 
dealing is often perceived as a victimless crime or, at least, a crime without 
easily identifiable victims and even less easy to prove damages. 
An important question in this respect is whether private individuals 
, vho have been adversely affected by the failure of a Member State to 
implement the terms of a Directive into national law should be able to 
claim compensation against the State for damage sustained as a result, 
even in relation to provisions of the directive which do not enjoy direct 
effect in the formal sense. 32 It can be argued that it would be incompatible 
with the binding effect attributed to a directive by Article 189 of the Treaty 
to exclude, in principle, the possibility that the obligation which it imposes 
may be invoked by those individuals whose rights have been directly or 
indirectly adversely affected by the Member State's failure to implement 
correctly or on time, even where the norm in question may not enjoy 
direct effect as such. 33 The existence of such effect, as Curtin remarks, 
would constitute an important additional weapon in the legal armoury of 
vigilant individuals affected by a Member State's failure to transpose 
correctly, and in good time, the provisions of a directive into national law. 
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b. Between EC Member States 
The Treaty on European Union34 was signed on 7 February 1992 at 
Maastricht in the Netherlands. It entered into force on 1 November 1993. 
The High contracting parties are the twelve Member States of the 
European Communities. Title VI of the Treaty is entitled Co-operation in 
the Fields of justice and Home Affairs. The Governments of the Member 
States of the European Communities have in fact co-operated in these 
fields for several years. They have done so outside the framework of the 
Community Treaties, and thus outside the Community legal order. Title 
VI of the Maastricht treaty provides a treaty basis on home affairs and 
justice matters. Co-operation under Title VI takes place outside 
Community procedures. The resulting decisions form no part of 
Community law. 35 
Title VI consists of ten articles: Articles K to K. 9. Article K states 
simply: "Co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs shall be 
governed by the following provisions". Accordingly, such co-operation is 
not governed by earlier provisions of the Treaty, in particular those 
relating to the Communities. Articles K. 1. to K. 8. describes how that co- 
operation is to be carried out in a number of defined policy areas regarded 
as "matters of common interest". Article K. 9 establishes a procedure for 
transferring some of these matters to the EC Treaty, thus placing them 
ýVithin Community competence. Title VI does not contain substantive 
rules of law regulating the maters of common interest. It is rather a legal 
framework for intergovernmental co-operation between the Member 
States in these police areas. The nine areas of common interest encompass 
asylum and immigration [Art. k. 1(1) to (3)]; combating drug addiction and 
fraud [Art. K. 1(4) and (5)]; judicial co-operation in civil and criminal 
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matters [Art. K. 1(6) and (7)1; and customs and police co-operation [Art. 
K. 1. (8) and (9)]. 
Article K. 1(6) lists as a matter of common interest "judicial co- 
operation in civil matters", and Article K. 1 (7) "judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters". 
The term 'Judicial co-operation" is misleading. It might suggest no 
more than co-operative arrangements between the domestic courts of the 
Member States. But in practice it has come to be used as a shorthand for a 
larger process. Each Member state has retained its own distinctive civil and 
criminal legal system, and in some Member States there are distinct 
regional legal systems. The Member States have guarded these jealously, 
and opposed the notion of Community competence over such matters as 
the organisation of the courts and administration of justice, rules of 
evidence, civil procedures and remedies, and criminal procedures and 
penalties. In general these matters as well as substantive criminal law and 
most areas of civil law, remain within the national competence of 
Member States. But the Member States have long acknowledged the need 
to co-operate closely to improve the efficiency and interaction of their legal 
systems within the Community. This need increased with the 
establishment of the single market, bringing with it freer movement of 
goods, services, capital and people within the Community. 
judicial co-operation, involving a regular process of exchange of 
information, consultation, and agreement on subjects ranging from 
extradition to maintenance payments, was carried out in recent years as 
part of European Political Co-operation. The process also involved 
discussion and co-ordination of Member States' positions in wider 
international fOra such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and 
the Hague Conference on Private international Law. This work can be 
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expected to intensify under Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty. 
In the civil law field, action has also been taken in pursuance of 
Article 220 of the EC Treaty. This provides, inter alia, that "Member States 
shall, so far as necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a 
view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ... the simplification of 
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgements of courts and tribunals and of arbitration awards". Notable 
achievements have been the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial MatterS36 
and the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law applicable to contractual 
Obligations. 37 The possibility of concluding further conventions pursuant 
to Article 220, and thus within the framework of the Community Treaties 
(though not in the form of Community legislation) remains unaffected by 
Title VI. 
Title VI makes an important legal distinction between civil and 
criminal judicial co-operation. Only action in the field of judicial co- 
operation in civil matters, since that field is referred to in Article K. 1 (6) 
may be transferred to Article 100c of the EC Treaty and thus into 
Community competence in accordance with Article K. 9; and it is only in 
respect of judicial co-operation in civil matters that the Commission 
shares the right of initiative with Member States under Article K. 3(2). This 
distinction reflects the greater sensitivity of Member states about their 
powers in the field of criminal justice. 
The main forms of co-operation provided for by Article K. 3 are 
exchange of information and consultation [para (1)], joint action [para 
(2)(a&b)] and more importantly the drafting of Conventions [para 2(c)] that 
will be recommended for adoption by Member States. 
In addition Article K. 5 of the Maastricht Treaty provides that: 
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'Within international organisations and at international conferences in which they 
take part, Member States shall defend the coninion positions adopted under tile 
provisions of this Title. ' 
The Council of Europe Convention on Insider Trading38, as has 
already been mentioned, represents an important attempt to facilitate 
multilateral co-operation for the enforcement of laws prohibiting insider 
dealing. In the European level it is an effort to further the objectives of EC 
Council Directive 89/592. 
The main undertaking of the Contracting States is "to provide each 
other with the greatest possible measure of mutual assistance in the 
exchange of information relating to matters establishing or giving rise to 0 
the belief that irregular operations of insider trading have been carried 
out. "39 Assistance is due when there is reasonable suspicion that insider 
trading has occurred and should be taken to include providing access to 
information in the files of the requested authority, taking evidence of 
persons and obtaining documents. Each State must designate authorities 
responsible for submitting and for receiving requests for assistance. 40 Such 
authorities may be administrative or judicial, and each State may 
designate more than one if it considers it necessary. 41 The execution of the 
requests is carried out in accordance with the law of the Contracting Party 
where the requested authority operates and, in the absence of specific 
provisions, the latter may apply the rules laid down by national law of 
obtaining evidence. 42 These provisions may not prejudice the rights 
accorded to the defendant by national law. 43 In this context, sanctions laid 
down for breaches of professional secrecy shall not apply in regard to the 
information provided compulsorily by witnesses in the course of an 
enquiry. 44 
The undertaking of the requested authority to supply information is 
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conditional upon the facts on which the request is based constituting 
insider dealing as defined by the Convention and, in addition, constituting 
"in each State an irregularity as regards the rules of both States. "45 As has 
already been remarked in the previous chapter, this inserts a requirement 
of "dital irregidarity-46 and means that the facts must constitute according 
to the laws of both the requesting and the requested States a criminal 
offence or an infraction subject to administrative, disciplinary or civil 
sanctions, but not an infraction for which damages is the only civil 
sanction. 47 Reference to "disciplinary sanctions" suggests that the 
communication network could be used for the enforcement of self- 
regulatory rules. 
The Convention establishes a multilateral network of 
communication under flexible and expedient procedures and facilitates 
continuity in co-operation. Nevertheless, the scope of its application is 
limited in two ways. First, the requirement of "dual irregularity" is an 
important restriction. Article 10 of the EC Directive specifically requires 
the exchange of information upon the request of a Member State even 
where the relevant action is not prohibited by the law of the requested 
State. Secondly, the Convention solely incorporates an undertaking of 
"passive assistance". 48 It imposes upon a state the obligation to provide 
information in connection with the suspected violation of the insider 
trading laws of another State if the latter so requests. It does not require the 
authorities of a Contracting State when they have reason to suspect that a 
breach of the insider trading laws of another State has occurred to inform 
the authorities of the latter. This type of "active assistance" is not 
institutionalised and remains for each Contracting Party to pursue in its 
own initiative. It should be noted that this type of "active assistance" is 
expressly included in the Memorandum of Understanding concluded 
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between the SEC of the United States and the Ontario, Quebec and the 
British Columbia Securities Commissions in 1988. Article 8 of the 
Memorandum entitled "Unsolicited Assistance" provides: "To the extent 
permitted by the laws and regulations of its jurisdiction, each authority 
will use reasonable efforts to provide the other authority with any 
information it discovers which gives rise to a suspicion of a breach, or an 
anticipated breach, of the laws and regulations of the other Authority. "49 
The Council of Europe Convention on Extradition5O, to which the 
United Kingdom has become a party, is a very important achievement of 
the EC legislation as regards interstate co-operation and enforcement of 
insider dealing rules. The Convention requires [Art. 2(1)] that, before 
extradition is granted, the offence be one which is punishable under the 
laws of both the requesting and the requested party by deprivation of 
liberty for at least one year. If this condition is satisfied, subject to the rest 
of that Convention, State Parties are obliged to extradite. As Alastair 
Brown has observed: 'hitherto, insider dealing was not an extradition 
crime. '51 Once all EU Member States have complied with the Directive 
and prohibited insider trading, 52 the criteria in Article 2(1) of the 
Extradition Convention are likely to be met in all cases of insider dealing, 
at least between EU countries, if the latter do not use pecuniary penalties 
as the only punishment for the insider dealing offence. It should therefore 
be possible to secure the return of offenders and face the difficulties 
experienced in prosecuting insider dealing which is largely a cross-border 
phenomenon, likely to be related to more than one jurisdiction. 
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c. At an International level. 
Increasing internationalisation of securities markets has made more 
difficult the task of prosecuting multi-jurisdictional insider trading. 
Difficulties are exacerbated when an international element is present for a 
variety of reasons. An inside transaction may take place in the securities of 
an issuer from outside the country where the securities are traded. 
Offences may be carried out by persons operating in a market outside the 
State where they reside and often through nominees so that the identity of 
the offenders becomes more difficult to determine. In these cases it is 
necessary to collect evidence which is located abroad but this process faces 
particular difficulties and the existing instruments for international co- 
operation are not designed to facilitate the exchange of information in 
connection with this type of abuse. Enforcement may be further hampered 
by banking secrecy and blocking laws in force in some jurisdictions, which 
restrain the disclosure of material information to foreign regulatory 
bodies. 
In view of these difficulties, national authorities have sought to 
expedite enforcement of securities laws by mutual co-operation. Three 
types of incentives can be distinguished: First, the inclusion in national 
statutes of provisions empowering domestic authorities to disclose 
information to their foreign counterparts and, even, to initiate 
investigations at the request of the latter. Such provisions have been 
included in the laws of France, 53 the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 54 Secondly, by mutual recognition arrangement for mutual legal 
assistance in securities markets. The American Securities and Exchange 
Commission and securities regulators from other countries have directed 
recent efforts at co-operation in insider trading investigation and 
-261- 
enforcement at formal bilateral agreements, including mutual legal 
assistance treaties and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). This 
process begun in the 1970's and has gained wide acceptance via the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which in 
1986 adopted a resolution on co-operation obliging members to provide 
assistance on a reciprocal basis for gathering information related to market 
oversight and protection of each nation's markets against fraudulent 
securities transactions. 55 Twenty-three securities regulators, including the 
SEC, subsequently ratified the resolution. 56 In 1989, the SEC proposed 
another resolution encouraging the formalisation of this process by 
advising IOSCO members to negotiate for comprehensive MOUs on 
information sharing arrangements. IOSCO's Technical Committee 
endorsed the resolution, which was opened for signature in June 1989. 
Such efforts at bilateral negotiations have achieved significant success, 
replacing earlier efforts at a multilateral approach, as represented by the 
Hague Convention (on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial 
Matters). 57 
Mutual assistance treaties provide procedures for mutual help in the 
investigation of criminal matters. The principal treaty for mutual 
assistance is the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between 
the Swiss Confederation and the United States (Swiss Treaty). 58 The Swiss 
Treaty was the first mutual assistance treaty of its kind to which the 
United States was a party. It provides that the U. S. and Swiss governments 
will provide for "broad assistance in ... criminal matters ... includ[ing] 
assistance in locating witnesses, production and authentication of business. 
records, and service of judicial or administrative documents. "59 The treaty 
applies to all areas of "dual criminality", except customs, tax, and antitrust 
law. This dual criminality requirement hampered SEC efforts to utilise the 
-262- 
Swiss Treaty in insider trading cases, because Switzerland did not have 
laws expressly prohibiting insider trading until the enactment of Article 
161 of the Swiss Penal Code (SPQ on 1 July 1988. The enactment of Article 
161 of the SPC will greatly expand the SEC's ability to obtain information 
from Switzerland for investigations of insider trading violations. 
Differences, however, in U. S. and Swiss insider trading prohibitions may 
make the Swiss Treaty provisions inapplicable in some SEC insider 
trading investigations. 
The United States has also entered into criminal mutual legal 
assistance treaties with Netherlands, Turkey and Italy. 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) are "non-binding statements 
of intent between like-minded regulators, providing for exchanges of 
information and mutual co-operation on a bilateral basis. "60 Although the 
SEC's first negotia ted MOU, the Memorandum of understanding between 
the United States and the Confederation of Switzerland (Swiss MOU), was 
designed specifically to address insider trading violations, subsequent 
MOUs cover a broad range of securities law matters. MOUs provide: 
'all efficient, predictable, and reliable ineans of obtaining information in securities 
enforcenten t Ina tters. III addition, they assist in developing 
(1) a frainework for co-operation; (2) greater experience in addressing international 
securities law issues; (3) improved co in in un ica tions; and 
(4) improved working relationships. MOUs are specifically designed to assist tile 
parties in their international enforcement efforts and generally allow requests to be 
inade and processed directly between securities atitliorities., 61 
In addition, because most SEC negotiated MOUs do not have a dual 
criminality requirement, they offer an important advantage over mutual 
assistance treaties in insider trading investigations. The SEC has 
negotiated and entered into MOUs with Switzerland, the United 
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Kingdom, Japan, the Canadian provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and British 
Columbia, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands and France. The MOU with 
France deserves special mention. It is entitled the Administrative 
Agreement between the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the Commission des Op6rations de Bourse (COB). It is comprehensive in 
scope and binding in nature, 62 providing that the SEC and the COB may 
use their respective compulsory powers to aid one another in matters 
falling within the scope of the agreement. This provision has required 
national legislation authorising such powers, such as Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), 
which expands the SEC's authority to conduct investigations at the request 
of a foreign securities authority, and by the French law of 2 August 1989, 
which gave the COB. the authority to gather information on behalf of 
foreign securities authorities. As one commentator points out, "this is 
significant because the domestic regulatory authority, in this case the COB, 
is recognising foreign legislative authority, here the SEC, as co-equal with 
or pre-emptive of its own legislative authority with regard to illegal 
behaviour. "63 
The French Agreement illustrates the limitations of mutual 
recognition. The laws and regulations applicable to securities regulation 
are still derived from, and rely on, national political and legal 
mechanisms. 64 On the other hand, the time involved and costs associated 
with negotiating narrow bilateral co-operative agreements are 
considerable. Finally, unless the regulatory regimes involved in reciprocal 
agreements offer certain minimal levels of protection in common areas of 
regulation, there is little basis for mutual recognition as is exemplified by 
the limitations of the U. S. -Swiss co-operative efforts to regulate insider 
trading under the dual criminality requirement. Thus, mutual recognition 
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offers little help in areas where regulatory regimes differ not with regard 
to methods but with regard to the objectives of regulation. 
In today's internationalised securities markets the crime of insider 
trading presents new and difficult challenges to securities regulators. The 
future of effective regulation in this area depends not on extraterritorial 
exertion of national jurisdiction but rather on co-operative regulatory 
efforts. The EC Directive on Insider Dealing is the most advanced example 
of international co-operation in this area. Although it is not a 
supranational regulatory scheme, it is an effective statement of the co- 
ordination and harmonisation of regulatory policy in the area of insider 
trading. As such, it provides a model for future co-operative securities 
regulation efforts in the modern globalised markets. The adoption of 
uniform rules, while desirable from the point of view of regulatory 
certainty and effectiveness, is not realistic in the world as it exists today. 65 
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F. Conclusion 
The two most significant contributions of the Community legislation 
towards the achievement of a common market in the field of investor 
protection are, on the one hand, an increased level of Prudential Re- 
regulation and, on the other, the establishment of Regulatory Harmony. 
Increased Prudential Re-regulation should benefit investors. The EC 
Directives combine numerous safeguards to protect investors from abuse 
through more comprehensive disclosure obligations, thereby promoting 
public confidence in both primary and secondary securities markets. 
Increased public confidence and analysis of corporate disclosures should 
stimulate the development of a stronger retail securities market in 
Europe. These factors. should not only attract and protect investors, but 
also provide them with greater opportunities for portfolio diversification! 
Assessment of risk and allocation of resources should vastly improve due 
to the increased availability of comparable information. The probable 
result of the EC's disclosure rules will be an improvement of investors' 
ability to analyse securities on a transnational basis, previously the major 
obstacle to cross-frontier trading in the common market. 
Corporate issuers and financial intermediaries will be equally 
benefited by the greater transparency and liquidity in the market of 
securities wl-dch prudential re-regulation is due to bring about. 
The second major contribution of the EC's initiatives is the 
Regulatory Harmony resulting from the "supranational accommodation 
of the diverse laws of the individual Member States. ,2 Regulatory 
Harmony provides investors with greater access to the EU securities 
markets. Investment firms seeking to accommodate them will also benefit 
significantly from participation in a larger single market. Reduced 
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regulatory barriers will make the development of pan-European 
distribution system more attractive, and could well stimulate more 
participation in retail markets and more demand for corporate securities. 3 
An overall goal of the EC Directives is to achieve an 
internationalisation of the EU capital markets. Mutual recognition of 
listing particulars and public offer prospectuses within the EU should 
make it easier and cheaper to obtain listings and to make public offerings 
throughout the Community. Corporate issuers may turn to EU securities 
markets as an alternative to United States capital markets to avoid 
disclosure and other requirements. Another purpose of the directives is to 
promote greater competition in the financial services sector and a 
reduction in costs to the consumer, since financial firms can more easily 
establish and sell products in other Member States and can better face 
competition in their Home State because they won't be exposed to unequal 
competition from abroad. 
Positive aspects and deficiencies of the EC Insider Dealing Regulation 
The "zeal to sqiiash insider- trading "4 has been criticised by 
economists. The latter mainly argue that insider dealing can make stock- 
markets work more efficiently and that this can benefit investors as a 
whole. If insiders trade on their information, according to these 
arguments from economic theory, stock prices come to reflect that 
knowledge more accurately and sooner than they would do had the 
insider not traded. More accurate prices mean less of a risk for investors, 
who will then require a smaller reward, or risk-premium, for buying the 
shares. Companies can raise capital more cheaply and invest more 
contributing, thus, to economic growth. 
A logically similar argument could be advanced, however, by a clever 
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thief pointing to the beneficent multiplier effect of his efforts to increase 
the circulation of stolen goods. 5 The two crucial elements in any scheme 
of insider dealing regulation could be inferred from, this analogy: 
firstly, that the structure of the overarching system (whether property 
rights or the integrity of the market) be protected and, secondly, that the 
things being protected (goods or information) are precisely defined to 
include items worthy of protection and exclude those that are unworthy. 
On the first point, if investors lose sufficient faith in the fairness of 
the market, this could have serious financial implications. Fewer 
investors would mean less liquidity and a higher cost of capital. 
Accordingly, the argument that the belief of investors in the fairness of the 
market must be secured seems rather convincing. 
As regards the second point, defining what information is "inside" 
and how to sanction its disclosure is more difficult. Most inside 
information, for instance, falls in the hvilight zone and insiders are often 
simply finding cleverer ways to exploit their knowledge. Well-drawn 
definitions are indispensable for the prosecution of insider dealing. But 
even more important are the sanctions provided for by the legislation. 
"The evidence that Britain's tough criminal prohibitions of insider- 
trading are less effective than America's approach"6 seems to suggest that 
civil sanctions may be more efficient than criminal penalties, at least if 
criminal prohibitions are not effectively enforced. 
The theoretical basis of insider dealing regulation, both on an EU and 
on an international level has evolved from the strictly corporate-company 
protection approach embedded in the fiduciary duty theory to the market 
protection approach and it will most probably evolve towards the 
direction of regulating privileged information. 
The objective of market protection is clearly underlying the EC 
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Insider Dealing Directive. The latter is a compromise text but has, 
nevertheless, promoted understanding among Member States that 
rigorous action should be taken to combat the expansion of insider dealing 
practices. The EC has taken an undeniably positive step towards 
harmonising the insider dealing laws in the EU States. 
The main deficiency of the EC Directive is that it fails to impose 
uniform sanctions for the insider dealing offence. As a result its efficiency 
depends greatly on the severity of sanctions that the Member States have 
adopted. 
The shortcomings of the Insider Dealing Directive are reflected in the 
way the Directive has been implemented by both the British and the Greek 
legislators. 
As regards the Greek jurisdiction, it should be remembered that the 
criminal sanctions chosen by the legislator comprise imprisonment and 
pecuniary penalty. The possible imprisonment sentence (minimum three 
months - maximum five years) can be considered as sufficient deterrent to 
potential offenders, whereas the maximum amount of the fine 
(Drs. 1.000.000.000) has also approached its deterrent objective. The aim of 
the provision has come even closer to its achievement by linking the 
measure of the fine to the amount of illegal profit that was made or the 
loss that was avoided multiplied by five. As far as the prosecution 
procedures are concerned, since no cases brought to court under Article 30 
of Law 1806/1988 or PD 53/92 have been recorded, no overall conclusions 
can be made. Given that the Greek Stock Exchange has come to flourish 
fairly recently, the Greek attempt to implement the EC Insider Dealing 
Directive plays an important role in making all persons involved in stock- 
market transactions sensitive about an abusive and anti-economical 
practice which may hamper the operation of a still unsophisticated 
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market. 
Even in the well-organised and developed London Stock Exchange 
the practice of insider dealing was not illegal until 1980. Until that time "it 
did not occur to City folk that they were cheating". 7 Itwas only in 1985 that 
the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act gave teeth to the law. 8 The 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 which has just come into force, introduces an 
innovation by no longer requiring the "insider" to be connected with the 
company involved. As regards the reactions to this innovation: "The City 
is squealing, saying the new rules could throttle the legitimate workings of 
the market. Worse, they could spell the end of the City lunch. "9 
This broader definition of the insider adopted by the Act reflects the 
international tendency of insider legislation to shift from the company 
law - fiduciary approach, which perceives as insiders persons with 
fiduciary duties, to the financial market approach which sets the 
protection of the integrity of the market as the main priority of the insider 
dealing legislation. The Act has also done away with the requirement that 
the inside information be confidential to the company. Consequently, 
liability can also arise in respect of a broader range of information. 
The wide definition of insider dealing has necessitated the adoption 
of ever more complicated defences that resulted in an increased number of 
loopholes. In that respect the purpose of the legislation is defied. 
The new British Act has mainly failed in altering the sanctions or the 
enforcement procedures. The criticism of the efficiency of criminal law 
sanctions and the possibility of affording the victims of the offence civil 
remedies have been ignored. Closely related to the use of criminal law 
sanctions are the problems of enforcement that the prosecution 
mechanism presents. A combination of the complexity of the offence, the 
inefficiency of the jury system, and the special capabilities of potential 
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offenders increases the likelihood that the prosecution case come to grief 
for technical evidential reasons. 
Both the Greek and the British Insider Dealing legislation have 
avoided questioning the validity of the contract of sale of securities where 
one of the contracting parties commits insider dealing. In other words the 
transaction tainted by insider dealing is neither void nor voidable. In both 
cases the need to protect the certainty of transactions and to avoid 
upsetting the market has prevailed. The unfair results over the victims 
that this solution may have could be counterbalanced by affording civil 
remedies to these individuals. For the Greek jurisdiction this is possible 
under the general clauses of the Civil Code and in view of the possibility 
to bring a civil claim to the Criminal Court. If the British legislature 
adopted substitute civil remedies at a future stage for the aggrieved person 
to take up, this would greatly supplement the penalties available against 
wrongdoers and the objective of the legislation could be better served. 
According to the results of a survey the new insider dealing 
regulations of the U. K. which came into force on March 1 1994 have had 
little impact on the way companies communicate with the City. 10 The 
sample consisted of the top 350 UK companies and a further 150 smaller 
companies with replies received from 177.11 Three quarters of the 
companies surveyed said they had not changed their attitude to the use of 
brokers' lunches and only 14 per cent had altered their approach to 
analysts' briefings. But half said they had changed their opinion on what 
constituted important information that should be communicated through 
the Stock Exchange. The new Act apparently created a, great deal of 
confusion among companies given that more than three quarters 
admitted they were vague or unclear as to the implications for analysts' 
meetings and only half were confident that they knew the implications for 
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conducting a take-over. As regards the popularity of the Stock Exchange's 
suggestion that companies issue quarterly trading statements, only 12 per 0 
cent of companies said they would do so with a further 20 per cent 
considering it. 12 25 per cent admitted they would consider an 
announcement if broker's estimates were out of line with current trading. 
The results of the above survey should not lead to any premature 
conclusions on the merits or demerits of the Criminal justice Act 1993. It is 
obvious that the Act was received by the City with reluctance, if not 
unwillingness, to abide by its provisions. The reason may be found in the 
simple fact that long-established practices of the financial life change very 
slowly and any innovation is bound to be viewed with suspicion at least at 
the beginning. 
The impact of the recent regulatory reforms and the establishment of 
the centralised FSA remains to be tested. 
It has already been suggested that political compromise has limited 
the effectiveness of the EC achievements. This compromise, perhaps 
critical to the succpss of the 1992 programme has necessitated this 
multiplicity of exceptions and exclusions. The choice of the Community 
was: "harmony now" at the price of "discord later. ', 13 The EC has not 
developed the appropriate institutional mechanism to assure the co- 
ordination and enforcement of the regulatory system it has created. While 
regulatory disparities among the Member States still exist, "virtually 
nothing" has been done to harmonise enforcement. The Directives simply 
provide for co-operation among the competent authorities. "Investment 
firms are discovering that the Directives already implemented by EU 
Member States are enforced competently by some and with "nods and 
winks" by others., '14The absence of established disclosure cultures in most 
European states, coupled with the fear of Regulatory Arbitrage may 
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aggravate these disparities. 
The creation of an international securities commission has been 
advocated by many commentators. The Paris Bourse put forward a 
proposal (European List) to members of the Federation of the Stock 
Exchanges in the EU for a common European listing of the major 250 to 
300 European stocks. 15 The proposal is in essence that, while each market 
would preserve its own procedures and set its own prices for such stocks, 
the documents and information to be provided by the companies on the 
List would be standardised and a network would be developed both to 
inform the national markets of decisions on the stocks and to relay prices. 
Further, there would be no special procedures to obtain such a Listing and, 
in principle, no extra fee payable. 
The International Stock Exchange in London has put forward its own 
proposals for an integrated European securities market. The proposals 
focus on the wholesale, rather than the retail, market, on the theory that 
the needs of the professional and institutional investor are different from 
those of the retail investor. The proposal for the European Wholesale 
Market (EWM) would involve a separate electronic marketplace for 
shares, based upon the ISE's SEAQ trading system, which would be 
integrated initially with the wholesale markets in Frankfurt, Paris and 
Amsterdam. The proposal also requires cross-frontier settlement systems. 
EWM membership would be open to any firm with membership on 
an EU or other eligible stock exchange. Enforcement will be the 
responsibility of the member's national exchange or other regulatory 
authority. 16 The above proposals although dictated by the same necessities 
do not seem compatible. 
The problems of enforcement of the Insider Dealing Regulations at a 
European and an International level are aggravated by the "international" 
I 
-276- 
nature of the offence. The efforts of the EC as represented by the Council of 
Europe Convention on Insider Trading or the Council of Europe 
Convention on extradition have not been particularly successful judging 
by the relatively low take-up that both have had. The problem of 
extradition of insider dealing offenders which is of the utmost importance 
for the enforcement of any insider dealing legislation has not been solved 
so far. 
Perhaps the most advanced effort in international co-operation in the 
area of Insider Dealing Regulation is the EC Directive. It has succeeded in 
co-ordinating and harmonising the regulatory policy of Member States in 
the area of insider dealing. It has already been stated that it can provide a 
model for future co-operative securities regulation efforts in the modern 
globalised markets. 
Regulating insider dealing could be dubbed as "the art of the 
possible". No matter how sophisticated rules will be devised or how many 
financial and legal experts will be recruited by supervisory authorities no 
paradise of informational equality can be created. A City professional glued 
to a computer screen will always get the crucial information before the 
notorious aunt Agatha in the country. 
The modest aim of the present study was to examine briefly the main 
provisions of the principal measures of community legislation regarding 
the regulation of insider dealing with a view to protecting investors. 
The Community's work on the regulation of dealing in securities has 
been inspired by two major concerns: 
- to ensure the smooth operation of Member States' stock exchanges, 
and 
- to promote a greater interpenetration of national markets in 
securities. 
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In order to do so, the Community Institutions took the view that it 
would be necessary to guarantee a minimum Community level of 
investor protection, through harmonised disclosure requirements, what 
the Commission terms "information policy". This policy got off to a rather 
slow start. 
More recently, and particularly since the entry into force of the Single 
European Act and the sudden progress of Community legislation on the 
free movement of capital, the Council has made fairly substantial progress 
in certain areas the sufficiency of which in the long term remains, 
however, to be seen. 
Looking forward, the possibility of common European listings, a 
shared information distribution system, the electronic linkage of stock 
exchanges and eventually, a common European securities market, all 
reflect a trend towards internationalisation of the EU securities markets. 17 
Regulatory harmony could prove fragile. The emergent Single 
Market for securities and investment services could be better preserved by 
centralised co-ordination and enforcement which may prove an essential 
18 component of the EU's legislative programme. The formation of a 
European Securities Commission with an aim of promoting regulatory 
standards within the EU could prove to be the cornerstone of investor 
protection in the Community. 
Those concerned in the accomplishment of a Single Market from the 
point of view of investor protection should, above all, refrain from any 
resting on laurels, but continue incessantly their efforts. 
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5 idem 
6 idem 




10 David Wighton, "New dealing regulations have little impact", Financial Times, 
Tuesday August 30,1994, p. 2 
11 idern 
12 idern 
13 "1992 Survey", Econoinist 
14 Warren, supra note 1, from an interview with Andrew Peck, solicitor with Linklaters & 
Paines, in London. (8 November 1988) 
1-5 Press release of Federation of Stock Exchanges in the European Community, Copenhagen - 
18 May 1990 
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(available upon request from the International Stock Exchange) 
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